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i 
Abstract 
The trajectory of the Taiwanese economy over past decades has reflected transitions in 
global geo-economy towards a vertical specialisation of global trade, knowledge-based 
competition, variation of industrialisation in the Third World, regional trisection of the 
world economy, etc. Its industry, making remarkable progress based on a long-term 
national assistance, is involved in the outward direct investment whereby overseas 
production is arranged. Such strategic actions of industrial capital slice through national 
boundaries and, meanwhile, incorporate state-business relationships on a broader scale 
at a national level. The thesis seeks to portray the transnationalisation of the Taiwanese 
IC sector through its specific organisational processes and spatial dynamics with an aim 
to understanding the way that indigenous firms are associated with the home state and 
the convergence of IC production systems on subnational, transnational and global 
scales. This work finds that the outward expansion of the IC industrial capital reflects a 
spatial trend converging on China, the Yangtze River Delta in particular, owing to a 
reshuffle of the global electronic production chain. However, flow of capital and 
material along the chain across the Taiwan Strait move along a circuitous route. It also 
finds that a persistent inter-state feud accounts for the domestic debates over the 
westward investment of the IC capital. There is tension between the neo-liberalist logic 
of business practices and national intervention in a guided capitalist stance. It underlines 
the conflicts of imperative territoriality. On the one hand, the firms recognise the 
necessity of stretching industrial territories to the Mainland in consideration of sectoral 
competitiveness. On the other hand, what the state is concerned with lies not only in the 
impacts of industrial de-territorialisation upon domestic industries but also in the result 
of over-dependence upon China that would incorporate national economy into economic 
territories of the Great China Circle.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION: AN EPITOME OF A GLOBAL SHIFT? 
1.1  A highway to the world 
The Sun Yat-sen [Freeway] is … the highway of globalization … the key 
70-km stretch starts in Taipei’s booming new Neihu district of high-tech 
office buildings and ends in Hsinchu ... Along the way, the Sun Yat-sen 
[Freeway] leads to some of the most important but anonymous tech 
outfits in the world … You’ll also find Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co., the biggest chip foundry on the planet, an essential 
partner to US companies such as Qualcomm and Nvidia. Dozens more 
companies dot the Neihu-Hsinchu corridor. There’s AU Optronics, a big 
supplier of liquid-crystal display panels, and Hon Hai Precision Industry, 
which makes everything from PC components to Sony’s PlayStation 2, 
and which is a fast-rising rival to Flextronics International, the world’s 
biggest contract manufacturer. Taken together, the revenues of Taiwan’s 
25 key tech companies should hit $122 billion this year. 
(Business Week May 16th 2005) 
By the late 1960s an economic recession had begun to sweep through most 
Western economies as a consequence of a sea change in Western capitalist 
accumulation (Amin 1994). The fading Fordist regime, combined with a demise of 
the Keynesian governance, was, however, propitious for the Asian Tiger 
economies – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – as it created an 
opportunity for them to improve their export performance. Certainly, the Tigers had 
favourable advantages in their own right – a disposable and low-waged labour 
2 
market,1 so that they enjoyed considerable capital inflow and technological import 
by devoting themselves to a sub-contracting role within emerging global production 
systems (The World Bank 1993) (Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1  Multi-thrusts to the Tiger Economies: A prototype 
Industrialisation in what was previously the Third World “is a problem of 
raising productivity and creating international competitiveness, not effective 
demand” (Amsden 1990: 10, emphasis original). A rapid growth of the Tiger 
Economies, followed by the second-tiered NIEs from Southeast Asia, recast the 
international division of labour (Henderson 1989). Some even went so far as to claim 
                                                 
1
 It was, ironically, on a basis of ‘bloody Taylorization’ constituted by self-exploitation (Lipietz 1982), 
so as to meet a demand of transnational corporations (TNCs) for organisational flexibility.  
Achievement of 
late-industrialisation 
National export-oriented 
policy 
TNCs’ international 
division of labour 
Learning dynamics of local 
firms via sub-contracting 
production 
The ascendance of flexible accumulation 
Acting directly 
Acting indirectly 
3 
that the Third World had ended with the burgeoning Asian economic boom (Harris 
1987). The Asian NIEs, to which China has been added of late, have now joined 
Japan to form a formidable Asian economic bloc. This modified the global map of 
economic power – the tri-polar structure is now comprised of Europe, North America 
and East and Southeast Asia (called Asia for short hereafter).  
This brief review outlines a general trajectory through Taiwan, and its 
neighbours, have undergone a global shift (Dicken 2003) in their productive capacity. 
The clustering of high-technology activity along the Sun Yat-sen Freeway can 
arguably be described as an industrial district – a constellation of sectorally-relevant 
production activities and services assembled in a single locality or region. This Sun 
Yat-sen district is a well reputed area for it maintains a position of considerable 
significance in the global electronic sector (Mathews 1997; Hsu 2005). The success 
of the high-technology district has not occurred by chance. Rather, the area has been 
incubated purposively through state intervention since the mid-1970s. The 
government made a great effort to update industrial competence in the area by 
ensuring that the early labour-based global competitive advantage of the firms 
located there was enhanced by capital- and intellectual-intensive investments (Hsueh, 
Hsu et al. 2001).  
4 
However, the story of this ‘highway’ is more than a paragon of one 
territorially-confined industrial park manifesting attainments of industrial upgrading 
among choice regions in East and Southeast Asia. As the business press describes it, 
“[t]his stretch of road [i.e. the Sun Yat-sen Freeway] is how you reach the companies 
that connect the vast marketplaces and digital powerhouses of the US with the 
enormous manufacturing centers of China” (Business Week May 16th 2005). It is 
certain that flexibility of corporate adaptation to globalising tendencies contributes 
significantly to the extra-local productive connections regarding the specific market 
of electronics besides the active role of the state in transforming the economy from a 
position of underdevelopment (Amsden and Chu 2003; Berger and Lester 2005). The 
entrepreneurship of Taiwanese firms, if not unique among their Asian counterparts, 
may be particularly representative of the potential of the Asian NIEs to compete 
within the global Triad (Dicken and Yeung 2002; Higgott 2002; Yeung 2006). This 
thesis is concerned with a distinct trajectory that shows how the quality of a 
territorial ensemble evolves with industrial practices of trans-local linkages in an era 
of globalisation. This facet refers to the relevance of the regional economy to the 
deep integration of the contemporary global economy which “is pervasive and 
involves the production of goods and services in cross-border value-adding activities 
5 
that refines the kind of production processes contained within national boundaries” 
(Gereffi 2005: 163).  
Within this thesis the spatial outreach of Taiwan’s regional high-technology 
cluster is used as a key point of departure to underline an endogenous dynamism that 
shows how indigenous firms2 growing out of a late-industrialised country act on 
‘globalising regional development’ (Coe, Hess et al. 2004; Yeung 2006). My 
analysis of the path of economic improvement in Taiwan is industry-specific. 
Industrial sectors in Taiwan have moved at different speeds, in large part because 
Taiwan’s economic growth has been led by the strategic industries that are identified 
and fostered by national policy.  
                                                 
2
 In my analysis, I do not see those domestic firms as numerous individual establishments but, rather, 
as a group of collective actors acting along the IC production chain. This is to highlight their collective 
power: at a level of industrial operation, Taiwanese IC industry is run in a form of coalition on the 
base of vertical disintegration and, at a level of value creation, Taiwanese firms exercise a 
countervailing power on national agents to advance economic autonomy and business interests in a 
course of cross-Strait production (see Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002).  
6 
1.2  The chips: Cross-Strait production and a discontinuous 
territoriality  
The illustration above serves as a starting point to develop my concerns with the 
transnational behaviours of domestic firms, which are situated in contextual 
specialities of one late-industrialised state, Taiwan. I attempt to shed light on the 
research objectives by placing emphasis on the geographies of the integrated circuit 
(IC) industry – ICs are products and are generally called ‘chips’. The selection of the 
IC industry is justified on multiple grounds, as outlined below.  
(1) ICs are viewed as the key components of electronics commodities (Castells 1996) 
due to their capabilities of implementing the functions of electronics goods. 
Sophisticated IC technology is also of great consequence to the military and the 
aerospace industry.3 To a certain degree, high-technology industry is politically 
sensitive. It signals so-called technonationalism “which treats technology as a 
commercial and strategic asset to be nurtured and kept at home” (Stevens 1990: 44). 
For example, in the US, the migration of the chip manufacturing sector to East Asia 
                                                 
3
 For example, a ‘Star-War Initiative’, announced by the US in 1983, was a technology project for 
wagon development applying the IC technology to weaponry. 
7 
has been highlighted as a potential strategic danger by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, on the grounds that the 
DoD [Department of Defense] and [US] intelligence services will lose 
both first access and assured access to secure advanced chip-making 
capability, at the same time that these components are becoming a crucial 
defense technology advantage … relying on integrated circuits fabricated 
outside the US (e.g. in China, Taiwan and Singapore) is not an acceptable 
national security option.  
(Lieberman 2003: 2) 
(2) The utilisation of IC technology is not confined to strategic purposes; not every 
country contains the advanced technological capacity for an armament race after all. 
The alternative IC significance demands attention by virtue of its economic value to 
consumer electronics, which is the main concern in this thesis. The IC technology 
was not commercialised until the middle of the twentieth century, and was once 
controlled by electronic monopolies, such as Fairchild, Intel, Texas Instruments (TI), 
etc. The international value of the industry reached US$255.6 billion in 2007 
according to the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS).  
(3) The trajectory of the IC sector is towards vertical disintegration, and an uneven 
spatial dispersion on an international scale. Specifically, a dynamic and 
ever-expanding industrial promotion of the sector in the Asian NIEs has facilitated 
such developments. The dynamics of the macro-regional economy have been 
8 
well-documented under a theory-inflected analysis of the (new) international division 
of labour (Henderson 1986; Scott 1986; Scott and Angel 1988; Henderson 1989; 
Hobday 1991) The geographical experience of the IC industrialisation at the 
international (or, to be precise, interregional) level will be outlined in Chapter 
Three.  
For Taiwan, the indigenous IC industry is outward oriented. Its development is 
based on the export of multitudinous electronic goods. Numerous firms have 
embarked upon ‘strategic asset-acquiring investment’ (Dunning 1998) to obtain 
state-of-the-art technologies and/or have sought closer access to international 
customers in advanced countries through foreign direct investment (FDI), strategic 
alliances, and merger and acquisition (M&A) (Chang, Shih et al. 1994; Saxenian and 
Hsu 2001; Breznitz 2005; Fuller 2005). More recently, the firms have sought to open 
branch offices or production lines in China, which turned into the third-largest and 
fastest-growing IC market during the late 1990s. The investment trend spanning the 
Taiwan Strait (or ‘the Strait’ from now on) is the central focus of substantial study in 
this thesis.  
Taiwanese IC firms became enthusiastic about external expansion over the past 
15-20 years. Such firms may be described as developing country transnational 
9 
corporations (TNCs) (Yeung 1994) given that the “co-ordinat[e] production from 
one centre of strategic decision making … takes [them] across national boundaries” 
(Cowling and Sugden 1987: 60). Literature on this kind of TNCs illustrates that the 
firms are used to channelling investment to neighbouring developing countries. Often, 
spatial and cultural proximity and the benefits of regional solidarity are regarded as 
determining this (Heenan and Keegan 1979; O'Brien 1980; Chen 1983; Wells 1983; 
Yeung 1994; Gangopadhyay 1998; Miotti and Sachwald 2002; UNCTD 2002). The 
geographical proximity represents a unique spatial characteristic in which industrial 
capital from late-industrialised states is deployed. This spatial distribution is 
correspondent with the embodiment of (trans-border) regionalisation so that 
accelerating economic tie-ups organised by Taiwanese investors cross the Strait (Jou 
and Chen 2001).  
There has been much literature dealing with the agency of foreign investment 
from the advanced economy on the industrialisation of the less developed countries. 
This work often focuses upon the TNCs of the advanced economy. The ‘highly 
politicized nature of MNE-institution relations’ (Phelps 2000) reveals that ‘invested 
places’ are often under the sway of external forces through the influence of TNCs 
(Cooke 1996; Braczyk, Cooke et al. 1998; MacKinnon and Phelps 2001). A very 
limited number of studies have focused on firm-government tensions with regard to 
10 
firms from the developing countries; and even fewer have explored the institutional 
dynamics between ‘run-away’ firms and their home states.4 Empirical research into 
the westward advance of Taiwan-based IC firms is concerned with matters of 
strategic contradiction, and the extent to which this provides a lens through which to 
view the cross-border activities of firms and the developmental implications of this.  
The IC industrial cluster of north Taiwan reaches out to the world, and this 
represents one facet of globalisation that “the scale of economic activity no longer 
corresponds to the territory of the nation-state; [instead,] it is global and 
transnational” (Hirst 1997: 409). By and large, the majority of the IC productive 
capacity emanating from Taiwan has been located in China, which is ironic given 
China’s hostility towards Taiwan’s sovereignty (Wang 2007). What has been 
described as the ‘go-west tendency’ creates a discontinuous territoriality of strategic 
actions as indigenous capital gets involved with production systems of global reach 
                                                 
4
 Yeung’s work on the regionalisation of Singaporean firms offers one pre-eminent exception (Yeung 
1998). The case study situates the operation of outward investment in a framework of 
collusion-and-rivalry interaction between the firms and the state (Pitelis 1991; Pitelis 1993). 
Analytically, it is significant to associate specific political economy with the formation of an 
entrepreneurial state in Singapore and the embeddedness of the firms in the entrepreneurial nature of 
institutions. There is an implication that suggests the significance of recognising the characteristics of 
nationally differentiated and locally embedded ‘business systems’ (Whitley 1996) in association with 
the dynamics of strategic behaviours that the firms develop for transnational actions (Dicken 2000). 
11 
which slice through national boundaries (Sassen 2000; Dicken and Malmberg 2001; 
Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Sassen 2003). It is politics of economic 
territorialisation occurring at the conjuncture of two empirical grounds. One is an 
industrial dimension on a global scale, embodied by a deepening international 
division of labour in organisational and spatial terms; another draws upon 
nation-specific regulation and points to the institutional features found in 
developmental trajectories of late-industrialised East Asian countries. A crux of the 
contestation of territoriality refers to the dynamic relationships between corporate 
and state actors where firms take the initiative in taking “control of the production 
system and the relative distribution of the costs and benefits associated with its 
operation” (Dicken 1994: 103). 
In light of geographical concerns with corporate behaviour, attention is paid to 
the firm-environment relationship, which is “to position business enterprises within 
their proper structural context; to conceptualize them as being truly endogenous to 
the capitalist production system (rather than exogenous)” (Dicken and Thrift 1992: 
284, emphasis original). It is distinguished from the economic and organisational 
stances of conventional FDI theories5 that lean towards viewing the firm as an 
                                                 
5
 Such as the market imperfections approach, the product life-cycle model or the eclectic paradigm.  
12 
individual unit of analysis, which is separated from the broader socio-economic 
contexts. The geographical perspective on analysing firms’ locational 
decision-making stresses the dynamics that provoke investors to act and respond to 
the contexts of environments which are economically, culturally or/and 
institutionally constituted at multiple geographical levels.  
Three environmental contexts are idiosyncratically tackled in relation to 
Taiwanese IC firms’ westward investment, including socio-economic practices of 
cross-local industrial connections, politico-economic entanglements at 
(inter-)national levels and spatio-organisational evolution of a global production 
network. It is argued that  
the nature of TNCs as highly embedded interacting networks [are] 
involved in competitive struggles in which a diversity of competitive 
strategies is used. Such strategies are, themselves, the outcome of 
contested power relations both inside the firm and, externally, with the 
constellation of institutions (including the state) with which TNCs 
interact. 
(Dicken 1994: 106) 
At this point, the central implication of these contexts to corporate behaviours that I 
stress does not lie in hierarchical division of spatial scales per se but in 
contextualities of scalar intermingling in which interactions between corporate and 
state actors are embedded. The main concern in the thesis centred upon the 
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geographies of the cross-Strait investment/production entails looking into tension and 
negotiation generated by agencies of transnationalising and regulating economic 
activities. However, although attention is paid to domestic debates on industrial 
transplantation, the analysis focuses upon a more complex power play of triangular 
relationships between Taiwanese IC firms, the Taiwanese Government and the 
Chinese Government. It does so on a range of spatial scales.  
The objectives are contextually situated, while I attempt to tease out complexity 
and structural necessity of the objectives by asking the following research questions:  
1. How did Taiwanese IC firms insert themselves into the global IC 
production chain?  
2. What mechanisms are responsible for the corporate arrangement of 
production operations across the Strait?  
3. How are the trans-local industrial systems articulated in the face of the 
institutional variables at national level?  
The following targets are clarified for the purpose of achieving the research 
objectives: 
• to review the growing path of the IC industry in Taiwan; 
• to probe peculiar features of the local industrial system at home 
base; 
• to analyse mechanisms of transplanting production to China;  
• to examine the state and firms’ stances on the go-west 
investment; 
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• to interpret the strategic discourses constricted by the firms and 
the state respectively;  
• to outline the presence of production reorganisation across the 
Strait. 
1.3  Structure of the thesis  
Considering that the dynamics of production systems are central to the research 
questions, I think it appropriate to enter the study via the idea of a production chain 
analysis (Walker 1988; Dicken and Thrift 1992; Gereffi 2005). The chain framework 
set out in Chapter Two primarily builds upon work on global commodity chains 
(GCCs). I will first lay out their characteristics and discuss the economic linkages 
that exist between developed and developing countries. I will then explore criticisms 
levelled at the analytical rigidity of this work, particularly questions about the 
unidirectional logic of linear chains and their geographical implications. I will draw 
insight from network-inspired work in recent geographical research to argue for an 
acknowledgment of multi-stranded connections between various sets of actors on 
spatial scales. In other words, the chain/network metaphor employed as a vehicle for 
assessing industrial reorganisation derives from the analytical framework of the GCC 
approach, combined with theoretical insight of new economic geographies in looking 
into social foundations of economic behaviours and their spatial demonstrations.  
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Chapter Three is a preface to the analysis of the substantial focus in the thesis, 
outlining the methods employed to determine how the ‘go-west strategy’ has evolved 
among Taiwanese IC firms. The chapter is a self-critical stance of my attempt to 
understand the perspective of corporate actors. Tensions exist between rational 
abstractions and the subjective reporting of motivations. Specifically, the 
methodological difficulty of gaining access to corporate informants during my 
fieldwork will be critically reflected upon given the political economic dilemma 
facing both domestic firms and the Taiwanese Government.  
The focus in Chapters Four to Seven will shift to an examination of the 
substantial research conducted into the cross-Strait organisation of the Taiwanese IC 
industry. Chapter Four begins with an illustration of the IC manufacturing 
procedures from a division-of-labour viewpoint. It identifies how the divisible nature 
of production components and a technological tendency of miniaturisation lead to 
diversification of input-output systems. It will be argued that the global IC 
production network has seen a discernible reshuffle regarding organisational 
flexibility. In turn, I seek to capture the globalising dynamics that have incorporated 
Taiwan into an evolutionary international division of labour and, by doing so, to find 
out the industrial niche within which the Taiwanese IC industry is located.  
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In Chapter Five I sketch out the industrial path of Taiwan’s IC sector. The 
chapter explores industrial governance within the industrial districts of the 
Taiwanese IC industry. I examine the economic landscape of agglomeration, and the 
‘sticky’ nature of sectorally-specific production systems. The analysis will highlight 
the organisational, intellectual and virtual linkages that extend the spatial scope of 
the indigenous firms’ reach, and ensure that production sites become nodes of global 
connectivity for social relations.  
Two successive chapters will concentrate upon the corporate decisions to ‘go 
west’ and the material actions taken to arrange cross-Strait production. The analysis 
in Chapter Six is at a domestic level, pointing to the impact of a state-firm chasm 
that complicates the geographies of cross-Strait linkages and organisational 
arrangements: economic integration with China challenges the State’s insistency on 
national jurisdiction over production. Chapter Seven examines the impacts of 
firm-place relationships upon the ways in which the cross-Strait IC chains are 
deployed. My discussion first revolves around how the firms rationalise the 
‘go-west’ imperative of transplanting production. The ownership-specific advantages 
of the Taiwanese IC firms and the location-specific advantages of China (on national 
and subnational scales) are combined to affect a westward tendency of capital flow 
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and organisational extension. The geographies of industrial reorganisation in light of 
the multi-site operation will be explained.  
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis. I will first sum up general observations 
about the spatial process of industrial reorganisation and its concomitant tensions. 
Following this, I outline the implications of the transnational corporate strategies and 
practices that complicate the state-business equilibrium of Taiwan’s developmental 
statist model. Finally, I go on to suggest some possible research agendas emerging 
from this thesis for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
ANALYSING TRANSNATIONAL PRODUCTION 
2.1  Introduction: A metaphor of chains 
The international division of labour in the current era of globalisation is unique 
in light of “the functional integration of internationally dispersed activities” (Dicken 
2003: 12; Gereffi 2005), and is distinctive from the previous scenario which saw the 
spatial expansion of economic activities across national boundaries in a less 
integrative way. In other words, it is “the nature rather than the extent of trade” 
(Kaplinsky 2001: 124) that is in transition. Cross-border production networks for 
parts and components are formed in the wake of increasing exports whereby various 
industrial outputs produced in developing countries are shipped to developed 
countries (Gordon 1988; Hummels, Rapaport et al. 1990). In a sense, “access to 
developed country markets has become increasingly dependent on participating in 
global production networks led by firms based in developed countries” (Gereffi 2005: 
178, Note 20). Along with this intra-industry trade is an overt tendency towards 
vertical disintegration of organisational patterns on a worldwide basis, which makes 
for tangled production chains. An understanding of economic divergence and 
convergence regarding organisation and geography is available via anatomising “the 
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process [by which] production systems are ‘cut up’ and ‘put back together’” (Walker 
1988: 378). This suggests that a chain metaphor is valuable in my attempts to 
identify an evolutionary trajectory in firms’ efforts to consolidate trans-local 
production territories, and will endeavour to explore its theoretical association with 
‘nodes in the global networks’ (Amin and Thrift 1992).  
In this chapter I will first take the approach of global commodity chains (GCCs) 
since it provides an accessible way of thinking about extensive and reorganised 
manufacturing systems. The rationale of the GCC approach is outlined in Section 2.2. 
The power dynamics and the extent to which corporate actors involve themselves in 
the global economy are discussed in the first part of Section 2.3. The second part 
moves on to the industrialisation of the Third World, revolving around the 
technology of Asian NIEs in relation to the territoriality of industrial organisations. 
The theoretical review will also draw attention to several conceptual drawbacks 
which limit the analytical capability of the commodity chain approach. Certain 
disjunctures will be explored and reworked in the following sections so as to make 
the framework more integrated. Section 2.4 questions a rigid distinction that 
dichotomises industrial systems, with reference to corporate capacities to control, or 
adjust to, changing patterns of production externalisation. Following this, Section 2.5 
identifies the significance of chain formats and regulatory involvements by teasing 
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out the way they are reflected in the geographical literature. This is an attempt to 
rework the chain framework to augment its explanatory potential.  
2.2  Essentials of GCC analysis  
The use of the idea of the chain in economic analysis is primarily as a heuristic 
metaphor to describe “a transactionally linked sequence of functions” in which each 
stage “adds value to the process of production” (Dicken and Thrift 1992: 284). 
Dicken (1994) points to the systems of the production chain at three levels (Figure 
2.1). The first level is a primary continuation of segmented manufacturing activities. 
A simple procedure indicates the input-output system where economic components 
flow in a physical medium. The second refers to a technological level. Input of a 
variety of technological processes along the chain determines the functional 
performances of the individual tasks and their ‘transactional links’ as a whole. The 
third level draws upon a broader production environment (e.g. financial basis and 
regulatory settings) in which the production chain works. This constitutes 
policy-related grounds that condition how the production chain is capitalised and 
coordinated.  
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Figure 2.1  The production chain 
Source: Based on (Dicken 1994: 104, Figure 1) 
Material Procurement Transformation Marketing & Sales Distributio Service 
M. P. T. M. & S. D. S. 
Technology / Research & development  
(product design, process technology, logistic of procurement / distribution) 
Transport & communications processes  
(movement of materials, products, people, information) 
Level 
Level 
Level 
Financial system 
Regulation, co-ordination, control 
M. P. T. M. & S. D. S. 
Technology / Research & development 
Transport & communications processes 
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Three components of the production chain in nature are salient in terms of their 
analytical importance (Kaplinsky 2001): (1) systematic efficiency: integral elements 
are completed in a reasonable and efficient order; (2) rent reeking: the chain collects 
material and non-material sets of productive cells to produce commodities for 
profit-making (Storper and Harrison 1991), and (3) organisational coordination: 
some degree of governance acts to enable the chain to function well and to 
appropriate profits. The chain approach has been widely applied in economic 
geography, economic sociology, development studies and business management to 
understand the “(dis)organization of economic activity and value creation, 
appropriation and distribution” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 41), “around which the 
organisational fabric of the economy may be wrapped” (Walker 1988: 380). An 
analysis of global commodity chains (GCCs), which has been developed by Gereffi 
et al. since the mid-1990s, is an answer to the question, “what is the appropriate 
organizational field to use in studying economic globalization?” (Gereffi 1996: 436). 
A working definition of a commodity chain is “a network of labour and 
production processes whose end results is a finished commodity” (Hopkins and 
Wallerstein 1986: 159). It was first proposed in Hopkins and Wallerstein’s work on 
theorising a complex division of labour which has been developed on a world scale 
since the early modern era. The chain concept was developed to identify “the loci of 
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the sources of value in the final product” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986: 160) by 
tracing production procedures of one commodity backwards to primary inputs. Major 
productive operations, involved with the output of goods or services, are designated 
as discrete nodes. The organisational relevance of production and its locational 
features are addressed by looking at an integrating process in which production 
nodes are functionally linked. The way to depict the constitution of chains suggests 
an efficient method to unfold “the functional integration and coordination of 
internationally dispersed activities” in a sectorally-specific sense (Gereffi 1999: 4). 
The commodity chain analysis thus “provides a useful antidote to the problems of 
overgenerality” (Mort and Thompson 1994: 109).  
Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, edited by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
(1994), extends this chain notion to a concrete new global manufacturing system, 
which is increasingly characterised by an extension across organisational and 
national boundaries.  Founded upon the reconstituting of industrial systems, three 
fundamental elements are particularly identified by Gereffi. First, an input-output 
system, which is “a set of the products and services linked together in a sequence of 
value-adding economic activities” (Gereffi 1994: 97). Second, a sense of territoriality, 
which is concerned with “where different stages of production actually take place” 
(Clancy 1998: 125), and with the spatial patterns that a chain of interconnected 
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activities, nodes and flows produce. Third, a governance structure, which is an 
organisational aspect that involves the exercise of authorities and power relationships 
in determining allocation and flow of resources and returns in the “contractual 
linkages of formally independent firms” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 396). Theorisation 
of the dimension of governance has only been partially addressed to date, with more 
attention being paid to the power dynamics of organisational shifts within the global 
sourcing system (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi 1999; Gereffi 2001; Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
2005).  
There are two types of governance structures formulated in Gereffi’s writings. 
One is producer-driven GCCs, referring to the internationalisation of industrial 
capital, e.g. automobiles and semiconductors. Another is buyer-driven GCCs, related 
to trade-led industrialisation, with apparel, footwear and agro-food industries being 
particularly good examples. Entry barriers to producer-driven chains are the 
large-scale, high-technology manufacturing facilities required for mass production. 
Large, and usually transnational, manufacturers play a dominant role in driving this 
sort of chain. They can afford to engage in heavy investment and so capture 
technological access to products and processing innovation. As they increasingly 
focus upon core production competencies, multilayered manufacturing systems are 
structured by outsourcing marginal segments. The externalising process blurs “the 
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organizational boundaries of vertically integrated corporations” (Gereffi, 
Korzeniewicz et al. 1994: 7) and has gone alongside an international extension of 
manufacturing chains. Organisational methods are another barrier to entry possessed 
by producer-driven chains, which are required to assure output reliability, quality 
control, inventory reduction, etc.  
Buyer-driven chains are dominated by commercial capital, such as retail brands, 
and are distinct from the producer-driven chains in their barriers to entry in as much 
as they are relatively low. Manufacturing activities in buyer-driven chains are subject 
to being subcontracted to suppliers which are usually located in low-wage, 
developing countries. Such production systems are decentralised in organisation and 
competitive in price. In comparison, the parts of these chains with higher barriers of 
entry refer to design and marketing activities linked to brands, so that the extraction 
of value from buyer-driven chains is highest in acts of consumption as opposed to 
production. The key agents dominating the buyer-driven chains are international 
buyers, including brand owners and retailers. They act as ‘producers without 
factories’ – Nike is a typical case (Austin, Aguilar et al. 1990; Donaghu and Barff 
1990) – to play a pivotal role in leveraging global sourcing to meet the mass 
consumption market they shape.  
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2.3  A concern with industrial ‘upgrading’  
The GCC approach is an alternative to both the development agenda and to 
conventional state-centric analyses – these tend to either cleave to a neo-classical 
perspective affirming domestic policies to “[get] relative prices right” (Amsden 1990: 
6) or to a view of state intervention that sees states as manipulating the forces behind 
the market (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). Gereffi’s commodity-centric perspective is 
involved with trade-led production. Its analytical focus upon transnationally 
economic linkages of individual sectors offers a systematic vehicle in explanation for 
how some countries are able to move out of an underdeveloped status. That is, the 
prosperity of domestic economies is situated within international divisions of labour 
in relation to geographic specialisation and global sourcing (Gereffi 1997).  
2.3.1  Profit and power 
The intellectual aspects of the GCC paradigm stem from the political economy 
of the world-system approach. It belongs to the realm of development studies, 
broadly defined. Similar to development studies, the GCC literature has a core 
concern with how lead agents dominate international trade and industry and how 
subordinate ones are incorporated into, or excluded from, the world economy. But 
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the GCC approach diverges from its theoretical antecedents in many aspects (Gereffi 
1997; Gibbon 2001; Bair 2005).  
A central interest of world-system theory is a hierarchical division of the 
modern world. Its primary attention to economic patterns is national in scope, which 
is predicated on the basis of a tripartite world-system. In comparison, Gereffi and 
colleagues describe GCCs as an analytical approach to understanding the global 
economy and endeavour to develop an organisational approach in order to “forge the 
macro-micro links between processes that are generally assumed to be discretely 
contained within global, national, and local units of analysis” (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz 
et al. 1994: 2). In addition, the differences are underlain by diverse experiences of 
sectoral and regional objects. Roughly speaking, development studies are mainly 
focused upon primary commodity-based industries in Latin America, while 
manufacturing activities in East Asia provide the GCC literature with rich evidence 
(Gibbon 2001). One particular question about “the opportunities and constraints 
presented by the forms of global integration of production and trade in specific 
commodities” (Gibbon 2001: 345) is posed to avoid a fatalistic attitude towards 
unbalanced economic processes. It considers globally organised linkages of 
production and distribution systems among developed and developing countries (cf. 
Harris 1987). Under a rubric of economic globalisation, direct attention is paid to 
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“the possibilities (and limitations) of economic upgrading for developing countries 
offered by special markets” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 391; and see Gereffi, 
Humphrey et al. 2005).  
Profits condition economic power and monopoly conditions profits. The profits 
are associated with a concentration of productive resources wrested by lead agents 
from weaker competitors. The GCC literature argues that the power lead agents are 
able to leverage along the chains influences the profits they make. But the inclusion 
of power dynamics in the GCCs formulated by Gereffi et al. is on the basis of the 
manifest structural changes of economic activities which become spatially dispersed 
but organisationally integrated. This economic transformation corresponds to an 
overt tendency towards vertical disintegration. This involves: (1) an increasing 
degree of production fragmentation (Arndt and Kiezkowski 2001); (2) an 
internationalising and networking trend of inter-firm deployment (Dicken, Kelly et al. 
2001; Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002) and (3) the effects of knowledge exchange and 
learning in decentralising business networks (Amin and Cohendet 1999; Brown and 
Duguid 2001). At an organisational level, “the coordination and control of 
global-scale production systems … can be achieved without direct ownership” 
(Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005: 81).  
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This includes a revised understanding of the generation of profits from the 
previous position – i.e. volume outputs are sources of profit – towards a concern 
about productive inputs of scarce assets. It incorporates a Schumpeterian view of 
quality competition regarding a primary perception of where and how economic 
resources and wealth are allocated. The profits are roughly divided into different 
levels of value creation which determine economic power. Higher value-added 
activities are signalled by dynamic progresses of improving efficiency, quality and 
reliability and diminishing risks. The lead agents can achieve these productive targets 
due to their advantages in “proprietary technology, product differentiation, brand 
reputation, customer relations and constant industrial upgrading” (Gereffi, 
Korzeniewicz et al. 1994: 6) and the fact that strategic alliances between leading 
firms have been increasing in technology-driven agreements. In short, the way to 
establish control and value in production chains is through technological 
advancement and the redefinition of organisational boundaries. 
In the current economic regime, profits accrue mainly from the innovative edges 
of production, rather than from large manufacturing runs and labour productivity. 
The economic coordination of “a specialization of core tasks and capacity within 
lead firms and the externalization of peripheral tasks and capacity to contractors or 
other economic organizations and institutions” (Boggs and Rantisi 2003: 109-110) 
30 
contributes to an institutional mechanism that confirms corporate status. Scarce 
assets create higher value, which supplies these well-run firms with the power to 
define and police barriers to entry (Gereffi 1999). Lead firms tend to give up what 
are seen to be dead-end aspects of the commodity chain (such as production based on 
unskilled-labour, for example) as lower value-added activities are left for less 
powerful agents to undertake. From a profit-cycle point of view, a decline in product 
value would emerge as productive techniques mature and the market becomes 
saturated or less attractive (Markusen 1987).  
The way “to out-source lower value-added activities and to retain or incorporate 
those with higher value-added” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 401-402) at an inter-firm 
level is associated with the lead firms’ ability to handle organisational flexibility. 
The status of chain governance offers the subordinate agents “an organisational basis 
of chain participation” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 396) – these less powerful agents 
are either allowed to hold a relatively unfavourable position within the chains by 
accepting the lead firms’ flexible leverage or excluded from the chain and, in so 
doing, from the global economy. In one sense, this flexible account indicates that the 
GCC analysis does not reject the dynamic of industrial progress in the developing 
countries where the subordinate firms are mainly based, although there is recognition 
that the powerful lead firms exert strong control over commodity chains (Gereffi 
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1996; Gereffi 1999). As such, it embraces “the growth of industrial capabilities in a 
wide range of developing countries” (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005: 79), which was 
ignored due to an ossified and conclusive tripartite divide of the economic system. In 
the end, the GCC approach “promote[s] a nuanced analysis of world-economic 
spatial inequalities” (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz et al. 1994: 2), and so may help to break 
up the zero-sum nature of power-profit circularity (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000; Gibbon 
2001). 
2.3.2  Link and leap  
Gereffi gives a pertinent demonstration of the remarkable ascent of the 
first-tiered NIEs from underdevelopment by a series of studies on apparel commodity 
chains (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi 1999; Gereffi and Memedovic 2003), and specially 
emphasises “the prominent role of locally owned firms in their export-oriented 
industries” (Gereffi 1997: 79). However, he concedes that the mere existence of real 
wages, exchange rates or state policy does not sufficiently account for the 
geographical outcomes of production flexibility. The Asian NIEs possess enduring 
and promising benefits from export manufacturing/trade even though their initial cost 
advantages have been eroded over time.  
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Considering their very weak industrial bases it is not easy for 
developing-country firms to construct more complete local industrial linkages as 
theories suggest they should (Saxenian 1994; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). It is a 
peculiar case that “the greater the leap in upgrading, the less likely it is that 
knowledge acquired in existing linkages suffices” (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002: 
1025). The premise on which the firms can upwardly move is that they become 
deeply and extensively involved with commodity chains. But this is where the 
problem begins. Insertion into the chains can be a risk that renders local suppliers 
“dependent on a small number of powerful customers” because “exclusive 
relationships with large buyers prevent them from diversifying their customer base” 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002: 1024). Note that it would be simplistic to conclude 
that the developing-country firms are only offered passive chances to engage in 
labour-intensive segments with regard to global sourcing international buyers’ 
command – even though this was true in the very beginning. The way to overcome 
innate constraints on industrial upgrading (such as financing inadequacy, 
technological barriers of entry, a lack of professionals, obscure legislation) is by 
dynamic learning.  
This issue is worth further comment. The growth of a national economy is not 
really carried out within a nationwide context. Intra-national fragmentation can occur 
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in the wake of transnational integration. The GCC perspective also has relevance for 
work on cluster-based upgrading (see Schmitz and Nadvi 1999 for a special issue of 
World Development). Work on late-developing industrial districts is considered to be 
theoretically “weak on external linkages” (Schmitz 1995: 23) – notwithstanding that 
“physical-cum-economic agglomeration within a given is a necessary condition of 
upgrading” (Gibbon 2001: 349). The view that draws upon the exporting clusters 
individually is not sufficient to grasp “the manner and pace at which clusters 
develop” (Schmitz 1995: 24). The GCC approach embraces the “local consequences 
of globalization” (Bair and Gereffi 2001: 1888) and contributes a methodological 
complement to the cluster study (Humphrey 1995). In that regard, the economic 
growth of the clusters is driven by a triad composed of export manufacturing, 
overseas markets and industrial upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). Having 
chances to play a part in transnational processes of some industry-specific system, 
emergent clusters that integrate within commodity chains will benefit from an 
increase in exports (Schmitz 1999) – but they are also likely to suffer from the 
occurrence of adverse results and local resistances. Take a case study from the 
Philippines, for example. Kelly indicates a radical resistance to land conversion from 
a grassroots movement that contested the capital-favoured discourse of globalisation 
propagated by the government (Kelly 1997). 
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Behind the growth (on both national and subnational scales) is the ‘exogenous 
push’ deriving from the arrival of lead firms which source materials globally, as well 
as institutional frameworks at national and international levels that programme 
corporate agents’ participation in the global chains. For instance, the growth of the 
shoe industry in Sino Valley, Brazil is reliant upon the intermediary role of export 
agents that connects a cluster of local producers into a distant mass market (Schmitz 
1995), and the apparel industry in Torreon, Mexico is connected to NAFTA markets 
through US buyers under the circumstance of a macro-institutional transition (Bair 
and Gereffi 2001). Firm-level learning draws upon a causal logic, expressing the 
extrinsic power of international buyers in bringing about the upward transition of 
local firms.  
Although an upgrade in production and product may be achieved by a consistent 
transaction with global buyers, it does not automatically mean that the local suppliers 
will develop a new productive function or enter a new market field. There are four 
types of upgrading categorised by Humphrey and Schmitz (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2002): (1) processing upgrading, where superior technologies are introduced to 
enhance manufacturing efficiency and speed of response; (2) product upgrading, 
referring to the ability to target more sophisticated but lucrative market segments; (3) 
functional upgrading, that extends competence to cover more productive tasks of the 
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chain, ranging from simple assembly or production upwards to design or downwards 
to marketing and brand making; and (4) inter-sectoral upgrading, that makes a 
horizontal move into a new productive field regarding market diversification. The 
industrial transformation of corporate agents from the NIEs is not single-track but 
multi-dimensional. 
At an empirical level, one specific strategy leading to the strong performance of 
the Asian NIEs is learning by exporting. International contract linkages with large 
buyers enable Asian suppliers to move up the ladder of skill-intensive activities and 
enhance their expertise of manufacturing, marketing, branding and their capability to 
co-ordinate systems (cf. Borrus 1997; Lee and Chen 2000; Ernst 2003). The local 
firms can initially afford to undertake assembly functions and cater for a low-end 
market that the international buyers order. As the sourcing linkages succeed, the 
buyers “[permit] manufacturers to upgrade their facilities as they [meet] buyer 
demands for more sophisticated products” (Gereffi 1999: 53). The Asian suppliers 
have made dynamic progress in transiting tasks of export-processing assembly 
offshore and gradually taking on skill-intensive segments in the form of original 
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equipment manufacturing (OEM) or original brand-name manufacturing (OBM)6. 
The offshore outsourcing arranged by the suppliers has the geographical character of 
a regionalising production scheme – triangle manufacturing. The chain format is 
theoretically related to a redefined territorial division of labour (cf. Frobel, Heinrichs 
et al. 1980; Henderson 1989): 
The essence of triangle manufacturing is that US buyers place their 
orders with the NIC manufacturers they have sourced from in the past, 
who in turn shift some or all of the requested production to affiliated 
offshore factories in one or more low-wage countries. … The triangle is 
completed when the finished goods are shipped directly to the overseas 
buyer, under the import quotas issued to the exporting nation.  
(Gereffi 1994: 114) 
As Gereffi concludes, “[t]he international competitiveness [of] East Asian firms 
has been spurred on by organizational learning through networks and it is anchored 
in conventions that are an amalgam of Western and Asian institutions, norms, and 
practices” (Gereffi 1996: 109). Indeed, a primary benchmark to measure to what 
extent economic bodies (at various spatial levels) are globally involved is associated 
                                                 
6
 OEM is “a form of commercial subcontracting. The supplying firm makes a product according to a 
design specified by the buyer; the product is sold under the buyer’s brand name; the supplier and 
buyer are separate firms; and the buyer lacks control over distribution”, while OBM is “the upgrading 
by manufacturers from the production expertise of OEM to first the design and then the sale of their 
own brand products” (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003: 1). An aggressive learning curve allows firms to 
evolve into OEMs or OBMs, which is underpinned by national innovation of systems (Lee 1992; Liu 
1993) and efficient absorptive capacity (Hobday 1995), to which I will return in Chapter Five.  
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with a capacity to export to external markets. An extensive sourcing matrix of 
production and trade underlines the cumulative fortune of East Asia.  
In summary, tracing an organisational succession of international inter-firm 
trade, coordination and learning enables us to grasp the late-industrialisation of the 
Third World. It demonstrates a peculiar approach to developmental issues by 
associating closely with the agenda of economic globalisation, rather than with more 
traditional arguments which directed analytical scope upon what happens within the 
countries. It is a feasible starting-point for looking into the spatial reconfiguration of 
Taiwan’s IC industrial systems by situating corporate agents in industrial systems 
within a global context. In addition to this panoramic view on convergent and 
divergent mechanisms of transnational manufacturing, Asian firms are not without 
agency within the structural context of globalisation. There is an interpretive 
dimension within firms that shapes an agenda to encourage them to think globally 
(Jessop 2002; Thrift 2002). The action to organise the chain in place achieves 
inter-firm coordination and extends spatial scope, and this embraces a strategic 
attempt to link/respond to opportunities/restraints of the structurally-and 
globally-constituted chain. In brief, the chain can be seen both as an approach to 
understanding the global dynamics of production linkages and a reflexive object of 
global capitalist processes.  
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I do not object to seeing an input-output system, a sense of territoriality and a 
governance structure as the key constituents of the chain as Gereffi premises. 
However, the mechanisms of the constituents are interpreted in a static manner, 
whereby the formation and its dynamic (and contesting) process are illustrated in a 
restricted way. Besides, as an approach, the formulation of the GCC framework 
contains several drawbacks in explanation. Geography and the state are both 
implicated in my attempt to account for ‘discontinuously territorial’ trajectories in a 
later part of the thesis. Thus, I intend to explore the lacunae of the GCC literature. 
Attention is focused upon a failure to sufficiently account for the role of geography 
in the trans-local constitution of production structures (Leslie and Reimer 1999) and 
for the role of the state in regulating transnational connections of chain practices 
(Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002).  
2.4  Analytical problems in the GCC literature 
The framework of the GCC analysis has two methodological problems. First, 
there is a set of empirical investigations, drawn from a narrow sectoral range, which 
is used to construct a framework that is held up as being inclusive and wide-ranging 
(Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001; Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002). Second, some aspects of 
conceptual rationale and some issues which have been presupposed or formulated are 
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dismissed in the subsequent research agenda. A case in point refers to an 
overemphasis on modelling inter-firm governance that leads to a persistent neglect of 
other elements that make up a chain. The coordination and power of the fragmented 
organisational structure enables flexible production at a firm-to-firm level 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2001).  
2.4.1  A bi-modal stylisation 
It has been clearly displayed how co-ordination across global chains is central to 
understanding the ‘disintegration of production’ in the global economy which is a 
constituent of the ‘integration of trade’ (Feenstra 1998). The characterisation of the 
modes of governance structures is no doubt analytically remarkable. However, the 
differentiation of industrial sectors within the world economy is not captured 
appropriately. A wide range of industries, various levels of coordination and power 
asymmetries are dichotomised: producer-driven chains/ capital- and 
technology-intensive industries/ multilayered production systems vs. buyer-driven 
chains/ labour-intensive/ decentralised production networks. Such a stylisation 
formalises an oversimplified structure in light of an opaque economic reorganisation. 
I will now explain this in more detail by pointing to three explicit limitations which 
are central to the analysis of governance dynamics.  
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Firstly, the producer- and buyer-driven chains are taken as “contrasting (but not 
mutually exclusive) poles in a spectrum of industrial organization possibilities” 
(Gereffi 1994: 99). The two models are associated with mass production and flexible 
specialisation respectively (cf. Piore and Sabel 1984; Gereffi 1996). In contrast, the 
distinction of what drives global chains is differentiated from the structural 
dichotomy in the industrial divide according to varied scales of analytical concerns – 
the GCC narrative focuses organisational properties upon globally industrial 
processes, rather than the organisational transformation of a domestic economy 
(Gereffi 1996). Lying behind this stylisation is an arbitrary binary that “exclude[s] 
flows of any given commodity or product which are not organized and controlled 
according to the standard ‘key-agent’ pattern” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 410). 
Moreover, other existing or newly-emerging categories that govern the chains are 
little concerned by such dualist rhetoric. Some researchers call for “an accurate 
reflection of commodity- and location-specific factors” (Clancy 1998: 345-345; 
Leslie and Reimer 1999). It is true that “the distinction between ‘producer-driver’ 
[sic] and ‘buyer-driven’ networks is more fluid than Gereffi’s work” (Henderson, 
Dicken et al. 2002: 446; and see Yang and Coe 2009). Several drivers are identified 
as transcending dogmatic patterns, such as ‘international trade-driven chains’ for 
primary producers (Gibbon 2001), ‘contractor-driven chains’ for hospitality 
41 
businesses (Clancy 1998) and ‘technology-driven chains’ for software industry 
(ÓRiain 2004).  
Secondly, even though the chain approach establishes the conceptual structures 
of the driver logic in a rather fixed manner, it is a loose definition. Epistemologically, 
it fails to differentiate “whether it is more appropriate to refer to one commodity 
chain for a given commodity or manufactured goods, or whether each flow of 
produce structured by a given key agent is to be considered a separated chain” 
(Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 400). The possibility that the two models converge remains 
unexplored; if so, how do the various types of drivers counter and balance 
within/across the chains? In light of an industrial trend towards production 
specialisation over time, it becomes more difficult to distinguish whether the 
inter-firm transactions belong to one chain or many. Intel is a relevant case. While 
possession of a technology-specific kernel often promises market superiority in 
industrial competition, it is hard to conclude that the advantage that Intel gains is 
grounded in the strength of technological rents (such as the ownership of patents and 
the power to bargain with international standards), a global brand with a popular 
slogan – Intel Inside – or both. On the one hand, the business approach of Intel, the 
leading chipmaker, which operates downstream from strategic nodes of brand-name 
marketing, is consistent with what international buyers would do. On the other hand, 
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the Intel Inside propaganda wisely consolidates end customers’ identification with its 
brand name. This enables a persistent market power from the mass to keep system 
integrators following standards it formulates (cf. ÓRiain 2004). Its approach to 
prestige-generation is not exceptional among research-intensive transnational 
manufacturers. To a degree, this case is pertinent in suggesting the potential that one 
firm might have to drive multi-forces in order to dominate (a) chain(s).  
Thirdly, the bi-modal analysis appears relatively ill-equipped to capture the 
evolution of a supply-base. An intensified vertical disintegration of production 
generates many organisational and geographical connections, not only between firms 
that are transaction-associated but also between other segments of functional services 
(e.g. e-business solutions and venture capital), although they are not directly relevant 
to productive activities. However, the premise of dominant-subordinate governance 
at an inter-firm level, which is grounded upon the rather static categorisation of the 
chain, fails to recognise nuances of production externalisation.  
An emergent modular production network of the American-centred electronics 
industry is specified by Sturgeon to supplement the analytical inadequacy of 
governance style. He points to the rise of turn-key suppliers (IC manufacturers who 
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produce made-to-order chips are a case in point) to meet the growing demand for a 
total solution. In such contract manufacturing,  
suppliers have in many cases had to add entirely new competence areas, 
increasing their scope of activities while improving quality, delivery and 
cost performance … As an industry’s supply-base comes to be comprised 
of large, highly capable turn-key suppliers, the prospects for increased 
outsourcing are improved. In this way, turn-key suppliers and lead firms 
co-evolve in a recursive cycle of outsourcing and increasing supply-base 
capability and scale … 
(Sturgeon 2002: 455) 
In modularised contract manufacturing limited interdependence between lead 
firms and suppliers results in low barriers to entry and exit. A series of procurement, 
inventory control, logistic arrangement, process engineering, quality engineering and 
after-sales services are run in a dialogic manner, which can only be achieved by “a 
highly formalized link at the inter-firm boundary” (Sturgeon 2002: 455). In short, 
this model substantiates the highly fluid organisational relationship in which one 
mutually adaptive pattern of chain governance works out fast output and prompt 
delivery for bringing down costs and risks.  
Regardless of comments or revisions from others, Gereffi et al. themselves also 
re-conceptualise the governance of global chains by recognising “levels of explicit 
coordination and power asymmetry” (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005: 78) in a 
spectrum from market to hierarchy. In addition to the driving forces from key agents, 
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‘an extension of network category’ – transnational complexities, codifying abilities 
in transaction and capabilities of suppliers – is drawn to illustrate the way in which, 
and the extent to which, a chain is governed. Progressively, the identification of the 
variables in examining the organisational mechanism pays attention to the 
transactional and intellectual processes in the supply-based parties instead of merely 
enthroning the supremacy of TNCs in commanding global industries (see Hughes 
2000; Sturgeon 2002 for case studies; Lee and Saxenian 2008). Taking account of 
information- and knowledge-involved variables in examining the complexity of 
supplier-buyer relations constitutes a more dynamic framework. It surpasses the 
previous assumption in grasping transaction diversification. Besides, organisational 
embeddedness of tacit knowledge is evolutionary in nature. This accentuates “spatial 
and social propinquity of local industrial agglomerations [that] work to buoy 
organizationally disaggregated, and often highly innovative, economic activities” 
(Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005: 98), providing a productive annotation 
correspondent with geographical literature on territorial dimensions of production 
(Storper and Harrison 1991).  
Nonetheless, the modified typology remains dubious because too much 
attention is paid to how firm-level organisational power is coordinated with 
functional sites of the chains in comprehending the extensive economic processes. 
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The result is an incomplete construct of the analytical framework, which does not 
dovetail with the rationale of the original supposition outlined in Section 2.2. With 
the literature on GCCs being largely about the dominant forces driving the chains, 
other elements – such as the distribution of value-added across a range of relevant 
industries and the geographical dispersion of production and marketing networks – 
are conspicuous merely by their absence. Demonstration of those chain constituents 
is a primary step in dealing with the improper handling of analytical integrity. Rather 
than just dovetailing with the originally-supposed rationale of the GCC approach, I 
will endeavour to reflect on the limits of a linear view and spatial aggregation.   
2.4.2  Linearity and global stratification of places 
Recognition that “[interorganisational] networks are situationally specific, 
socially constructed and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of 
economic organisation” is stated in the GCC’s narrative at the outset (Gereffi, 
Korzeniewicz et al. 1994: 2). At a spatial level, this recalls the point made by Storper 
that “[a]n activity is fully territorialized when its economic viability is rooted in 
assets (including practices and relations) that are not available in many other places 
and that cannot easily or rapidly be created or imitated in places that lack them” 
(Storper 1997: 21; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). In later work Gereffi has a 
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particularly clear idea about a ‘geographic logic of each node’ (Rabach and Kim 
1994) in an attempt to “bridge the macro-micro gap in comparative research by 
highlighting the local social context of global production” (Gereffi 1997: 65). The 
place in which transactions occur, or specific fragments of industrial processes are 
located, is influenced by the peculiarities of localities, such as “households, their 
connections to enterprises and states, and related issues of gender segmentation and 
racial/ethnic conflict in the workforce” (Gereffi 1997: 65).  
Gereffi’s interest in focusing the local contents upon ‘the social embeddedness 
of economic organisation’ is weakly expounded as a result of the exhaustive 
treatment of organisational connection (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000). A two-fold 
emphasis existing in conceptualising the GCCs has been questioned: one is the bias 
for the analysis of governance dynamics as alluded to above; another is that the 
buyer-driven industries are overwhelmingly accentuated among the GCC literature in 
a sense that trade-orientated activities increase and pervade globally (Dicken, Kelly 
et al. 2001). The organisational connection is specified by two aspects that clearly 
demonstrate (1) that a comparable array of governing categories is “posited from 
industry characteristics alone” (Clancy 1998: 140) and (2) that the connectedness of 
diverse global industries is conditioned by big firms.  
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The input-output system is composed of successive tasks where each link adds 
value to one peculiar product constituting the physical substance of the production 
chain. But ‘where to start and end?’ and ‘how to divide up?’ are not conceptually 
identified. It is more than a problem with how far along the range of commodity 
chains analysis should be undertaken; an important question about “how to treat 
convergence, divergence, and other links between separate chains” (Raikes, Friis et 
al. 2000: 401) is rarely asked. The system “is merely a descriptive construct at most 
providing a heuristic framework for the generation of data” (Kaplinsky 2001: 122).  
Configurations of the input-output systems are understood by an assumption of 
an “essentially linear process” (Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001: 99) because the GCC 
narrative centres upon the global dynamics of functional linkages at the expense of 
the social relations involved with the constitution and transformation of chains. This 
logic of linearity frequently refers only to one chain in its entirety. The linear 
perspective gives little consideration for possibilities that separate production chains 
may interact with one another since it is not so effective in capturing “significant 
intermediary sets of decisions and processes” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 418, Note 18) 
and it does not explore the ways in which socially contextualising processes bind 
agencies into a larger global industrial relationship. The production nodes are often 
regarded as operative sites “located within GCCs themselves” (Dicken, Kelly et al. 
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2001: 100) because the analysis of chain composition “passes over the particularity 
of individual nodes” (Leslie and Reimer 1999: 404). For that matter, the uniqueness 
of an individual place appears vague when analytical attention is paid to vertical 
connections of functional positions.  
In addition, the linear-linked chain is typically imagined as a vertical system of 
top-down production sequences, which leads to a deterministic attitude towards the 
question of “what [are the] implications for the extraction and realisation of an 
economic surplus?” (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994: 43). It is discernible that the 
perspective tends to stratify economic space by a structural principle “at a very high 
level of spatial aggregation” (Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001: 99). First, there is a politics 
of transactional links, demonstrated by the fact that commodities typically move 
from developing-country producers to developed-country consumers so that 
“[e]nterprises and states in the core … gain a competitive edge through innovations 
that transfer competitive pressures to peripheral area[s]” (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz et al. 
1994: 2-3). The territoriality of the GCCs is employed descriptively to outline the 
spatial coverage regarding divisions of labour posited by the logic of comparative 
advantage. Meanwhile, connections of the nodes along the individual chains are 
examined in a matter of functional position, so that vertical commodity exchange 
relationships between local suppliers and transnational subcontractors are highlighted. 
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It settles the organisational arrangement of chain practice in a scalar binary (the local 
vs. the global) in addition to a horizontal division of space. For that matter, the GCC 
approach runs the risk of bringing about a conceptual maze that unduly imposes a 
homogenising influence upon understandings of economic convergence and 
divergence. 
To sum up, vertical connections are underlined as a result of the analytical focus 
upon linkages between functional sites. The approach’s attempt to interpret how 
“[c]ommodity chains ‘touch down’ in communities and industrial districts” (Gereffi 
1997: 65) is never really that successful since the treatment of the “spatial dispersion 
or concentration of production and market networks” (Gereffi 1997: 68) flattens a 
diversity of multiple sites to a flat surface. With the understanding of this limit, 
geographical insight that highlights the multiplicity of production chains will be 
reviewed to assist in understanding the dynamics by which a productive site is 
extensively associated with certain localities to make up a chain.  
2.4.3  The state as a fuzzy unit 
Institutional frameworks refer to regulatory settings surrounding a chain and so 
influencing the processes along the chain which agents are incorporated into or 
excluded from (cf. Gordon 1988). Institutions that condition productive stages play 
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an important role in shaping chain formats (although they were not specified in the 
early text of the GCC literature) (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz et al. 1994; cf. Clancy 1998; 
Bair 2005). Gereffi elaborates the dynamics of trade and investment regimes to 
delineate the international contexts of development in that “[t]he economic agents of 
supply and demand do not operate in a political vacuum” (Gereffi 1994: 99). 
Trade-based forms of transnational economic linkages are situated in circumstances 
of institutional coupling. Two sets of policy configurations call for special attention: 
that is, development strategies of export-oriented industrialisation adopted  to 
promote the national economy in the first-tiered Asian NIEs; and import restrictions 
imposed on successful export countries in core countries for industrial protection 
(see Yoffie and Milner 1989). The policy stances of nation-states become coupled 
with “broader (de)regulative changes” of, specifically, a global financial market 
(Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 400).  
Nonetheless, a failure to incorporate the issues of state regulation into the GCC 
framework invites criticism (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000; Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001; 
Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002). Inter-firm organisation constitutes the focus of chain 
analyses; this implies that “internal chain relations are the only important axis of 
variation” (Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 396). This stance inevitably comes to see “the 
state … [as] little more than a contextual backdrop colouring the particularities of 
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national industrial orders” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 46). The position of national 
regulation in governing the constitutive process of a specific chain is undetermined, 
although Gereffi has argued that “state policy plays a major role in GCCs” (Gereffi 
1994: 100). But the role referred to is “little more than trade policy” (Smith, Rainnie 
et al. 2002: 47) and fairly insubstantial. Gereffi (1996b: 433) explains that  
globalization … tends to diminish the influence of national origins on 
business systems, and to highlight the role of design, production, and 
marketing core competencies and strategic capabilities within and 
between economic sectors. The way firms do business in the global 
economy thus is determined to an increasing extent by their position in 
GCC, not their national origins.  
This viewpoint envisages institutional “converge[nce] to a single efficient type 
through some universalising competitive process” (Whitley 1996: 411). The capacity 
of the state to control domestic industries is analytically underestimated and 
marginalised within this mode of thinking (Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001). It becomes a 
“false dichotomy” (Panitch 1997: 85) rendering the nation-state a fuzzy unit that has 
diminishing relevance to the development of international production.  
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2.5  Geographical reformulations 
2.5.1  The morphology of non-linearity and multi-dimensionality 
In contrast to the spatiality of the structural abstraction in the GCC narrative, 
many geographical appraisals have recently sought to expand the territorial 
embeddedness of commodity chains by representing the morphology of exchange 
relationships of production, distribution and consumption. A topological 
presupposition of ‘network’ is inspired by the concept of the nervous system in 
biology and electrical networks, and “is now in common usage in the social sciences 
as the emblem of an ambition to produce flatter, less hierarchical theories of the 
economy” (Thrift and Olds 1996: 322). The metaphor of network is suggested in the 
application of the concept to the analysis of production chains considering that  
[a commodity] chain maps the vertical sequence of events leading to the 
delivery, consumption and maintenance of goods and services – 
recognising that various value chains often share common economic 
actors and are dynamic in that they are reused and reconfigured on an 
ongoing basis – while a network highlights the nature and extent of the 
inter-firm relationships that bind sets of firms into larger economic 
groupings.  
(Sturgeon, 2001: 10) 
The network metaphor surpasses a metaphor of chain in describing non-linear 
morphology of exchange relationships and multi-directionality of economic forces. 
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The former appropriately accentuate that the value-added processes “are organised 
vertically, horizontally and diagonally in complex and dynamics of configuration” 
(Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001: 99). This outstrips the chain metaphor which is very 
likely to “[restrict] our view to the linear/vertical dimension of production network” 
(Coe and Hess 2007: 8) in that it is extended to embrace fundamental nodes in 
horizontal scope (e.g. gender, legitimacy of various standards) which critically 
support exchange relationships alongside functional nodes of vertical dimension 
(Leslie and Reimer 1999).  
Material and intangible inputs multi-directionally circuit round a network, so 
that “the privileging of one sphere of commodity circulation over another is ideally 
avoided” (Hughes and Reimer 2004: 5). Literature on commodity culture pushes a 
step further to engage in “more contextual understandings of the meanings attached 
to goods in different times, places and phases of commodity circulation” (Hughes 
2000: 177). Various geographical lores of products (including a global sweep of 
geographical sensation, context-specific knowledges, discursive associations of 
impressions and aesthetic reflexivity) are identified in the course of flows and 
representations (Crang 1997) through a figure of displacement. There is a premise 
that recognises “contradictory organizations and lores available at different sites” 
(Leslie and Reimer 1999: 407). This position on spatial and interpretative transfers of 
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productive inputs contributes to redeeming a failure of the chain perspective in 
anchoring commodity (or production) processes in places. In other words, it 
supersedes a tendency of GCC literature towards abstracting input-output systems 
from territorial specificity. At one level, the position concretes the dynamics that 
commodities are decoded, identified and informed are multi-locally demonstrative as 
a travel of commodities across sites of the chain (Jackson and Taylor 1996). It 
recognises that peculiarities of the places matter in “a multi-stranded and reflexive 
cultural process” (Weiss 1996: 104) of value creation (and allocation).  
2.5.2  Actors in networks 
The network-like organisations are analogous to the webs of interdependence 
(Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994) embodying “the organisation of social and cultural 
ties in economic linkages” (Hughes 2000: 178). The network, conceived of as an 
alternative interpretative concept, is conceptualised to challenge the sterile exchange 
forms of market and hierarchy (Powell 1990; Hamilton and Feenstra 1998). In 
contrast to the neo-classical view which tends to atomise economic actors, a 
socio-economic concern directs attention to socially exploring the formation of 
cooperation and collaboration. On this intellectual ground, an increasing number of 
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geographers recognises “the importance of organizations as cognitive, cultural, social 
and political (spatial) framework for doing business” (Dicken and Thrift 1992: 283).  
Connectivity is one distinguishing feature of organisational dynamics, by which 
“firms are seen as enmeshed in loosely coupled networks of reciprocity, 
interdependence and unequal power relations” (Taylor and Asheim 2001: 320). In 
terms of governance, the global economy is embodied as a set of integrated global 
production chains governed by increasingly decentralised corporate organisations. It 
reflects the fact that the organisational boundaries become blurred considering 
globalising impacts upon organisations of corporate governance.  
Using the concept of the network as a way of referring to dynamic power 
relationships in industrial linkages is methodologically informed by actor-network 
theory (ANT) (Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001; Amin 2002; Yeung 2003; Dicken 2004; 
Hughes and Reimer 2004). ANT dictates that material resources (and institutions) are 
“functioning parts of ‘actants’” that, together with human actors, drive agency in a 
network (Thrift 1996: 262); simultaneously, the network “is able to redefine and 
transform what it is made of” (Callon 1987: 93; cited in Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001: 
102). The mixing of various actants constitutes interaction which “is always bounded 
and circumscribed” in real places, and “[t]hrough the use of certain material 
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resources, interactions can be stabilized, summarized and extended through space 
and time” (Murdoch 1997: 327; Hughes 2000).7 Adoption of ANT approach leads 
economic geography to relational consideration for social practices among actors 
(Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001; Bathelt and Glückler 2003; Boggs and Rantisi 2003; 
Ettlinger 2003; Dicken 2004; Yeung 2005; Bathelt 2006).  
Among others, theorisation of a global production network (GPN) framework 
developed by the Manchester School is more comprehensive. It is an actor-centred 
analysis to manifest formation of transnational production systems which is 
scale-transcending in feature. Notions of power, value and embeddedness are 
analytical integral. Relational attribute of power is highlighted, whereby a notion of 
relational geometries “refer[ing] to spatial configurations of heterogenous relations 
among actors and structures through which powers and identities are played out and 
                                                 
7
 For example, in the nineteenth century, emerging capitalists from metropolitan New York activated 
their disembedding power to alienate values of commodities from the cumbersome packages of 
agricultural products in a forward market through an advance of telecommunications and to 
incorporate a peasant economy and local credit systems in remote communities into capitalist 
modernity via a stretch of railroads to the Great West (Leyshon 1996; Kessner 2004). In this case, the 
information and communication technologies as technical objects have a significant bearing on an 
evolving transition of New York to a premier centre mastering nationwide (and then worldwide) 
financial systems.  
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become efficacious” (Yeung 2005: 38) is proposed.8 Recognition of how “economic 
agents … operate under specific institutional and cultural conditions from which they 
cannot easily be separated” (Bathelt 2006: 226) is important in exploring the 
articulation of GPNs. This is considering that effects of cultural sedimentation, social 
fabric and institutional presence upon intentionality and the performance of co-exist 
with stabilisation of economic relations. Consequently, it requires concreting 
embeddedness of economic action to understand “the circumstance under which 
value can be enhanced” and “the possibilities that exist for value to be captured” 
(Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002: 449).  
Hess identifies three aspects of embeddedness by demonstrating 
socio-institutional imprints which influence how actors behave, relational 
architectures reflecting stability in which actors cooperate, collaborate, compete and 
conflict and particular territories where actors anchor (Hess 2004). Societal, 
relational and territorial embeddedness are expounded in place of conventional 
territorially-fixed considerations. The reworking is directed at a fallacy of scalar 
dichotomy resulting from either a bias for solidification of territory-confined 
                                                 
8
 Critically, the scenario does not lead to a risk of ‘anti-essentialism’ overstating voluntarism and not 
inclining towards determinism of structural imperatives (Dicken 2004; Yeung 2005). 
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economic life or an overstress upon de-localising forces of globalisation. Critically, 
there emerges a topological view in a geographical space. The following moves to 
de- deterritorialise meanings of places in line with Massey’s expanding upon the 
relational construction of spatial identity (Massey 2004).  
2.5.3  A progressive sense of place 
Literature on territorialised production clusters holds a common interest in the 
changing productive structure (i.e. the specialisation and externalisation of industrial 
operation at intra- and inter-sectoral levels) and its agglomerative concomitant. It 
tends to interpret the growth of industrial cluster by following the logic of 
endogeneity – to stress that an “inner momentum of falling production costs” (Scott 
1988: 176) enables the pool of economic externality or to make concrete a crucial 
role of untraded interdependencies among local agents in enhancing “a local nexus 
of relational assets” (Amin and Cohendet 1999: 89).  
An industrial cluster often refers to a certain place (which can mean cities, 
industrial districts, nations and supranational blocs versus a planetary integer) where 
production and transaction are located. The landscape of places is depicted as an 
outlook of social cohesion and cultural continuity. With regard to socio-economic 
production, the place appears as an introverted community in which individuals 
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locally integrate with one another and encounter the rest of the world via a ‘learning 
network’ or ‘innovative milieu’ that they constitute jointly. These bounded territorial 
dynamics are from a Heideggerian perspective9 – ‘space/place as being’ with a static 
notion vis-à-vis ‘time as becoming’ with a progressive connotation – that leads to a 
common recognition of place: the identity of a place is essentially single and built up 
via an inward-looking historical sedimentation enclosed by given boundaries. Yet, 
the perception is disputable considering a “spatially-varying nature of 
humanly-created milieux” (Johnson 1991: 137). Markusen is critical that such theses 
“owe their stickiness to the role of small, innovative firms, embedded within a 
regionally cooperative system of industrial governance which enables them to adapt 
and flourish despite globalising tendencies” (Markusen 1996: 294, emphasis 
added).The “coherent, settled and bounded” sense of place (Massey and Jess 1995: 
218), thus, deserves a reinterpretation.  
 This is a world of transnational flows – transnational migrants, foreign 
investment, cultural imports, industrial technologies, business knowledge, 
super-national agreements and even financial crisis! They are mobile elements 
                                                 
9
 Massey makes a trenchant comment on a reactionary idea of place/space in Harvey’s ‘time-space 
compression’ (see Harvey 1989) and envisages an alternative interpretation of place with a 
progressive sense on a wider scale (Massey 1993; Massey 1994).  
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characterised by interconnections.10 A global connectivity deriving benefit from an 
increasing advance in information and communication technologies has continuously 
circumvented the global with the relevant localities. As a result, it becomes less valid 
to delimit places with physical lines simply to underscore the specificity of the places. 
All the cross-border actions and phenomena that embody the presence of globalising 
practice and process are blurring boundaries:  
Definition in this sense [of place] does not have to be through simple 
counterposition to the outside; it can come, in part, precisely through the 
particularity of linkage to that ‘outside’ which is therefore itself part of 
what constitutes the place.  
(Massey 1993: 67, original emphasis) 
The place is not a territorial enclosure but a porous site. The reason why the 
place matters is not so much in light of its territorial properties which are materially 
present in relative terms; rather, that it resorts to nuances of articulation: “a politics 
of connectivity and a politics whose relation to globalisation will vary dramatically 
                                                 
10
 For instance, the maquiladoras in the U.S.-Mexico border zone embody the formation of 
trans-border economic space; an emerging class of capitalist ‘astronauts’ (Portes 2002) takes on 
cosmopolitan distinctiveness to transmit soft capitalism trans-locally (Thrift 1998; Brown and Duguid 
2001); a variety of ‘mass actions’ is carried out at the grassroots no matter whether they are politically 
organised or act spontaneously (Smith and Guarnizo 1998); or labour movements are trans-scale 
consolidated to campaign against a neo-liberalist discourse of global capitalism via virtual hyperlinks 
(Herod 1998; Waterman and Wills 2001). 
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from place to place” (Massey 2004: 17). Dynamics can render a place as “qualitative 
changes occurring in the nature, extent and intensity of social interaction on a 
worldwide scale” (Kelly 1999: 379).  
In Markusen’s comprehensive comparative work on the diversity of ‘sticky 
places’, she rightly substantiates the viewpoint that distinguishable configuration, 
transformation and prospect of industrial districts display “greater propensities for 
networking across district lines, rather than within, and a much greater tendency to 
be exogenously driven” (Markusen 1996: 294). It is true that the specificities of 
places progressively take on “the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct 
mixture of wider and more local social relations and, further again, that the 
juxtaposition of these relations may produce effects that would not have happened 
otherwise” (Massey 1993: 68). The perspective that views places “as juxtapositions 
of intersecting, overlapping, and unconnected global follows and historical fixities” 
(Amin and Thrift 1994: 10) is to put places within a wider spatial setting. Favouring 
Massey’s reformulation of the sense of place, Amin and Thrift go on to conceptualise 
the global-local nexus by taking the local complexes as part of the global; in their 
terms, “[g]lobalisation … impl[ies] … a continuation of the significance of territorial 
diversity and difference” (Amin and Thrift 1994: 6) – and reversibly, “different 
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places have very different experiences of globalization” (Massey and Jess 1995): 
220).  
There is an analytical shift from scalar relativisation towards process-based, 
relational networks involved with reinterpreting geographical implications of 
contemporary social organisations (Marston 2000; Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001; Amin 
2002; Marston, Jones et al. 2005). Geography of global economy is referred to the 
spatial extension of ‘associations’ organised by interconnected economic and 
non-economic actors being enrolled in networks believing that localities should “be 
imagined as articulated movements in networks of social relations and 
understandings” (Massey 1991: 28; cited in Crang 1996: 51). Amin delves into 
spatial ontology of globalisation moves to propose a sense of placement of practices 
“to think of place in nonterritorial terms, as nodes in relational settings, and as a site 
of situated practices (of presence and absence)” (Amin 2002: 391).  
Three intangible and micro-level natures of places are demonstrated to 
accentuate the power of actors to control transmission of information (Amin and 
Thrift 1992; Thrift 1996; Allen 1997). The elements are decisive conditions by which 
the place is “constructed out of a particular constellation of social existences, 
meeting and weaving together at a particular locus” (Massey 1994: 154): (1) 
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Representability: to be a meeting site for ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) to 
“generate and disseminate discourses, collective beliefs, stories about what world 
production filieres are like” (Amin and Thrift 1994: 13, emphasis original). (2) 
Sociability: to be a sociable context in which to exchange information, make 
agreements and establish trust through dense contacts and, thereby, make firm ‘an 
expression of social knowledge’, crossing organisational boundaries (Walker, Kogut 
et al. 1997; Brown and Duguid 2001). (3) Knowledgeability: to be a discursive mass, 
contributing to enriching the knowledge base and reinforcing market sensitivity for 
the purpose of “keep[ing] up levels of product and process innovation in a 
decentralised system” (Amin and Thrift 1992: 576).  
At one level, this is a non-economic perspective accentuating that centred places 
are characterised by subtle socio-institutional exercises rather than economic entities 
constituted by pure input-output transactions. At another level, it suggests a 
de-territorialised interpretation to expound regional agglomeration of knowledge 
reaction (see Malmberg 1996; Malmberg 1997; Bathelt 2003; Bathelt, Malmberg et 
al. 2004; Bathelt 2005). As Amin and Thrift conclude,  
[t]hese centres of geographical agglomeration are, thus, centres of 
representation, interaction, and innovation within global production 
filieres … It is this unique ability to act as a pole of excellence and to 
offer to the wider collectivity, a well-consolidated network of contacts, 
64 
knowledge structures, and institutions underwriting individual 
entrepreneurial, which makes a centre a magnet for economic activity. 
(Amin and Thrift 1994: 13) 
That is to say, the capability for knowledge promotion is regarded as the 
determinant advantage for both corporate agents and local integrities in global 
competition. Knowledge evolution is not merely a localised process, nor is it 
generated simply by clustering effects of automatic, spontaneous circulation of 
knowledge and information. Instead, it necessitates combining intense exchanges of 
‘local buzz’ with the creation of ‘global pipelines’ to enrich the extra-local sources of 
knowledge as well as to strengthen the individual firms’ competence for innovation 
(Bathelt, Malmberg et al. 2004). In terms of centred places, their nodal positions are 
mainly based upon innovation ability. Their knowledge contents are not only 
accumulated by the spatial convergence of capital, resources, talents, information, 
knowledge, etc. but also enriched by extending the knowledge-transacting relations 
of places to counterparts co-located in the global webs.  
The interpretative insights reveal that actors and their power are embedded in, 
and substantiated by, social arrangements and discourses, far more than atomic, 
mechanistic rationality in economically lucrative terms (Ettlinger 2003). These 
socio-institutional elements mean that places are “constructed out of a particular 
constellation of social existences, meeting and weaving together at a particular 
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locus” (Massey 1994: 154), and the specificities of places progressively take on “the 
fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social 
relations and, further again, that the juxtaposition of these relations may produce 
effects that would not have happened otherwise” (Massey 1993: 68).  
In a network-informed mode of thought, places are conceived “as open and 
relational constructions” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 50), no longer invisible in the 
globalisation of a production network. This recognition helps to move beyond the 
conceptualisation of commodity chains as “simply structured through class divisions 
or the functional positions of producer and consumer” (Leslie and Reimer 1999: 403) 
in an unidirectional sense. It is necessary to include “the different degree and sort of 
power and ‘powerlessness’ to be found along and external to the length of a chain” 
(Raikes, Friis et al. 2000: 402 emphasis added; Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Smith, 
Rainnie et al. 2002) when thinking of the mechanisms responsible for geographical 
convergence through chain practices. I pay particular attention to governance 
mechanisms of state regulations at a national level.  
2.5.4  State regulations in the chains 
Increasing the amount of attention paid to an entanglement of a bureaucratic 
rationale with capitalist accumulation offers a distinct approach to theorising the state, 
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and moves away from simply seeing it as a neutral institution there to correct market 
failures or as a political instrument that legitimises capitalist control over the labour 
process (see Pitelis 1991; Glassman and Samatar 1997; Yeung 1998). As Jessop 
argues, “the capitalist state is an essential element in the social reproduction of 
capital – a political force that complements the economic force of competition 
between individual capitals and assures the immanent necessities that cannot be 
secured through the latter” (Jessop 1990: 37). The state should be regarded as an 
actor; the force that the state exerts to govern or manoeuvre economic processes is 
inherent in exclusive territoriality of institutionalisation.   
Smith and his colleagues comment on the limited treatment of state regulation 
in the GCC analysis. In the first place, they bluntly ask “why commodity chains 
cannot have a national or even local constitution, linking economic activities at 
various spatial scales?” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 50). Here the emphasis put upon 
national or local processes of chain arrangement does not intend to slice global 
chains into territorial sections of the chains. Rather, consideration is given to the 
reality that “social relations and social systems of production have important national 
and subnational variations which crucially can impact upon the performance of firms 
in place” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 50). In his comparative analysis, Whitley 
attaches importance to “the effectiveness of particular forms of business organisation 
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[that] is institutionally relative” (Whitley 1992: 5). As I will seek to show in Chapter 
Five the institutional embeddedness takes account of the fact that Taiwan’s 
‘technology leverage strategy’ influences the result of industrial decentralisation of 
the local IC sector.  
However, it is problematic to exaggerate the stability and endurance of national 
business systems regardless of the transformation forces deriving from “dialectical 
tendencies of globalization towards homogenization and differentiation” (Yeung 
2000: 399; Dicken 2003). Beyond this it is an issue of scale. Concern with the 
implications of national variation relates to an insight into representations of national 
scaling. The spatiality of globalisation is conventionally identified by a self-evident 
scale, under which all other scales are framed in an arbitrary power territory. The 
way to categorise spatial scales by a hierarchical ordering is a simplification. The 
continuing perception that exclusively focuses globalisation upon a scalar analysis at 
the global level has been challenged by geographers both theoretically and 
methodologically. They discern multi-scalar versions of trans-boundary networks 
and contest the assumption that national dynamics are replaced by super-national 
and/or subnational processes (Amin and Thrift 1994; Dicken 1994; Amin 2002; 
Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Sassen 2003). There is no doubt that states yield 
regulatory authority to the exigency of economic globalisation, as Dicken stresses 
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that “[b]ounded political spaces matter” (Dicken 2004: 9). But it is also true that the 
globalising processes, in turn, “[take] place deep inside territories and institutional 
domains that have largely been constructed in national terms” (Sassen 2003: 1-2). 
For that matter, Smith et al.’s argument for a proper account for the national 
contingency of commodity chains is to take denationalisation of sovereignty 
seriously but not to confine the chain analysis to a certain scale of the state’s 
territorial jurisdiction (Sassen 2000; Sassen 2002).  
The second argument that Smith et al. propose is that “if attention is not 
confined to the international level, the significance of the state as an agent of 
commodity chain governance increases, as it includes industrial and other policies 
impinging upon the structuring of commodity chains” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 47, 
emphasis added). Indeed, the strategy that the nation-states regulate international 
economic activities is more than trade-centred policies. Regulatory barriers and 
incentives of FDI and industry policies which are implemented within an 
intra-national framework influence the spatial strategies of firms in light of market 
and resources’ accessibility and rules of corporate operation (Dicken 1994). In 
addition, management of monetary policy and interest rates is also an active 
instrument through which states condition exchange rate fluctuations and capital 
flows (Gordon 1988).  
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2.6  An analytical framework for cross-Strait production  
A variety of state regulations give prominence to a multiplicity of state-firm 
interactions. It produces “the complex outcome of a myriad of negotiating and 
bargaining processes within both firms and states as different interest groups and 
stakeholders themselves attempt to influence the larger-scale bargaining position” 
(Dicken 1994: 120, emphasis added). A triangular nexus of interdependence is 
argued to outline the characteristic that the firm-state interactions are intricately 
associated with inter-firm and inter-state relationships (Stopford and Strange 1991). 
Both firms and states are economic agents having capacities to exercise to various 
degrees within a structure – or, a network, from the ANT perspective.  
For my research concern in this thesis, this nexus privileges an institutional 
environment at a level of political economy in which actor-specific practices work 
out to shape the configuration and geography of production chains/networks over 
time. Consequently, I argue that the spatial strategies of TNCs – if it is possible to 
see TNCs as a collective agent – are associated with the power play between firms 
and their home state, firms and their host state, and between home and host states 
which are entangled by economic, political and institutional determinations at 
multi-layered levels (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2  Triangular articulation of the firm-state relationships 
The interactive statuses between these actors reflect differentiated recognitions, 
intentions and ‘bargaining counters’. Pitelis identifies the power struggle between 
states and TNCs as a condition that might be described as ‘rivalry-and-collusion’, the 
nature of which “will depend heavily on whether the relationship refers to TNCs’ 
own states or ‘host’ states, as well as whether the states in question are ‘strong’ 
or ’weak’, DCs or LDCs” (Pitelis 1991: 142). It is important to recognise that this 
status is volatile in a synchronic sense, rather than a stationary matrix of firms and 
states.  
In an Asian developmental context the guiding efficiencies of the national 
strategies were used to attach the growth of indigenous firms to an export-oriented 
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policy environment and/or industrial linkages commanded by foreign investors. The 
status of indigenous firms appeared negligible vis-à-vis the governments: the firms 
were assisted, and dominated, by the states which had wielded their authority to 
provide subsidies, constitute national innovation systems, improve infrastructure etc. 
However, these firms, growing out of a guided capitalist context, have been making 
creditable progress in handling offshore production and accommodating ‘triangle 
manufacturing’ schemes.  
The importance of government assistance diminishes in relative terms. For the 
firms, corporate capital capacity can be magnified through internationalisation, and 
technological improvement benefits directly from a diversity of strategic alliances 
with foreign TNCs. Exercise of such material economic practices is profoundly 
underpinned by the globalisation of business knowledge that enrols economic agents 
(including not only business leaders but also politicians) into international business 
communities (or networks) where up-to-date managerial discourses circulate (Kelly 
1997; Thrift 1998; Yeung 2000; Thrift 2002). Nonetheless, in reality domestic firms 
are far from being independent of policy steers. The power balance evolves into a 
system of plurality away from one of a single model of state leadership. It is also 
possible that conflict and compatibility coexist in the firm-state interactions between 
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the same pair of corporate individuals (and groups) and the public sector. As Gordon 
(Gordon 1988: 61) suggests, firm-state interactions become  
both cooperative and competing, both supportive and conflictual. They 
operate in a fully dialectical relationship, locked into unified but 
contradictory roles and positions, neither the one nor the other partner 
clearly or completely able to dominate. 
Finally, I want to demonstrate a methodological argument for my empirical 
analysis. It is declared that “[t]he activities and strategies of firms in engaging with 
international production networks cannot be properly accounted for within theories 
of developmental state, as latecomer firm behaviour tends to be treated (usually 
implicitly) as an automatic response to policy and economic circumstances, rather 
than as a shaping influence in its own right” (Hobday 2001: 25). Attention paid to 
corporate action is not meant to belittle influence of the state interference, while it is 
significant to embrace a developmental context in general terms and distinction of 
state jurisdiction in specific terms. In the thesis, I seek to engage in a relational 
understanding by treating the nation-state as an institutional counterpart of corporate 
agents in economic development – rather than as a developmental structure in which 
the firms work.11 There are two accounts involved with the revision. At one level, 
                                                 
11
 However, the politics whereby the local matters are associated with the globalising tendencies 
embrace many different ‘scripts’ realised by agents of various natures in various scales, labour unions, 
international apparatuses, NGOs, etc. (Gibson-Graham 1996). My attention to the two agents is to 
73 
the Asian NIEs have been seeing considerable transformations in economic 
constitution. As such, reflection upon the empirical presence of, in particular, 
entrepreneurial enthusiasm for globalising business and a regulatory shift to 
liberalise the national economy is analytically indispensable for tackling the 
reconfiguration of the regional economy (Yeung 2006). At another level, and 
relatively, I intend to get away from an epistemological given of literature on the 
Asian developmental state for its theoretical position tends to structurally settle 
economic trajectories within institutional environments arranged by the nation-states.  
2.7  Conclusion 
Within this chapter I have looked at the chain metaphor employed widely to 
map and analyse the geographical convergence and divergence of economic 
activities. Building upon the organisation-based analysis of the GCC approach, the 
general framework for the study of global manufacturing integration was managed. 
But, despite acknowledging the useful conceptualisation that allows for positive 
prospects in developing country exporters, identifies the role of actors in governing 
                                                                                                                                          
make the narrative more focused, rather than meaning to confine (political) economic affairs of 
complexity to a dual image of visible flux of capital that drives materials and intangibles to become 
globalised and for nationally/regionally-tiered states to retain a commitment to their territorial turf.  
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economic development and problematises a state-centric analysis, I reflected upon 
the dualism of governance stylisation and the linear view that leads to an overview of 
the particularities of individual sites in constituting the chains.  
The reformulations argued that the composition of production chains is multiple 
and persistently shifts. At an organisational level, it does not only indicate a 
multi-layered and multi-faceted matrix of manufacturing but also stresses that the 
dynamics of power relations between economic agents are associated with the 
reorganisation of functional activities across space. Here, the agents should include 
those actors out of the particular chain in addition to buyers and suppliers. I 
highlighted the role of the state. The nation-state is not a mere territorial entity but an 
actor involved with geographies of value flow. As such, the implication of the border 
is more than a boundary to divide territorial jurisdiction in terms of international 
relations; intangibly, it represents the territorial struggle between corporate agents 
and state agents in respect to cross-border productive capacity. At a spatial level, the 
geographical literature on economic globalisation was particularly drawn on to 
reflect upon Gereffi’s chain framework of a ‘self-evident global scale’. Geographical 
insights are invaluable in drawing attention to “locally scaled practices and 
conditions articulated with global dynamics, and … the multiplication of 
cross-border connections among various localities fed by the recurrence of certain 
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conditions across localities” (Sassen 2003: 3). Such a position transcends a tendency 
towards geographical reductionism, which can consist of either a steamroller-like 
global assimilation on the one hand or a territorially-bounded local defence on the 
other.  
In the next chapter I will discuss the research methodology employed in 
examining the strategy of Taiwanese IC firms in building trans-local productive 
capacity as part of global IC production networks.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
METHODOLOGY  
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses upon methodological issues in the practice of doing 
research. The chapter will proceed in the following way. Section 3.2 is a wider 
discussion of my methodological strategy which is adopted to achieve the thesis 
objectives. Section 3.3 focuses on the methods of data collection, including 
documentary and field research. A discussion of the practicalities of the research and 
my positionality in relation to the subjects and objects of the research form the basis 
of Section 3.3. That section also draws attention to the dilemmas and contradictions 
that I faced in obtaining information, the tension that exists between the desire to 
conduct a rich analysis and the partiality of information generation, and how I began 
to resolve these issues. The practicality of doing corporate interviews makes up 
Section 3.4. It is concerned with the representation of knowledge that inhabits the 
contextual politics of cross-Strait business (cf. Sabot 1999; Ward and Jones 1999; 
Reid-Henry 2003). This section provides an account of the difficulties and challenges 
of carrying out qualitative research in relation to cross-Strait issues, highlighting the 
way that these problems are compounded by a highly politically-sensitive setting.  
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3.2  Methodological considerations: Explanatory power and data 
collection 
3.2.1  A mix of research methods 
Having outlined the framework of research I shall now proceed to describe the 
methods of data collection adopted. The selection of research methods depends upon 
“how they are used to ask which kinds of questions and how the results are 
interpreted” (Nightingale 2003: 79). That is to say, the methods flow conceptually 
and rationally from a series of intriguing questions that become concrete with the 
evolution of the research project (Valentine 2001).  
The rationale for my selection of methods involved two dimensions of questions. 
The first dimension was concerned with factual conditions of industrial operation, 
including the geographical reconfigurations and governance of the global IC industry 
and the organisational measures and spatial strategies that individual firms have 
taken in accordance with the changes of industrial settings. Preparatory questions 
were developed to identify practical areas of product type, processing technology, 
market segments, production organisation, labour management and locational 
selection. This aimed to reveal the processes by which the Taiwanese IC industry has 
been successful in carving out a niche within the global IC production chains and the 
geographical implications of this.  
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Another dimension sought to understand the contexts within which agents are 
embedded. The contexts or settings refer to an actual presence/milieu that is 
geographically specific and cuts across historic contingencies. In particular, 
corporate agents – such as enterprises and individuals (Clark 1994; Schoenberger 
1994) – and other types of organisational agents possess “multiple, path-dependent 
spatialities fashioned by their transactions, structures and interconnectedness within 
economies and societies, and the multiplicity of places (local and global) where they 
operate” (Taylor, Ekinsmyth et al. 1997: 59). When exploring cross-border economic 
activities, analytical attention is drawn both to peculiarities and spatial tensions that 
are substantial. They justify methodologically investment to ensure that the 
knowledge of policies and practices pursued by these firms are valuable since “the 
strategy adopted in any one area has implications for other choices” (Schoenberger 
1991: 181). The research considers “spatialities intrinsic to actors’ actions that are 
themselves a mirror and reflection of the information, the prejudices, and foibles and 
the traits of the agents that perform them” (Taylor, Ekinsmyth et al. 1997: 60). 
The data were gathered by a mix of research methods, including secondary data 
sources and field methods of corporate interviews and on-site observations. Evidence 
from various sources was corroborated repeatedly in the process of data collection to 
avoid bias or data error (Yin 1984). In addition, the “silences and incompatibilities 
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that become evident when data sets [are] produced by diverse methodologies” 
(Nightingale 2003: 80) were critically acknowledged to represent a partial view 
generated in situated contexts. For me it is not necessary to evade the variable results 
(gleaned by field-based methods particularly) which were likely to be full of 
subjectivity, although compiling the multifarious and tangled evidence was indeed a 
challenge. One reason is my own interest in learning stories from the ‘real world’. 
Another reason draws upon what Clark discusses a ‘close dialogue’ (Clark 1998: 79), 
which 
“is used as the raw material for a reconceptualization of economic 
behaviour. It relies upon the process of codification which, according to 
Bourdieu (1990), provides a means of building up a general picture of the 
observed world, bridging local observation with broader interests and 
concerns, and thereby making a world rather than simply accepting as a 
given ready-made world composed by theorists”. 
He argues for making a world; that is, a matter of intellectual construction which is 
achieved via “the free association of one’s imagination and intuition” (Clark 1998: 
76) in the process of embracing “a fine-grained, substantive appreciation of 
diversity” (Clark 1998: 75). The data collected were also organised in the form of a 
database, which is beneficial for data composition and for further studies.  
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3.2.2  Appropriateness of the qualitative approach 
In intensive studies the individuals need not be typical and they may be 
selected one by one as the research proceeds and as an understanding of 
the membership of a causal group is built up. In other words, it is 
possible – though not mandatory – for intensive research to be 
exploratory in a strong sense.  
(Sayer 1992: 244)  
The universality and neutrality of the qualitative materials bear the brunt of 
critiques. A precise point that positivists focus upon is the validity of empirical 
findings. This is in light of unquantifiable outcomes. For example, business 
interviews are called into question, over matters such as whether the information 
acquired is partially oriented by a certain group of ‘sample firms’ and as a result of 
restricted  access. However, the positivist point of view is rebutted by qualitative 
researchers. I shall now review debates on the explanatory power of these two 
methodological paradigms.  
A “research instrument … [is] ultimately dependent on epistemological 
justifications” (Hughes 1990: 11; Hoggart, Lees et al. 2002). For the positivists, the 
accuracy of interviews is questionable. An interviewee may have a poor memory for 
events, or strive to maintain a good image or have an axe to grind. Meanwhile, the 
‘highly subjective nature’ of field materials fails to produce generalised laws for 
explaining and predicting empirical correlations in a rigorous sense of objectivity 
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(Richards 1996). Proponents of qualitative methods are opposed to those critiques 
and mount effective rebukes to the critiques of positivist epistemology by explicating 
philosophy (Harvey 1969; Sayer 1992; Hoggart, Lees et al. 2002). Firstly, the 
positivist approach is based upon a scientific ontology that only accepts things of 
direct visibility and places an emphasis upon abstracting empirical regularities as 
laws. It tends to pursue explanatory principles which are testable repeatedly and 
constantly predicable. Such logic may be efficient in understanding a surface 
appearance of realities. However, it is unable to uncover the subtlety of motivations 
behind the empirical exterior since it fails to “distinguish between accidental 
associations and causation” (Sayer 1982: 119), and the things that are not 
immediately accessible to the senses are obscured or excluded by an analytical 
inclination to cohere and unify divergence in pursuit of definitive ‘truth’ (Lawson 
1995). Moreover, positivistic social science adopts a top-down stance, aimed at 
modelling empirical regularities in a neutral manner. This requires a qualification of 
empirical observation within preconditioned, closed systems. A manipulative 
methodology may be adopted in an attempt to control the bias of researcher and 
respondent and any other external variable so that hypotheses can be objectively 
confirmed. “[F]or no other purpose than to increase understanding of a particular 
phenomenon” (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 212), knowledge formulated by positivist 
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deduction largely ignores the essences of specific contexts. The epistemology of 
objectivity and value-neutrality incurs a blunt reproach: “object and unbiased 
knowledge is impossible because our access to reality is never unmediated” (Hoggart, 
Lees et al. 2002: 4).  
An academic orientation of qualitative researches, by comparison, is towards 
making sense of human phenomena (re)presented in social structures which “are 
open systems and subject to constant change” (Hoggart, Lees et al. 2002: 17). It  is 
well known that knowledge of “people’s elusive sense of place” (Limb and Dwyer 
2001: 3) is context-dependent and socially constructed. In particular, qualitative field 
methods sensitive to processes and people are efficient tools that can capture and 
illustrate the truth that the informant tells “about themselves and their industry” 
(Clark 1998: 79) and are able to dig into indefinable information – which either has 
not been surveyed statistically (i.e. a definite number of the Taiwanese IC firms in 
China) or could not be made public (i.e. the under-the-table transfer of capital, 
technology and human resources) (Schoenberger 1991). What makes more sense is 
to “produce a coherent and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation 
that is based on and consistent with detailed study of the situation” (Ward-Schofield 
1993: 202; cited in Bailey, White et al. 1999: 172).  
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One thing that is critical here is to ponder whether the acquisition of messy and 
creative realities is open to the charge of producing “debilitating effects of 
fragmented identities and separate loyalties” (Clark 1998: 83). This puzzle of 
practice is tied to the methodological substance of validity. The procedures to acquire 
field-based information are not necessarily linear, but proceed “in a series of 
iterations with modifications of understanding occurring throughout the interviewing 
state as well as during the formal analysis and writing up stages” (Sykes 1991: 4). It 
is ‘a permanent self-critical stance’ on which an intellectual rigour of qualitative 
researches relies – an imperative to striking a balance between rational reflecting and 
subjective reporting (Schoenberger 1992; Baxter and Eyles 1997; Wainwright 1997; 
Clark 1998; Bailey, White et al. 1999).  
3.3  The practice of research 
3.3.1  Secondary sources 
Documentary evidence contributes to contextual material that “embeds the 
research questions in broader empirical traditions” (Valentine 2001: 42). Compared 
to field materials, one distinguishing point of secondary analysis is that “it forces the 
researcher to think more closely about theoretical aims and substantive issues of the 
study rather than the practical and methodological problems of collating new data” 
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(Hakim 1982:16). Hence, these sorts of data – whether in number or in text – were as 
vital as the field materials before, during and after the empirical stages of research.  
The secondary data were multiply sourced, and grouped into four categories: 
first, numerous forms of statistical materials from government censuses and 
international market surveys (e.g. the IC Insight); second, existing academic and 
commercial studies in the form of journal papers, books, and consultation reports; 
third, other texts including on-line archives of corporate annual reports and releases 
of government communiqués and archives of newspapers. There are disparate 
stances among the newspapers so that it is a risk to presume neutrality and integrity 
of news coverage, press comments or editorials. For example, the China Times and 
the Liberty Times – which constituted materials for a textual analysis of 
state-business interplays – are ‘barons’ of the Taiwanese press, standing for two sides 
of the political spectrum and having different opinions on Taiwanese outward FDI to 
China. These sources covered a wide range of general informant and critical analyses 
regarding industrial intelligence and programmes of public policies. The fourth 
aspect was industrially-focused with reference to known industrial press sources, e.g. 
the Electronics Business, the Silicon Strategies, the EE Times and the DigiTimes in 
English, and the Business NEXT, the Computex and the Micro-Electronic Magazine 
in Chinese. These sources produced such a prodigious volume of written evidence 
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that I had a long process of extracting and evaluating materials to develop an 
industrial profile at the incipient stage of research and for cross-referencing with 
field materials.  
One important caveat is necessary when using official censuses. As warned, 
“[t]he official status of much secondary data [has] given them an authoritative air 
which can be both reassuring and beguiling” (Clark 1997: 57). This requires 
researchers to have a reasonable scepticism and not to be blinded by an authoritative 
rubric. For example, consider data on Taiwanese investment to the Mainland in 1993 
(Table 3.1) which draws out several problematic issues.  
Table 3.1  Comparison of statistics: The approved investment to China in 1993 
 MoEA, Taiwan MoC, China Ratio (MoC/MoEA) TW.Modif. 
Item 1,262 cases 10,948 cases 8.7 9,329 cases 
Amount 1.14 billion US$ 3.139 billion US$ 2.8 3.168 billion US$ 
Source: Industrial Development & Investment Centre, MoE (http://www.idic.gov.tw/html/c3409.htm) 
Notes: (1) MoEA is short for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, and MoC is short for the 
Ministry of Commerce, China. (2) TW.Modif. means the data that were officially updated by 
Taiwanese authority. 
Firstly, as shown, in 1993 there were 1,262 cases of investment from Taiwan to 
China which amounted to US$1.14 billion according to Taiwan’s Investment 
Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs. However, the numbers claimed by 
Chinese authority was as high as 6,247 cases and amounted to US$53.95 billion 
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respectively. There is a big difference here – 8.7 times for cases and 2.8 times in 
amount – despite both being official sources. Secondly, figures in the final column of 
Table 3.1 are much closer to the Chinese statistics. In March 1993, a regulation 
issued to supervise the westward investment, by which the firms having done 
business in China but not yet registered were required to do so officially within three 
months. The data revision is associated little with techniques of statistics per se but 
much more with political implications. It certainly implies that the data released prior 
to 1993 were far from genuine numbers. But, paradoxically, the Taiwanese 
Government was fully aware of this quantitative gap between statistical results and 
reality.  
It is argued that “facts of strategic manoeuvrings, conflicts, and tradeoffs, or 
historical contingencies ... may be rendered opaque by aggregate statistical 
manipulations” (Schoenberger 1991: 181). At least two reasons for the gap can be 
identified. The first is a technical issue in relation to statistical sampling. For 
example, data of proceeding trades were compiled as an investment category in 
China but as a trade category in Taiwan. In other words, the divergence in numbers 
resulted from the discrepancy in defining taxonomic groups. In addition, the fact that 
Taiwanese firms failed to fully report their overseas operations is the second reason 
obscuring the accuracy of statistic figures (Yang and Tu 2004): on the one hand, a 
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tedious reporting process was an administrative burden that made the firms reluctant 
to register with the Investment Commission; on the other hand, a desire to evade 
paying taxes or to keep their flow of funds confidential was an important factor 
leading the firms to conceal their foreign investment from the government.12   
It is not my purpose to judge which authoritative resource is more authentic here. 
Instead, I intend to suggest the necessity of deliberation in applying the sort of 
‘official’ data directly to studying cross-Strait exchanges. I was aware of ‘statistical 
manipulations’ more discreetly, which led me to rethink the nature of the data per 
se – the data were expedient figures referring to implicit messages of political 
temporality. For me, the summary statistics in the methodological stance of situating 
knowledge serves not simply as an extensively descriptive role but also shows that 
the material itself is a problematic object within the research (Sayer 1992). On the 
one hand, the authoritative status of quantitative methodologies entails being situated 
in a broader context formed by causality and politics of temporal depth (Nightingale 
2003). On the other hand, such numerous materials are also artificially produced by 
those priorities  highlighted by administrators (Clark 1997) and in  specific 
                                                 
12
 For enterprises, all income from overseas operations needs to be accounted for in relation to their 
liability for tax, whereas personal income tax is calculated only on domestic income.  
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(regulatory) circumstances. For that matter, I made use of the data with quantitative 
reference to “set[ting] the topic in context” (Markusen 1999: 872) and checked 
diachronic changes at a primary level. 
3.3.2  Corporate interviews 
Corporate interviews are commonly adopted in obtaining first-hand data from 
firms. I conducted interviews during 2004 and 2005 (from December 1st, 2004 to 
May 5th, 2005 and from October 14th, 2005 to December 9th, 2005) in five cities: 
Taipei and Hsinchu in Taiwan, and; Shanghai, Suzhou and Nanjing in China. The 
fieldtrips to China were held twice in 2005 (one was from March 21st to April 8th and 
the other was from October 18th to November 3rd) as the amount of time I could 
realistically spend there was financially constrained.  
Qualitative interviewing design takes shape by degree, which is an iterative 
process to repeat information gathering, analysing and testing (Rubin and Rubin 
1995). By doing so, the research topic can be narrowed down and the core point can 
emerge gradually. I did not ask the interviewees to complete questionnaires. 
Providing informants with a range of possible answers was unlikely to cover the 
diversity and complexity of industrial practice, pre-coded answers might have 
restricted the attitudinal and motivational responses of informant
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1991). Semi-structured interviews were seen as a more appropriate strategy to 
determine how the IC industry as a whole has undergone change. In the fieldwork, 
the questions were continually refined/reorganised to explore the relevant themes 
which emerged as the preliminary results came out. 
Semi-structured interview has a number of strengths, of which three are 
particularly important. The first is flexibility. The questions used in a semi-structured 
questionnaire are open-ended. The interview is not simply question-and-answers, as 
it is more appropriate to undertake conversational-based interaction with managers. 
The phrasing of questions need not be fixed but can be adapted in line with “how the 
interview develops, the knowledge of the respondent and the level of understanding 
of the interviewer at the time of the interview” (Healey and Rawlinson 1993: 344). 
As such, I was allowed to “go back over the same ground, asking the same questions 
in different ways in order to explore issues thoroughly; and interviewees c[ould] 
explain the complexities and contradictions of their experiences” (Valentine 1997: 
111). Secondly, rich narratives are displayed unintentionally via detailed examples in 
open conversation, particularly if questions are tailored to individual interviews. By 
doing so, I was able to stimulate debates with respondents to pick apart agents’ 
strategies for real-world predicaments and to explore their analysis of specific issues 
as the interview progressed. Information yielded could thus be mutually validated by 
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way of cross-checking with the analysis of statistical materials. Thirdly, initial 
suspicions between the researcher and informant are mitigated in a face-to-face 
encounter, and as discussions proceeds a rapport can be developed. Potentially useful 
information can not only be obtained from what informants say; tones and gestures 
often unwittingly reveal attitudes towards business environments (Butler 2001; 
Jackson 2001). Reading the rich detailed and multi-layered (con)texts helped in 
piecing together a more inclusive picture of the cross-Strait investment and 
perceiving discourses of the firms’ de/re-territorialising.  
Practicalities  
The corporate interviews were conducted  with reference to general guidelines, 
while every interview differed according to the background and context of the 
interviewed company, the field in which the informant specialised, the rapport 
developed with the informant, my own performance as an interviewer, and time 
constraints of the interview. I now provide more detail of my in-depth interviews 
with IC professionals.  
(1) Who to talk to? 
It is impracticable to conduct interviews with all the relevant corporations due 
to time and cost considerations. Originally, I intended to take representative firms on 
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the strength of the companies’ market niche/share, technological competence and 
profitability.13 However, recruitment of potential informants in targeted corporations 
did not go as well as wished considering the narrow point of entry. Finally, the 
selection of the corporation samples was made at random by means of snowballing.  
I carried out 52 semi-structured interviews with 37 companies (Appendix A), 
including firms located in the IC production chain, two administrative institutions of 
industrial parks, one press agency and one industrial association. The interviews 
covered most parts of the IC production chain although I did not (and could not) 
pursue informants following an exhaustive inventory of companies. An elite group of 
electronics experts was identified as my potential informants. They were insiders, 
clear about constraints and opportunities open to the IC industry as a whole and the 
firm’s investment business. Those in managerial positions had the power to decide 
and execute corporate policy. The major group was composed of senior managers 
(from department-level directors to VPs and CEOs) and senior engineers 
                                                 
13
 Common Wealth, a business report published annually by a noted and reliable business journal 
publisher, provides an authoritative index of corporate performance. The samples of the companies 
investing in the YRD are chosen from those that remain in the list of the top 1000 during 2000- 2003. 
This annual survey, considering manufacturing enterprises in Taiwan, is conducted on the basis of five 
indicators (revenues, revenue growth, return on equity, total and profit). Basically, the methods for 
survey are similar to other business journals, such as Business Week. 
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(specialising in various professions) in selected top IC firms. It is worth remarking 
that most of the managerial respondents held important posts directly concerned with 
engineering-related tasks in their firms.  
As well as the respondents from Taiwanese-based companies, I also contacted 
several senior managers from start-ups operated by ‘returnees’ (that is, Taiwanese 
and Chinese nationals who had been either educated or worked overseas, often in 
Silicon Valley, California) and in Chinese companies with government backgrounds. 
Extending the range of ownership categories was considered to be helpful to 
triangulate the reports offered by the Taiwanese companies since information 
(including rumours) often circulated rapidly throughout the industrial circle, and 
since interpersonal exchanges were common even if they might specialise in various 
professional segments, work in differentiated establishments, and even stay in 
discrete locations. Many people were friendly with one another because they were 
alumni of the same university or worked in the same lab or firm in the US (cf. Angel 
1989; Hsu 1999; Oinas 1999). Consider one of many examples that I learned about in 
the field: a Taiwanese expert running a foundry in Hsinchu was a major shareholder 
of a design start-up in Shanghai whose Chinese founder had made the acquaintance 
of the semiconductor ‘veteran’ when engaging in venture capital in Silicon Valley.  
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In addition to corporate workers, I also interviewed two people working in the 
Taiwanese industrial press, and three director-level administrators of industrial parks 
and industrial associations in Shanghai and Suzhou. An additional remark is 
necessary here. Although the agency of the states is one of the main concerns in the 
research, governmental officials were not included among my interviewees simply 
owing to impossibility of access. I made a compromise by gleaning officials’ 
speeches or interviews released by the press. Citation of their statements was 
perceived to be a feasible method to find out adoptable information about 
governmental attitudes towards certain agendas –what the officials might have said 
in an interview was very likely the same as that which they declared publicly in 
authoritative terms.  
(2) The procedure  
All of the interviews were pre-arranged by phone and conducted in person at the 
respondent’s place of work wherever possible. Having obtained prior permission 
before a visit, I was generally welcomed by the respondents. To maximise the quality 
of the interviews, I allocated specific question areas to different respondents in each 
firm according to their job role (Appendix B). Consistency was addressed by means 
of an interview checklist, a list of topics to be covered with all respondents, whilst 
94 
allowing them freedom to describe their own experiences in their own terms. I 
usually interviewed a single respondent, but in several cases more than two people 
were interviewed. Generally speaking, most respondents appeared keen to conduct 
the interviews and they lasted about one hour on average. Two interviews lasted 
about two-and-a-half hours but, at the other extreme, one informant wound up the 
interview after only 15 minutes.  
I tape-recorded the interviews, except for two respondents who turned down my 
request to do so. Unfortunately, three interviews came out blank because the recorder 
was faulty and an additional three had poor sound quality because of background 
noise. The notes I took during and directly after the interviews were analysed to 
provide information. In addition to the pre-arranged interviews, I had follow-up 
interviews with several respondents via a direct visit or web phone. Some 
opportunistic – and so unrecorded – interviews were also conducted with individuals 
at a trade fair and on a staff outing. The former was a B2B exposition, eMEX, having 
been held since 2002 in Suzhou. The exposition was held with the aim of promoting 
the electronics sector in the Suzhou area and its sponsor was a quasi-public agency 
constituted jointly by a government-appointed board of Suzhou City and an affiliated 
office of the Taipei Computer Association (TCA). The staff outing opportunity 
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emerged when one respondent invited me to attend a two-day trip with his 
department colleague. The transcription was done on my return to the UK.  
(3) Confidentiality 
“Confidentiality is a particular[ly] thorny issue” (Valentine 2001: 49). When 
asking the informants to talk me about matters that might include professional, 
commercial, political or potentially sensitive information, I endeavoured to keep all 
interviewees anonymous. They were given pseudonyms which were coded with a 
serial number (of interviewing sequence). I avoided displaying trademarks, 
abbreviations or acronyms, considering that many IC firms that I visited were easily 
identifiable. But I did not disguise corporate locations in case the data and 
interpretation were confused. As a result, some details had to be suppressed in order 
not to provide a set of clues that, taken together, would lead someone else to be able 
to identify the firms. However, this was not the case if specific business news or 
corporate affairs had been released or were well-known.  
Hurdles and tactics 
The intensive, flexible format of the open-ended interviews was of use to probe 
the process of cross-border investment/production and potential contradictions and to 
generate in-depth geographical accounts. However, “[f]ieldwork is permeated with 
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the conflict between what is theoretically desirable on the one hand and what is 
practically possible on the other” and “[i]n the conflict between the desirable and the 
possible, the possible always wins” (Buchanan, Boddy et al. 1988: 54, emphasis 
added). Many expected and unanticipated dilemmas and issues came to light during 
the interview period. They were complexly bound up with each other and played an 
important role in shaping the interviewing processes and the acquisition of 
information.  
Obtaining primary knowledge of the semiconductor field was the first obstacle 
to overcome. In particular, the issues I needed to master covered four major 
segmentations and a bifurcation of auxiliary sections (e.g. equipment vendors and 
distributors) owing to a fine division of labour. I had to be able to identify technical 
jargon commonly used in the IC industry and to learn about the process of 
chipmaking, the applications of IC components and trends of technological advances. 
It was a difficult job for me, a computer illiterate, to figure out the cryptic electronic 
world! It was for the purpose of being able to make sense, and make knowledgeable 
assessments, of what respondents might say lest I got lost in a maze of 
technology-laden vocabularies and so failed to grasp the contexts and more intimate 
insights which were useful for my data collection. To accomplish the task, the best 
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policy was preparation. Learning the ‘working vocabularies’ began when I decided 
to select the industrial sector as my research object, and this ultimately worked out.  
Challenges in the field were even trickier than those I faced at my desk. 
Interviewing is a social encounter fraught with reflexive ideas manifested by axes of 
social identities. It is described as “a game in which participants often are playing 
with a different set of rules” (McDowell 1992: 214). The rules consist of a power 
matrix: elites are talking with less powerful groups (England 1994; Richards 1996; 
Desmond 2004). In such encounters the elites tend to “have the upper hand by 
controlling access to knowledge, information and informants” (Valentine 1997: 114) 
and by “impos[ing] his or her power agenda in the interview” (Schoenberger 1991: 
182). As a result “the interviewer is more often in the position of a supplicant, 
requesting time and expertise from the powerful [corporate informants], with little to 
offer in return” (McDowell 1992: 213). The problem was quite true in my experience. 
Respondents’ narrative accounts were prone to go adrift and strayed around the latest 
products, unintelligible engineering, anecdotes, and personal experiences of living in 
Chinese cities or encountering verbose bureaucracy. Sometimes I wondered if they 
received my request for an interview in expectation of disseminating new smart 
devices or expressing their appeal (to policy-makers) by having their business affairs 
prioritised through me who would make their narratives public, or if they (the 
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resident engineers peculiarly) simply liked to help with enthusiasm and have a chat 
(with someone from their home town). For fear that an interview went too far adrift, I 
struggled to keep the discussion focused upon the issues – and struggled to do this 
while maintaining conversational fluency at the same time.  
Reflected by methodological rationality, the term ‘elites’ is an arbitrary one 
“without any substantive conceptual depth” (Woods 1998: 2101; cited in Smith 2006: 
646). In light of my interviewing process, those managers and engineers I met did 
not exactly intend to exert their authority of a peculiar profession upon our 
relationship when talking. As alluded to, my unfamiliarity with specific expertise in a 
particular field could be offset to some extent by prior desk-based study. What 
challenged me more lay in unfamiliarity with how to conducts a visit to and interact  
with the respondents in an office suite who had professional knowledge – and 
presumably owned social power by mobilising ‘divergent sources of social capitals’ 
(Schoenberger 1994). I knew well that the sort of self-conscious feeling was reflected 
by my own preoccupation with differences of occupations, social status and living 
experiences. Concretely speaking, my working-class background and teaching 
experience caused me to be more hesitant and less assured of handling 
technology-laden interviews with predominantly male experts than if I were doing so 
with high school students and parents.  
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My attempt to be perceived as “one of them” (Schoenberger 1992: 218) put me 
under considerable pressure, and sought to over come this problem through a number 
of strategies. First, I sought to mask the obvious visual signifiers of position by 
giving off the appearance of an academic. Dressing in smart and sensible attire was 
helpful in creating a good impression on the respondents, and which was a good way 
to raise my own self assurance. An ability to display my professionalism and a sound 
knowledge of the subject under discussion was actually of more importance. Asking 
questions succinctly and to the point substantially demonstrated my professional 
attributes that led me to win the confidence of the respondents. A second tactic was 
to deal with my gender. Being a female researcher doing a study in an industrial 
realm of masculinity was another challenge. One young male geographer, who was 
conducting similar fieldwork in Shanghai and smaller cities in the vicinity, told me 
that ‘smoking’ was his vehicle for digging out stories behind the scenes since “a 
smoky room is particularly a space [in which] we fellows’ talk”. On some occasions, 
this did seem like a strategy that would work. But I did not perceive this to be a 
particularly strong or failsafe strategy – not all the bosses had the time to befriend 
him in the ‘smoke’ after all. I found that my female status could be helpful, as I was 
seen as being “less threatening, more intriguing, or presumed to be a better audience 
for the recounting of exploits” (Schoenberger 1992: 217). Drawing upon my 
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experience, I agree that ‘acting dumb’ (O'Connell Davidson and Layder 1994: 146; 
cited in Valentine 1997: 121) is a smart tactic to encourage the senior, male 
respondents to tell more details and give a clearer explanation. This tactic was also 
useful – and necessary – when their reports were totally beyond my comprehension.  
Compilation and analysis 
The transcription was done on my return to the UK. Those well taped-recorded 
conversations were transcribed verbatim in Chinese. On average, transcription 
required about one hour for every ten-minute. There were several stages of my 
building analysis from the transcription. Time slots for each stage were not distinct; 
rather, the analysis “involve[d] going through material, then going back to check or 
change in the light of later ideas” (Crang 1997: 188).  
Firstly, I read through the transcripts to mark up changes of tones (such as 
emphases, pauses, or hesitations), while the conversations were still fresh in my 
memory. This was for fear that actual opinions an interviewee intended to express 
could be hidden or misunderstood by literal meanings. Secondly, I marked key words 
of the text that interviewees used. Then, each response to one specific question/issue 
was labeled by interpretive words abstracted from the data in the margins. All the 
passages were summarised subsequently. In many cases, I returned to the tapes to 
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grasp “the ‘flow’ of a particular conversation, to locate the context in which a 
particular view was expressed” (Jackson 2001: 203-204). This coding process was 
undertaken manually, so that I could become aware of how interviewees made sense 
of their dispositions. Thirdly, a further phrase of analysis was a second reading 
across the interviews. I noted down common/various discourses by linking the 
materials, and drew out ‘silences’ in the contents.  
3.3.3  On-site observations 
An on-site (non-participant) observation was an additional tool in the fieldwork. 
If the intensive interview is a method executed for the “understanding of an 
interviewee’s ‘mental set’” (Hoggart, Lees et al. 2002: 209), then I see observation as 
reading the landscape as text as a short-cut to making sense of substantive conditions 
of space-time experience in order to look through “communication of meaning about 
places and the political manipulation of space” (Aitken 1997: 204).  
Observation acquainted me with unfamiliar spheres in relation to potentially 
necessary materials and gave me greater understanding of the situation. It is, as Sayer 
argues, “precisely because causal groups are selected, [that] the ‘logic of the 
situation’ is often relatively easy to discover” (Sayer 1992: 248). In many cases, the 
potential materials were more intangible – e.g. the business culture of the industrial 
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circle in the IC sector (and electronics industry as a whole). It is an 
experiential-oriented sort of knowledge, which eluded me as an outsider. Even if I 
had learned some explanations and descriptions from written information, direct 
observation in person revealed the subtleties of characters and the contextually 
relevant circumstances became more lucid.  
The pertinence of making an observation goes with an intellectual sense that 
‘geography is everywhere’ (Cosgrove 1989). Visual discovery of spatial formats 
adequately incorporated a substantiality of place into the fieldwork within which the 
corporate agents were the focal objects with whom I talked. Experiences of the 
fieldtrip in China were examples of this. I had some reservations about visiting China 
before going. It was without doubt a prejudice within my own sense of place. When I 
arrived, I nearly ‘drowned’ in culture shock – there was a mismatch between my 
internal image of ‘socialist China’ and the adapting to an updated impression. For 
example, many commercial advertisements were displayed on the reverse side of 
‘official’ traffic signs on the streets (in urban areas), looking like cornucopias 
embodying the ‘enormous potential of popular consumption’ that has been largely 
reported empirically. This was a sensory experience. They were so dazzling that they 
persuaded me that there is a socialist Republic of capitalist vigour.  
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In addition, the non-verbal knowledge I gleaned enriched and constructed my 
spatial perception when I walked into a respondent’s office or stayed in 
fully-equipped accommodation for company personnel. The procedure was not a 
one-way flow of information but “a creative, evolving and contingent process” 
(Cook 1997: 128). One case that impressed me was a rediscovery of spatial scales. I 
was told about efficiency in the workplace by one manager in the Suzhou Industrial 
Park. He pointed out a material condition as an explanation of why his local 
colleagues were not so engaged themselves in work performance:  
… first of all, it is much more flexible [to arrange working schedules] in 
Taiwan. One may ride a motorcycle to the office; it doesn’t matter [if he 
gets] off duty at ten o’clock. [But] you have to leave by five-thirty here. 
[If not,] the office is so far away from the city centre. He gets no 
transport home. As such, this [situation] certainly drives him [out of the 
office].  
I had been oblivious to the problems of transport and communications, and 
simply deemed it as managerial comment on subordinates until I jumped on a 
jam-packed local bus and went around Suzhou City. In geographical terms, there was 
simply not a short commute for local employees (cf. the Taiwanese companies often 
fixed up the posted staff with accommodation around the Park) between the 
residential, populous and hectic urban area and the newly-built area interspersed with 
smart office blocks and shop floors of increasing number (but which remained 
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spacious and monotonous at least during the period I visited). Of more annoyance 
was an ill-equipped transport system that made the physical distance seem longer 
than it really was. This physical condition also constituted one reason why the local 
staff fled so soon when being released from duty – to catch the free bus provided by 
their companies. Obviously, the time–space experience in the locale was 
distinguished from that in Taiwan’s HSIP where the engineers can simply “ride 
across the back yard of the Park (the HSIP)” to have further education after work, as 
reported by another posted engineer in Suzhou. Spatial-temporal properties in 
reference to actualities of work setting are, to a degree, implicitly shaped by urban 
formation. Being forced to experience the material realities of location and context, I 
learned at first hand the different possibilities for collective learning between 
technical communities (Brown and Duguid 2001) in diverse circumstances; this was 
materially associated with employees’ everyday routes.14  
My perception of those material landscapes and the like was more than an 
auxiliary proof of material landscape. On the one hand, it was also a concern that 
                                                 
14
 Although beyond the scope of the central issues in this thesis, additional questions can be posed by 
thinking over the working spaces experienced and created by the local (technological) staff: along 
which path does knowledge spill over in the functionally-estranged enclave that the workforce 
perceives? And, does the time–space restraint fall into a pattern, working on industrial agglomeration 
of innovation and knowledge fluidity?  
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avoids having a prejudice in favour of “analyses of spatial clusters or development 
within regions” but situates “the focus on the firm as the unit of analysis” in “the 
development of the region as a whole” (Sayer 1982; cited in Perrons 2001: 210). On 
the other hand, the fieldwork experience exposed me to ‘reflexive management’, 
creating an openness to “re-presenting messy, creative, fragmented and complex 
modes of reality” (Bailey, White et al. 1999: 172). Despite this, one thing became 
problematic during my early stage in the field. There was a plurality of empirical 
observation since I was like a sponge, although it was problematic to absorb anything 
bizarre that arose. Side issues cropping up unexpectedly led me astray. Opportunistic 
on-site observations were eventually positioned as an intermediate method, balancing 
and making sense of printed information and informants’ responses at each stage of 
data collection and then communicating empirical narratives with 
theoretically-informed accounts. Pieces of information or images inserted into field 
notes were conceived of as helpful in understanding the industrial circumstances in 
which Taiwanese firms were engaged. But when bringing the materials into 
economic-focused geographical research within a cross-cultural context, I was aware 
of a latent danger of creating illusions or new biases (Clark 1998).  
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3.4  Accessing and reporting ‘situatedness’ 
Access to a research setting is never a given. What is open at one 
juncture can be closed at another time or in different circumstances. 
(Lee 1995: 16) 
The business of actually initiating interviews was a frustrating experience. I try 
to illustrate the complicated situation of recruiting informants in Appendix C with 
indications of location and timeframe. There was often no reply after mailing named 
individuals at an early stage of the research. I was also directly rejected, mainly by 
secretaries, when making a direct enquiry to relevant companies on the list. Having 
received a series of rejections, I decided that I would need to make the reason for the 
request of an interview less specific. The wording of the objective was slightly 
altered: “I’d like to ask you some questions about corporate strategies and disposition 
for outward investment” – in place of westward investment. Changing the tone 
appeared a bit deceptive but was necessary in order to pass through several 
gatekeepers. However, in comparison, drawing on personal networks (i.e. calling or 
mailing friends and relatives to ask if they knew any potential informants) bore an 
immediate result. It seemed to me that seeking out a potential respondent directly 
was less easy than getting through by guanxi, at least in the first round of fieldwork 
in Taiwan. In general terms, the experience of recruitment might be a result of 
coincidence or luck, or just that business people are reluctant to answer student 
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queries. But it would dangerous to dismiss out of hand “the deeper structures that 
generate events and discourses” (McDowell 1992: 213, emphasis added).  
According to Cook, “the reasons for why a community and/or situation … is not 
open to you may reveal vital clues to its character [of the research objectives]” (Cook 
1997: 132). I intended to unravel the ‘why’ of a series of rejections. The means of 
accessing the field were not intentional but were compelled by the circumstances at 
the time. Making manufacturing investments in the Mainland is always an open 
secret even though it has long been forbidden legislatively by the Taiwan 
Government. What one senior manager said was both explicit and pertinent:  
[we are all] afraid to talk. All are proceeding [in the Mainland] on tiptoe; 
[but] just cannot [talk].  
The initial cases in which I was refused access were conveyed with a gentle 
wording under thin excuses (such as a coincidence of a manager’s tight schedule, an 
impression of intrusion or corporate confidentiality). The situation worsened later. 
Many corporations I contacted made no excuses but simply gave a flat denial. This 
was particularly problematic during an episode of legal action in February 2005. The 
UMC was raided by the public prosecutor, accused of having illegal connections 
with another start-up foundry, HJTC, in Suzhou. More than 20 key employees of 
HJTC (who were UMC’s ex-employees) had travel restrictions imposed upon them 
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at that time. This event, albeit surprising, threw the whole industrial circle and me 
into a panic and discloses the true reason why the interviewing access was so 
problematic. At one time in Suzhou one interviewee introduced me to his colleague 
by making a joke that “I’m sure she is okay; she won’t spy on us”. For the 
managers/engineers, it would undoubtedly be running a risk to talk to someone 
unknown who might disclose information to create trouble or even ruin them (cf. 
Mullings 1999; Sabot 1999).  
I do not mean to define the incident as a watershed, marking out a degree of 
difficulty concerning corporate responses found in Taiwan, but to point out the tip of 
an iceberg that indicates a suspicion of research enquiry in the industry. The problem 
of permission and access is pertinent in explaining the ‘sticky’ moments at which 
objects, events and considerations are contextualised. According to regulation, once 
an investment project has applied for a grant, the result of the official decision should 
be given in three months. A domestic chipmaker proposed to apply for permission to 
open a fab15 in China in August of 2004, but the project was asked not to make an 
application until January 2005 (some six months later). One respondent in charge of 
opening a branch plant complained about the administrative delays on qualification. 
                                                 
15
 The word ‘fab’ is short for wafer-fabricating plant. 
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The words that an official of Taiwan’s Investment Commission suggested he quoted 
make sense: “you[‘d better] come [to apply for a grant] after an election”. The reason 
is that once the outcome was declared in December (of 2004) when the presidential 
campaign was in full swing, the public voice must make a noise no matter whether 
this project would be approved or not. The challenge of having corporate interviews 
was actually a matter of timing, seeking access in precarious circumstances, and a 
fear of political reprisal or rejection often resulted in ambiguity, obfuscation and 
cryptic comments. The accessibility is involved with the methodological nuance of 
reflexive ontology demonstrating that free-floating access is hardly a case in concrete 
studies. The timing is concerned with a sensitivity to “the politics of time as a 
research moment” (Ward and Jones 1999: 301).  
So far, I have made a brief explanation of the corporate interviews in Taiwan by 
drawing upon the informants’ response after receiving an academic enquiry. I now 
turn to the interviews in China. I contacted potential informants in China via three 
interviewed respondents. I was obliged to reconcile myself to the possibility of 
failure in data collection and made a decision to take the plunge. Only three 
interviews were arranged before my setting out and an additional four respondents 
were recruited through a snowball method in the locality. The first fieldtrip to China 
was of some help, despite starting with a small number of interviews. I seemed to 
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have more positive replies when making a call to ask if there would be any 
possibility of conducting an academic interview during the sensitive period I was 
there.  
The Taiwanese staff in China were friendly towards me, which was in sharp 
contrast to the experience in Taiwan. Those who were assigned to China appeared 
more relaxed, although some of them might have felt ill at ease at the outset. As they 
made sure that my purpose in coming would not be threatening and perilous to them, 
a rapport was developed, to a degree. They talked about the organisational structure, 
the (outline of the) strategies for marketing and manpower, and their personal 
experiences in a light-hearted manner. Many of them even voluntarily made an 
apologetic statement concerning the ‘meanings’ of companies’ outward expansion 
(to China), and made sarcastic remarks on the policy contractions of ‘go-west’ affairs 
(in Taiwan) and the generous tariffs (in China). The same issues would be evaded by 
their Taiwanese colleagues who were circumspect and tended to dodge my queries 
about the business in the Mainland.  
The reporting was given in a distinct manner but its qualities were not mutually 
exclusive in general terms. I do not espouse the either/or stances of interviewees’ 
statements in a neutral sense of data accuracy, but I tried to figure out why the field 
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location made “a story [that] was told ‘that’ way” (Riessman 1993: 2). It is proper 
(and easier) to think of the question by drawing upon the assigned cadres because 
they were directly involved with the investment in China. Many managers and 
engineers have been keen to work abroad (on the Mainland they meant). Such 
resident cadres had a clear stance: “if you [like to] keep doing semiconductor things, 
then just stay in the Mainland”; “[y]our view would be widened, [in spite of] no idea 
of ups or downs”. Certainly, no matter what they aimed at (such as ‘getting on’ or 
broadening scope), a possible risk of career had been stressed: “my boss told me, 
‘never calculate upon a withdrawal [if you fail]; your place won’t be [reserved] 
here’”.  
I found a status of distance to be a key issue. This distance was as a result of 
capital flight and in turn became a measure for business purposes. It refers to a 
transfer of personnel under circumstances that a certain group of elites have 
‘expatriated’ themselves to an alternative position in relation to the home country’s 
domain (of geography and governance). Being a foreign national was instrumental. 
As one Taiwanese CEO (having run a start-up in Suzhou financed by a Taiwanese 
firm) spoke bluntly, “I don’t care [about investment limitations]. I’m of American 
nationality. I won’t be fined 50 million [NT] dollars [by the Taiwanese Government] 
like Richard Chang (the chair of SMIC) [due to his direct investment here]”. 
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Distance gives an artificial impression: being far from the territory of the domestic 
regulation tool effectively allowed the posted staff a ‘buffer space’. Deliberately or 
not, they themselves owned a relatively sheltered status of security to represent their 
own knowledge.  
From the above, it is possible to conclude that “the political time-specific mode 
of entry by the researcher into the research field shapes the contexts, forms of 
response and kinds of ‘knowledge’ obtained” (Ward and Jones 1999: 307). The 
qualitative nuance of reporting is discerned by associating the time–space 
contingency (of the political economic structure) with the respondents (i.e. the 
corporate agents). The way and intent that the Taiwanese respondents articulated 
corporate information, creative insights and/or arbitrary attitudes reflected the 
narrowed entry, which was led by the politically-relative dilemma (e.g. the election 
campaign and the indictment against UMC). In the meantime, the respondents 
resident in the branch offices took a position distant from the arguments in Taiwan; 
they acted in an effective regulatory void which is relatively divorced and detached 
from the debates in Taiwan, and felt able to pass me, a researcher, information of 
strategic trade-offs and ‘buzzes’ and their own interpretations of business 
perspectives from technological, managerial and locational points of view, in often 
subtle ways. In the matter that a certain knowledge is (re)produced through a 
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respondent’s (intentional) choice of (physical) positions, representation of the 
knowledge is actually the text discourse authorised, in Rose’s terms, by the 
respondent in response to the moment when the research is undertaken (Amin and 
Thrift 1997; Rose 1997; Ward and Jones 1999; Reid-Henry 2003). In summary, as 
Schoeberger states, “the knowledge generated is unavoidably filtered through the 
processes by which people make sense of their experiences” (Schoenberger 1991: 
183). The processes consist of research situatedness, of “what those actions mean in 
context” (Hoggart, Lees et al. 2002: 16), and which is constrained/enabled by 
political concerns mobilised at the scale of the state.  
3.5  Conclusion 
A clear justification for the selection of the research methods employed in this 
study has been discussed in this chapter. The rationale, strategies and processes 
behind the research were framed by the qualitative approach. With recognition that 
social phenomena are tangled but contextualised, this approach is flexible in that it 
allows for the generation of modest, situated knowledge. My efforts to collect data 
were made by incorporating the techniques of documentary sources, in-depth 
interviews and observations.  
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I underline two arguments emerging from the chapter. First, the practice of 
research was not a linear process; instead, I kept reorganising and interrogating the 
questions to explore the relevant themes which emerged as the preliminary results 
came out. The data-collection tools played complementary roles by building 
incremental knowledge. The documentary review contributed to primary materials 
from the industrial statistics to the profiles of my targeted interviewees, while the 
field-based methods helped to anchor tangled information by contextualising the 
interpretation of non-verbal interview nuances and landscape texts. Second, the issue 
of political temporality is crucial to my study. On the one hand, it was a 
methodological question reflected by the hurdle of gaining fieldwork access and 
respondents’ sometimes awkward attitudes towards my academic visit. On the other 
hand, it was an empirical background contextualising the practical actions and 
intangible discourses through which Taiwanese IC firms engage in cross-Strait 
business. The ensuing discussion of a domestic debate on ‘go-west investment’ has 
been significantly informed by the political-temporal contingency. The following 
chapters provide empirical narratives of the subject matter. The geographical shift of 
the global IC production chain, in tandem with organisational changes and 
technological evolution, will be examined first in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT INDUSTRY: DIVISION OF LABOUR 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the empirical background of the thesis with regard to the 
industrial tendencies of the IC sector. Organisational evidence of the temporal 
trajectories of the industrial systems is provided. The narrative considers the 
theoretical implications of the research for understanding the international division of 
labour, national innovation systems, and clustering dynamics. But, before getting 
into the main issue, it is appropriate to give a general description of the IC industry 
within a global context. In Section 4.2, an elementary background is given to aid 
understanding of the industrial trajectory. The IC production process is first 
described. Following an analysis of the features of electronic components, the 
spatio-organisational structure of IC industrial production on a broad geographical 
scale is interpreted. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 reveal the evolving process of the 
international division of labour by focusing attention on a migration of the US IC 
manufacturing to East Asia. Implicitly, but essentially, the chapter examines the 
(Taiwanese) IC industry within the context of developmental agenda. 
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4.2  The procedure of IC manufacturing and its components 
An IC (generally called a chip) is a piece of semiconductor material with a set 
of electric connections etched on it to perform tasks of digital data storage or 
amplification. Semiconductor devices were originally built as discrete components, 
such as diodes and transistors, but the incorporation of these functions on one silicon 
chip in the 1950s created considerable potential for miniaturisation. The commercial 
production of IC began in 1958, with TI and Fairchild leading the way (Tilton 1971). 
Chip production for consumer markets became significant during the 1970s when the 
application of ICs to consumer commodities accounted for nearly 25% of all chip 
sales (Saxenian 1983).  
Chip manufacture goes through a set of complicated and precise processing 
segments. There are three main stages of IC production involving related support 
industries: (1) IC design and ‘mask marking’; (2) wafer fabrication; and (3) chip 
assembly and testing (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1  The processing flow of IC production 
The purpose of IC design is to create a product which is marketable or which 
meets a customer’s specific requirement. Many sophisticated engineering problems 
must be worked out in the design process, which is related to the particular function 
to be performed, the specification to be defined, and the consideration of process 
technology for fabrication. The completed circuit layout is stored on a tape using the 
database format. In electronics, ‘tape’ refers to the writing of the magnetic tape with 
the final data file describing the circuit layout and other details, although magnetic 
tapes are now rarely used for this process. The final stage of the design of a chip is 
called ‘tape-out’: that is, the point at which the description of a circuit is sent for 
mask marking. Mask marking copies the designed circuits onto a glass plate as the 
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mask for fabrication (Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2  Illustration of mask marking 
In the fabricating process, each wafer is run repeatedly through various 
procedures using masks that fabricate the circuits upon the wafers. Every wafer will 
possess hundreds of identical chips on completion, with each of them containing 
millions of submicron circuits, photo-etched on its surface. The complexity of 
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fabrication is related to the numbers of masks used. For example, one DRAM has 
over 20 masks to run; that is, to complete one piece of DRAM it is necessary to 
repeat the processes of oxidation, implantation, diffusion, and photo and etching 
more than 20 times. Thus, the fabrication can take several weeks, even months, to 
complete. 16  Chipmaking is an extremely intricate process carried out in very 
expensive ‘clean rooms’ which are rigorously controlled under management 
schedules designed to reduce yield loss (i.e. the rejecting rate of wafer output which 
is associated with the production cost of wafer output). In the final assembly stage, 
which involves less technical competence, the completed wafers are cut for 
packaging as individual chips so as to make electrical connections17 and to protect 
them against moisture and contaminants. After testing, the chips can be applied to 
diverse electronic commodities.  
Two distinctive features of the IC production procedure are significant for 
economic geography. First, all the procedures are “relatively disarticulatable from 
                                                 
16
 The wafers are sliced from silicon crystals, so the size of each wafer depends on the diameter of the 
crystal; normally, wafers are 6-inches, 8-inches or 12-inches. The size of the wafer determines the 
power of the chip: the larger the wafer diameter the greater the capacity of the chip.  
17
 The chips are mounted on a piece of plastic or ceramic, and connected to metal pins, so that they 
can be connected to printed circuit boards (PCB). 
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one another” (Scott 1986: 144; see Henderson and Scott 1987) and therefore 
potentially flexible. Second, every step in the processing flow is “an important and 
complex labour in its own right” (Scott and Angel 1987: 880). Thus, IC production is 
characterised by technical divisibility owing to its finely detailed division of labour 
with special knowledge involved in individual stages. This divisibility is further 
reinforced by a tendency towards miniaturisation within chip manufacture. The 
pursuit of miniaturising18 the circuit line-width of chips has been ever-present since 
IC first came into existence, and is inherent in an innovative process which seeks to 
encompass more and more functions on one piece of chip.  
A twofold commercial logic of electronic components enables electronic goods 
to be versatile and/or portable to fit in with market demand. Driven by an ethos of 
miniaturisation, all the input elements, including labour skills, managerial procedures, 
production facilities, etc., are constantly upgraded and revised in chip design. 
Similarly, the trend of miniaturising chips raises the entry barrier to chipmaking, 
because it requires a great deal of investment to upgrade technology and facilities. 
                                                 
18
 The substitution of chips for previous components, such as, for example, vacuum tubes and 
transistors, is based upon the continuous reduction in the size of chips yet their capacity to bear more 
functions. The cutting-edge technology in 1984 was 1.0-m line-width. Some leading chipmakers, 
Taiwanese firms included, have put the 65-nm process technology into mass production since 2007.  
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For instance, to build one cutting-edge 12-inch wafer line would cost nearly US$3 
billion, coupled with the R&D expenditure of US$1.5 billion to develop up-to-date 
processing technologies. This large and continuous investment in technologies and 
fixed capital perpetually raises the cost of production. The difficulty of internalising 
production, meanwhile, is reinforced by the pressure of time economies as a result of 
a shortened life-cycle of the product. In this sense, the production process tends 
towards vertical disintegration (Scott 1988; Walker 1988; Storper and Harrison 
1991).  
Vertical disintegration is driven by more than simple cost considerations. While 
IC production is technology-intensive and market-driven to a certain degree, the 
direction of IC industry development is not confined to self-explanatory 
technological logic following the ‘science-technology-production’ process. Rather, 
the developmental trajectory of the industry calls for dense, subtle interactions, both 
organisational and spatial, along its input-output structure. It is the technological 
trajectory that Dosi suggests in order to stress the complexity of the relationship 
between technological change and economic growth; he draws attention to 
non-technological variables as an explanation for innovative process (Dosi 1982).  
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From the next section on, particular attention is paid to the sectors of design and 
fabrication considering that, empirically, they are the axis of IC production with high 
technology involvement and that, technically, industrial and spatial presence are 
important considerations. 
4.3  The dispersion of assembly operations 
The restructuring of the IC industry can be dated from the 1970s in its 
birthplace, Silicon Valley. This process of industrial realignment, as Saxenian (1983) 
documents, was due both to changes in the local labour force and the shifting nature 
of competition in the IC industry. The former refers to the spatial dispersion of 
manufacturing activities because of wage increases and local labour shortages after a 
couple of decades’ growth in the IC industry. The assembly sector vis-à-vis other IC 
sectors is characterised by labour intensive but routinised processes; thus, these 
‘back-end’ manufacturing functions were first relocated from the Silicon Valley to 
locations with cheaper labour costs, both within the US and to developing countries, 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Saxenian 1983; Henderson and Scott 1987; 
Scott and Angel 1987; Scott and Angel 1988).
The operation of offshore assembly in some selected locations of the global 
periphery was originally explained through the theoretical framework of the new 
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international division of labour (NIDL). International assembly managed by 
US-based companies19 was undertaken to take advantage of favourable labour costs 
in Asia. However, researchers did not conclude that the US companies merely aimed 
to make use of the “ownership advantages to exploit the location-specific advantages 
of the host economy” (Chen 1983: 209). Rather, a core-periphery pattern of 
industrial structure emerged at a regional level from the mid-1970s onwards (Scott 
1986; Henderson and Scott 1987; Coffey 1996). Research on offshore assembly in 
Southeast Asia has certainly provided emphatic evidence to explain that the spatial 
realignment of the industrial system was underpinned by technology spillovers from 
US-based assembly branches, together with the intervention of developmental states 
and a socio-economic presence in the selected localities.  
It is undeniable that the operation of offshore assembly reflected ‘a rather static 
picture of the way foreign direct investments function in peripheral areas’ (Scott 
1986: 156) and its industrial linkages remained hierarchical, both organisationally 
and geographically. Most assembly branches were operated by US-based integrated 
                                                 
19
 I do not suggest that the US firms were superior to European or Japanese firms regarding 
contribution of direct overseas investments to internationalisation of the IC industry (Sayer 1986; 
Scott 1986). But this narrative presents the empirical specificity that reorganisation of the US IC 
industry was dynamically associated with IC industrialisation in the Asian Tigers, although lower in 
technological capacity, through an internationalisation of spatial processes.  
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device manufacturers (IDMs), while the locally-owned plants were inferior to their 
international counterparts in both scale and capability. That is, there was an uneven 
geography of technological competence between the core on the one hand (i.e. 
Silicon Valley), and the periphery/semi-periphery (i.e. production sites in Asia) on 
the other hand. During this period, industrial restructuring was more geographically 
dispersive than organisationally transformative.  
4.4  An extensive division of labour 
There was a profound reshaping of the geography of IC production as the nature 
of competitive advantage changed in this market. A demand for chips in 
fast-changing consumer markets, combined with the miniaturisation of devices, 
escalated from the 1960s onwards. Product life-cycles began to be shortened. In 
terms of international competition, US firms suffered from the formidable 
competition of Japanese companies in the world market during the first half of the 
1980s (Angel 1994). US firms turned their product emphasis away from commodity 
products, such as DRAM,20 to differentiated, design-intensive, high value-added 
custom components (Schoenberger 1988; Hobday 1989; Angel 1990) in addition to 
                                                 
20
 The memory chips are output in large, standard lines, requiring less design flexibility but heavy 
fixed assets.   
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appealing for a legal aid against Japanese ‘dumping’ (Yoffie and Milner 1989).21 
Technically, the growth of advanced customised chips in small-volume output was 
encouraged during the 1980s because the upgrade of design technology, such as 
electronics design automation (EDA) tools, and process technologies, such as 
low-volume flexible management, reduced production costs. Thanks to the 
widespread use of application-specific IC (ASIC), downstream electronic 
manufacturers have experienced a considerable growth by reducing time and money 
spent on system-technology R&D (Angel 1994). Consequentially, the exploitation of 
the production systems in the US shifted to economies of scope from economies of 
scale. The requirement for diversification and speed of product output has made IC 
production more market-driven, which in turn intensified the innovation of chip 
design (Saxenian 1983; Saxenian 1991).  
Electronics manufacturers require novel components and diverse sources of 
component supply to meet the market volatility. IC design start-ups – also known as 
fablesses – gained more opportunities to develop proprietary technologies for 
small-volume market niches in the second half of the 1980s (Angel 1990; Hobday 
                                                 
21
 That is the claim that Japanese firms were deliberately selling goods at artificially low prices to this 
market to drive competitors out of the market.  
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1991; Angel 1994). Without fabricating facilities, the IC design houses needed to 
contract their designs to IC producers, i.e. the IDMs, which meant that firms such as 
Intel and TI took on full-range processing. A significant specialisation of the IC 
production system, therefore, began to develop. A vertically disintegrated production 
system emerged among the fablesses and the IDMs, while the two corporate parties 
competed against each other in technological innovation and for market share. 
Consequently, the fablesses suffered from the reluctance of IDMs to lease fab 
capacity for chipmaking (Economist May 19th 2001) particularly during boom 
periods for IC. The IC design houses, meanwhile, remained subordinated to IDMs 
because the latter dominated the manufacturing process and capital-intensive 
facilities.  
As vertical disintegration proceeded, the geographies of IC production in East 
Asia were transformed. Mathews and Cho (Mathews and Cho 2000) propose a 
conceptual explanation for the dynamics behind the East Asian experience, teasing 
out various ‘technology leverage strategies’ used by South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and, to some extent, Malaysia in rapidly catching up – and in some cases 
overtaking – the rest of the world. From an institutional point of view, one distinct 
developmental model – a ‘national system of economic learning’ – attributes the 
success of the East Asian experience in promoting knowledge-intensive industry, 
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including the IC sector, through a learning path of technology acquisition rather than 
original innovation. Industrial ‘latecomers’ made remarkable progress in upgrading 
their microelectronic technologies over the last two decades. For example, the rise of 
the Japanese microelectronic industry took much of the market share away from US 
firms in the first half of the 1980s, while South Korea has “built up strong in-house 
capabilities” (Hobday 1995) and is currently ranked at the top in the DRAM world 
market.  
A striking transformation may be seen in the case of ‘pure-play’ foundry 
services, which were first created by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. 
(TSMC) in 1987. This was an innovative production model that “specialise[d] in 
capital-intensive manufacture and [did] none of the design” (Economist May 19th 
2001: 62), distinguishing itself from the original IC producers, IDMs, in several 
respects:  
A foundry would specialise in capital-intensive manufacture and do none 
of the design. It would then sell capacity to many customers – not only 
chip designers that had no plants but also IDMs22 whenever they hit 
production bottlenecks – and consequently achieved economies of scale 
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 Actually, the outsourcing from IDMs was some 30% of pure-play chipmakers’ output value in 
2003, according to the IC insights. For example, Motorola closed down 10 of its 18 factories (about 
25% of its chipmaking) and outsourced by the end of 2002; meanwhile, TI farmed out 10% of its total 
manufacturing in 2002, and the proportion kept climbing (Business Week June 24th 2002).  
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and better returns on big capital investments. For designers, foundries 
would lower barriers to entry by offering them a factory for hire, while 
keeping their intellectual property secret. 
(Economist May 19th 2001: 62) 
A foundry provides a supporting service, and the specialised, small IC design 
houses were allowed to focus upon “innovative muscle and marketing clout to drive 
and define the market for new products” (Sturgeon 2000: 13) and so became 
numerous worldwide. In the mid-1980s, there were only about 20 IC designers, 
indicating a dependence on the IDMs to produce their chips, although the number 
has increased to over 1,000 worldwide (http://www.fsa.com/). This structural 
breakthrough encourages a transformation in the spatial division of labour in this 
sector. Taiwan, for instance, “dominate[s] what has become a $16 billion global 
industry” (Business Week May 16th 2005) by means of providing highly 
technology-intensive services to global customers, mainly in the US. As shown in 
Figure 4.3, the industrial structure has been divided into an intricate hybrid with an 
increase in the degree to which production specialisation increases. The juxtaposition 
of the original IDMs and finely separated fractions shows that the division of labour 
in the IC industry becomes multipartite and closely interdependent. The sectoral 
relationship is, therefore, dynamically redefined: foundries might not only take 
advantage of running in full capacity but also regulate market fluctuations owing to 
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various sources of specialised orders; while design houses are able to embark on the 
introduction of novel products by continual design innovation but need not make the 
large investments necessary to set up an expensive fab operation. In combination 
with the processes of multiplying vertical disintegration, the spatial tendency of the 
IC industry represents an extensive connection that enables production complexes in 
East Asia to coordinate/compete with the sustainable ‘technology districts’ in 
advanced economies.  
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Figure 4.3  Illustration of vertical disintegration in IC industry 
Notes: * refers to silicon intellectual property (SIP or IP) vendor; ** refers to design house. 
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4.5  Conclusion  
The process of IC industrialisation has seen a geographical transformation over 
time in both technological and organisational dimensions. Globally extensive 
manufacturing is organised in a contractual form, where multi-layered technologies 
are scattered across multiple sites, so that lower-ended processing lines are 
geographically separated from highly capitalised and knowledge-intensive units, 
such as R&D or design. The IC industry is representative of the hierarchical world 
system, but its international division of labour is not fixed in a rigid manner. The 
Asian NIEs are found to have considerable advantages in a process of long-term 
learning and, thus, in technological promotion. They are able to involve themselves 
more widely and deeply with the progression of the industry – although their terms 
and conditions remain dominated by the multinationals from the developed countries. 
In the following chapters, central attention is paid to analysing Taiwan’s industrial 
trajectory and its geographies of industrialisation with special reference to the 
organisational fabric of the (trans/)local IC production chain. It is necessary to 
understand the qualities of the IC industrial system evolving in Taiwan before I look 
at production transplants in China and the political issues related to production 
de-territorialisation. As a result, the next chapter will concentrate upon the rise of the 
Taiwanese IC industry and its properties of industrial systems.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
GEOGRAPHIES OF THE IC INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter begins to develop the empirical study contained in the thesis. It 
serves as an introduction to the geographical industrialisation of the IC sector in 
Taiwan. The spectacular growth of the Taiwanese economy, in line with the other 
Tiger economies, is attributed to the efficiency of official guidance (although the 
policy instruments differ between the Asian NIEs as a whole).23 The fundamental 
stance of the thesis accepts the idea that “state intervention is a given” (Evans 1995: 
10) and crucial in driving the industrialisation of East Asia. However, it is important 
not to underplay other mechanisms related to the top-down nature of economic 
growth. Two points deserve to be mentioned among these. One refers to the 
entrepreneurial momentum of the private sector which complements the 
‘bureaucratic economy’. The business enterprises were outward-looking and 
encouraged to be so by national export programmes. Taiwan’s firms were engaged in 
                                                 
23
 It has been emphasised that the Far East experience is distinguished from the Western model (a 
critical theoretical reflection in Yeung and Lin 2003). Although the Tiger economies are used to being 
grouped into one group, the common results were archived by various historical backgrounds and 
institutional contexts (Whitley 1992; Preston 1998). 
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flexible manufacturing. It is certain that there was a “sustain[ed] entrepreneurial 
vitality and commercial adaptability of [a] decentralized industrial system that is 
preserved by the state” (Chan and Clark 1994: 137; cf. Buck 2000). The ethos of 
such a system is ‘small-is-beautiful’, which has been described as guerrilla 
capitalism (Lam 1990). A second point is beyond the scope of substance in the state 
and/or enterprises. It is contingencies of the space-time variable that persistently 
impinge upon the industrialisation and globalisation of East Asian economies (see 
Preston 1998; Olds, Dicken et al. 1999).  
The space-time dynamics that exist and evolve in industrial situations of the 
local firms – as well as the changing postures of the state-business nexus – should 
not be underplayed in the context of late-industrialisation. Attention is drawn to the 
properties of the Taiwanese IC industry and the dynamics of geographical 
(re/)formation. It is an attempt to identify the process by which indigenous 
corporations become more receptive to the world market and reject the productive 
limits of national borders. The global chain approach is of merit in understanding the 
industrial evolution owing to its useful framework which frees the late-industrialised 
economies from a pre-designated geographical scale of boundary-confinement.  
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The evidence revolving around the geographical trajectories of Taiwan’s IC 
industrial sector is outlined in the rest of the chapter. Section 5.2 reviews the 
industrialisation of the IC sector in Taiwan in a nationally-guided dimension. 
However, this perspective suffers from questions of geographical substance with 
reference to a territorialised industrial system. The issue is complemented by spatial 
experiences of entrepreneurial activities in Section 5.3. Case studies are developed 
with reference to issues of network, proximity and extension. I will explore these by 
associating the relationship between clustering and connotations of place and 
boundary. In the final section, I argue that the industrial complex area of Taiwan is a 
crucial link within global IC production networks.  
5.2  An institutional trajectory of industrialisation  
Over the course of the last three decades, Taiwan’s IC industry has come to the 
forefront with significant industrial chains and output value. Currently, both 
pure-play foundries and outsourcing assembly are dominant, taking the lion’s share 
of production worldwide, as much as 72.9% and 30.4% respectively in 2001, 
according to the Industry and Technology Intelligence Service (ITIS). Meanwhile, 
the IC design sector in Taiwan accounted for almost 26% of global production in the 
same year, ranked second only to the US. This developmental trajectory was given 
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significant impetus by the Taiwanese state (Wade 1990; Castells and Hall 1994; 
Mathews 1997; Fuller 2002).  
5.2.1  Guided by the government  
I shall focus upon two dimensions of national strategies for promoting the 
highly technology-involved industry of the IC sector: technology diffusion and 
creation of industrial parks. Before going further, it is necessary to give a brief 
introduction to industrial transition in Taiwan. The success of Taiwan’s long-term 
economic growth was mainly ascribed to an export-oriented strategy that made good 
use of industrious but low-cost labour. Nevertheless, the labour-intensive industrial 
structure exposed the national economy to latent problems rooted in the scarcity of 
natural resources and export-led manufacturing possessing. Two energy crises in the 
1970s drove Taiwan to confront its inadequate energy sources and triggered the 
decision to upgrade the domestic economy towards energy-efficient, high-tech and 
high value-added sectors. In the late 1970s, the government undertook several 
measures to promote a technology upgrade.24 The developing trend was imperative 
                                                 
24
 The earliest national technological policy, the Guidelines for National Long-term Science 
Development, was promulgated in 1959. However, the procedure was not formalised until the late 
1970s (Li 1995). 
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in the 1980s. This was because the main source of competitive advantage in 
Taiwan – its ample and cheap labour pool – had diminished due to a long-term low 
unemployment rate and steep wage rises. According to official statistics, the average 
unemployment rate in Taiwan was 2% between 1978 and 1988. The real wages in 
1980 were nearly four times as much as those in 1960 (Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001: 52). 
This changing climate burdened the labour-intensive manufacturing sector with 
higher labour costs, which revealed Taiwan’s weak position within the international 
division of labour, and its dependence upon labour-intensive output.25  
The domestic electronics industry has been made up overwhelmingly of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to the government’s support of 
state-owned enterprises since the 1970s (Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001), which limited the 
ability of the private sector to invest in manufacturing innovation and to absorb 
state-of-the-art technologies. In this sense, Taiwan has a significant technology lag in 
respect to advanced countries. For example, compared to R&D expenditures of 2.3% 
in the US and 2.35% in Japan, research expenditure in Taiwan accounted for merely 
0.71% of GDP in 1980 (Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001: 65, Table 3.2). For purposes of 
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 The main export products were textile products, and electrical machinery and apparatus, making up 
over 40% of the total export turnover aggregately since the 1970s (Jou and Wu 1993). 
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industrial promotion, the government took responsibility for piloting the 
development of the IC industry from the mid 1980s onwards (Chen and Sewell 1996; 
Hsu 2000).  
The government sourced advanced technology from abroad through 
international licensing and this typified the national learning strategy. The indigenous 
IC industry in Taiwan started with an initial technology contract with an American 
company, RCA, in the mid-1970s, when the Electronics Research and Service 
Organization (ERSO) was set up under ITRI, which took charge of IC technology 
acquisition (Liu 1993). This may be described as an accommodative approach, by 
which the state sought to connect the development of domestic industry with the 
tendencies of the global technology market (Wang 1994). Under the agreement, 
ESRO sent 37 engineers to RCA for one-year’s technical training in 1976. Following 
training in the US, the engineers brought back not only IC technology but also 
managerial skills, including knowledge of design and testing processes, fabricating 
management, and accounting (Chang, Shih et al. 1994).  
The trainees became the pivotal media for the transfer of comprehensive IC 
manufacturing know-how to Taiwan’s IC industry as a whole (Hsu 2000). In 1977, 
the first prototype plant was set up for a pilot run of IC manufacturing in Taiwan 
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with RCA’s assistance (Chang, Shih et al. 1994). From then on, any technology 
acquired has been assimilated successfully within the national system of innovation. 
It fosters local talent in collaboration with domestic universities in order to 
disseminate advanced technology from abroad and to build up in-house technological 
know-how. For instance, there was the Multi Project Chip (MPC) programme 
initiated to improve students’ and professors’ practical ability in IC design through 
computer-aided design training at ITRI (Chang, Shih et al. 1994). The primary 
reason that ITRI devoted resources to sourcing IC technology from abroad was to 
promote the industry, by transferring new technology to commercial operations (Li 
1995). To achieve this task, ITRI began to focus its research efforts upon business 
firms by setting up spin-off companies as well as financial assistance in various R&D 
stages (Liu 1993; Chang, Shih et al. 1994) (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1  Government-funded projects for IC industry promotion 
Project/exp. Objectives  Tech. capability Main spin-offs 
EIDP-I 
(1976-1979) 
NT$489 mil. 
To acquire IC design & manuf. technology 
To establish pilot operation 
7.0m CMOS N/A 
EIPD-II 
(1979-1983) 
NT$796 mil. 
To improve CMOS facilities 
To promote mask technology 
To promote IC applications in industry 
3.5m CMOS UMC 
Syntek 
VLSI  
(1983-1988) 
NT$2,921 mil. 
To establish VLSI process technology  
To acquire CAD for VLSI ICs 
To promote VLSI IC application 
1.0m CMOS TSMC 
TMC 
ULSI 
(1990-1994) 
NT$5,500 mil. 
To acquire submicron process technology 
To establish ULSI pilot plant 
To promote ULSI IC application 
0.5m CMOS VIS 
Source: (Liu 1993: 303, Table 2; Mathews 1997: 43, Table 2). 
Notes: EIPD is short for the Electronic Industry Development Project, VLSI is for Very Large Scale 
Integration Project, and ULSI is for Ultra Large Scale Integration Project.  
Since the first spin-off was funded in 1979, the entire structure of Taiwan’s IC 
production, ranging from design, masking, fabricating, packaging and testing, had 
been completed continuously until the late 1980s (Liu 1993). The United 
Manufacturing Corp (UMC)26 was the first spin-off company from ERSO founded 
in 1979. To ensure that the process of technology transfer was smooth and efficient, 
ERSO started with a transfer project team to cooperate with the preparatory office of 
UMC. This involved establishing an IC fabrication plant with 4-inch wafer capability, 
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 There was 40% of UMC equity capital from the government, and the remainder was from the 
private sector (Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001). 
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providing the latest information on equipment selection and so forth. ERSO also 
offered almost all the executives to UMC. The support personnel covered all the 
sectors of a business firm, including design, manufacturing, quality control, and 
marketing sectors (Chang, Shih et al. 1994). In addition, UMC had its IC design 
masked in ERSO at that time, so that it did not need to send its IC design abroad for 
the masking procedure (Chang, Shih et al. 1994). 
Following the setting up of UMC, a number of staff members from ERSO 
initiated enterprises in the design sector. As the number of domestic IC design 
companies increased, the requirement for the development of the very large-scale 
integrated circuits (VLSI) became urgent. The VLSI project was achieved, and 
carried out IC fabricating procedures for IC design houses, which led to an 
increasing demand for IC mask manufacturing. Thus, ERSO initiated the sourcing of 
masking technology from overseas in the early 1980s and opened the Taiwan Mask 
Corp. (TMC) in 1988. The creation of TMC completed Taiwan’s IC industry, as it 
now had facilities that ranged from design, masking, foundry and packaging to 
testing (Liu 1993). Among numerous spin-off companies, the foundation of the 
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Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (TSMC)27 was a distinct landmark 
in the global IC industry (Electronic Business November 1st 2005) due to its taking 
the lead in developing a made-to-order model service revealed in Chapter Three. 
Taiwan’s IC manufacturing sector has seen an astonishing growth for the last three 
decades. For example, two major foundries (TSMC and UMC) have pioneered 
cutting-edge process technologies to produce 12-inch wafers of line-width level at 
90nm and less since 2003.  
In addition to transferring technologies to private firms, the government 
developed a strategy to encourage investment that would promote the overall 
development of the IC industry. To archive this, the Hsinchu Science-based 
Industrial Park (HSIP) was opened in north Taiwan in 1980 in an attempt to create a 
specific industrial district (Figure 5.1).  
                                                 
27
 The founder of TSMC is Dr Morris Chang whose previous career was as a top manager at TI 
(1958-1983) and General Instruments (1984-1985). Owing to his familiarity with the semiconductor 
business, Chang foresaw a tendency for the division between the IC design sector and the IC 
fabrication sector to increase. Chang is typical of Chinese expatriates who were recruited by the 
Taiwanese Government to engage with the promotion of the domestic IC industry. 
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Figure 5.1  Spatial distribution of Taiwanese IC companies by sector: 1998 
Source: Adapted from the Year Book of the Semiconductor Industry 1998. 
Note: The data of HSIP is incorporated into Hsinchu.  
The Park was modelled on the export processing zones (EPZs) seen elsewhere 
in East Asia to be ‘a high-tech version of an export processing zone’ (Hsueh, Hsu et 
al. 2001: 61). From the outset it was expected to attract foreign investment from 
high-tech firms to bring advanced technologies and to employ local labour (Li 1995). 
In 1983, there were 37 companies with a combined capitalisation of NT$3 billion; by 
2003, 369 firms were established in the HSIP which, between them, generated 
NT$857.8 billion in annual turnover. In contrast to the original intention, however, 
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most firms in the Park were actually operated by Taiwanese experts from overseas, 
instead of foreign firms per se (Mathews 1997). Actually, foreign investment played 
a negligible role in the development of the domestic IC industry (Amsden and Chu 
2003), while those emergent start-ups there flourished since they enjoyed lots of 
incentives, including convenient transportation networks, preferential tax and duty 
measures, the simplification of administrative procedure, a good infrastructure and 
back-up services28 and so on (Chang, Shih et al. 1994; Li 1995; Chen and Sewell 
1996) 
It is shown clearly in Figure 5.2 that there is a lasting growth of IC output value. 
Together with the increase in profits, the contribution of the IC value to the total 
value in HSIP has a steady growth. Its share exceeded one-third of HSIP’s annual 
revenue in 1991 and has been more than half of that since 1997. The development of 
high-technology firms was not geographically confined to the Park, but spread out in 
north Taiwan, which has captured an increasing share of the market with a 
significant niche in a wide range of electronics manufacturing. In summary, the rise 
of the Taiwanese IC industry benefits from a range of institutional provision 
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 For instant, there is an experimental bilingual school built to accommodate those English-speaking 
children who come with their parents (who are staff in HSIP) from abroad. 
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covering good quality and subsidised premises, infrastructure and business services. 
The industrial agglomeration in north Taiwan embodies the sustainability of 
Taiwan’s IC industry territorially. 
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Figure 5.2  Revenue of the IC sector and its percentage in HSIP: 1986-2007 (billion 
NT$) 
Source: Adapted from the database of the Science Park Administration (www.sipa.gov.tw). 
5.2.2  The analytical limits of institutionalism 
The government was instrumental in leveraging the growth of the IC sector in 
Taiwan. The IC industry, and its territorial complex in north Taiwan, “was not a 
development so much as a creation” (Mathews 1997: 27, emphasis in original); the 
state enabled institutions to take technoglobalist measures to achieve a 
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‘techno-nationalist’ goal (Fuller 2005). As Mathews concludes, the achievement of 
the Taiwanese IC industry has been made possible by a unique technological 
trajectory by which “the institutional framework [was] created and the dynamic 
interactions [were] triggered between firms and public agencies” (Mathews 1997: 48, 
emphasis in original). The idea that local corporations are cast as subservient to 
national development policy is an epistemological concept of the ‘hard state’. As 
Whitley puts it, “where the executive can enforce its economic policies and ensure 
that leading economic actors follow its commands” (Whitley 1992: 27; see various 
national contexts of the IC industry in Mathews and Cho 2000). 
The governmental support has framed the IC sector as an important industry; in 
particular, a full range of infrastructural provision and administrative aids have 
facilitated geographical consolidation of industrial activities. The nationally-guided 
trajectory tells an interesting story about how Taiwan came to the front in an 
industrial sense, while some caveats must be observed. Firstly, an overstress on the 
policy narrative of institutions is an unsatisfactory explanation for the reason why 
Taiwan was able to catch up with its more advanced counterparts over a short period 
and to overtake them in the long-term. On empirical grounds, the guiding role of the 
public sector as an incubator for industrial start-ups and technological promotion has 
yielded ground to the firms with an increasing vibrancy in the private sector. 
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Entrepreneurship within firms has stood out as technology sources were diversified. 
Indeed, based upon the institutional framework of industrial development mapped 
out by the government,29 the firms had an initiative to collaborate with one another 
domestically and increasingly reached out to worldwide counterparts with regard to 
market transactions and non-price connections. The state became more of a supporter 
of the industry in the late 1980s; from then on, there was a steady flow of indigenous 
and expatriate start-ups (Mathews 1997; Hsu 2000).  
Secondly, the explanation fails to associate local performance and improvement 
with the global setting. The review of institutional matters draws upon a domestic 
arrangement and explains that the ‘national system of economic learning’ (Mathews 
and Cho 2000) coordinates with the progressive trajectory. It seems to display a 
one-way flow of technological knowledge and to downplay international factors, 
such as strategic alliances, global demand, talent flows, etc., which might affect the 
industrial outcomes. In a word, the practical reality whereby the domestic industrial 
integrity has climbed up the value-added chains is ignored, for the forming of an 
industrial system is enclosed at a national(ly-led) level.  
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 This national innovation system represents a strategic intent of geographical industrialisation 
involving the regional context of the national system (Hsu and Cheng 2002; and see Bathelt 2003). 
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The third point refers to an assumption that industrial policy acts on a spatial 
isotropic plain. Geographically, the national learning system is prone to even out the 
geographies of industrialisation. The agglomeration of the IC industrial system is 
treated simply as a spatial outcome deployed by the public programmes of industrial 
promotion. It is difficult to expand upon the industrial territorialisation of the 
Taiwanese experience due to a spatial vacuum at both international and subnational 
levels. To sum up, the top-down statist account tends to “assume that capitalism is 
acting on or spreading over an isotropic plain and therefore neglects the range of 
socio-political constellations with which economic forces engage and by which 
varied outcomes develop” (Boggs and Rantisi 2003: 110). 
Other than the explanation that highlights state-driven and incentive-based 
provision, insights from research in new economic geographies offer theoretical 
advances to think about why the Taiwanese IC cluster is able to outrun the 
difficulties of economic adjustments compared to others. Literature on the industrial 
district, in particular, points out the significance of inter-firm synergies in the context 
of territorial development (see Storper 1997). The extent to which a regional 
trajectory is technologically dynamic and innovation-rich relies upon an efficiency of 
socially regularised institutions. Untraded interdependencies play a profound role in 
economic coordination, because they are crucial for “constitut[ing] region-specific 
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assets in production” (Storper 1997: 5). The processes of knowledge spillover and 
information flow are achieved in “a field of forces” (Perroux 1950: 95) where firms 
and others agents (such as public institutes and labour markets) interrelate with one 
another.  
This perspective draws upon “a site of important stock of relational assets” 
(Storper 1997: 44) with an emphasis upon a sense of local ‘institutional thickness’ 
which broadly includes provision of enterprise support systems and the endogenous 
force that firms use to strengthen networks of association (Amin 1994; Amin and 
Thrift 1995; Amin 1999). According to this view, the convergence of the IC firms 
and related agents within north Taiwan has been labelled as an ‘industrial district’ 
(Hsu 1997), a ‘learning region’ (Hsu 1998), a ‘technopole’ (Castells and Hall 1994), 
and a ‘new industrial space’ (Yang 1999). Such an array of terms specifies the 
industrial district of IC production as a typical economic agglomeration which 
represents “critical masse in one place of unusual competitive success in a particular 
field” (Porter 1998: 78). However, it is not my purpose to stylise the Taiwanese IC 
industrial complex as a particular ‘brand’ of clustering here (Gordon and McCann 
2000; Benneworth and Henry 2004). Instead, what follows are endeavours to draw 
upon self-reinforcing dynamics performed by corporate and individual agents 
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(indigenous and foreign) jointly in the state-framed industrial setting and 
externally-connected features of the industrial cluster. 
5.3  Clustering dynamics and beyond 
An industrial cluster is an ensemble of firms, “a large assemblage of producers 
tied into an interdependent whole by means of their external transactional relations” 
(Scott 1988: 28). Some specific regions working out this externalisation of the 
production system found themselves to be surviving or even prospering during the 
Western economic crisis of the 1970s. This unusual phenomenon triggered numerous 
investigations of industrial districts (in the Third Italy ad hoc and other cases in 
places such as Germany) where small- and medium-sized firms were gathered and 
produced an extensive social division of labour as early as the mid-1970s. Following 
this, theoretical argument developed over the possibilities of shifting paradigms in 
capitalism in the 1980s.30 Since the 1990s there has been an account of regional 
advantage connecting the literature on territorial specification with the research of 
techno-economic paradigm (Malmberg 1997; Audretsch 1998; MacKinnon, Cumbers 
                                                 
30
 Piore and Sabel, in particular, see the endogeneity of local productive systems constituting regional 
development to be a more general tendency of industrial success (Piore and Sabel 1984; Sabel 2000). 
It is from a macro perspective beyond the interpretation of “regional individuality” (Lipietz 1993).  
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et al. 2002; Malmberg and Maskell 2002). Literature on geographies of knowledge 
has been carried out to explain and understand the phenomenon of economic 
clustering in a territory. The notions of network and proximity are two relative and 
overlapping elements in some aspects. They are abstracted from the localisation 
literature although with different approaches and changing concerns.  
5.3.1  The arrangement of corporate networks 
The networking practices of economic agents are fundamental to the production 
of agglomerations. Material, intellectual, or social articulation of vertical 
disintegration often works out in (and is illustrated by) the form of a network. The 
network metaphor as the prescription for business success is considered a key to 
regional development (Cooke and Morgan 1993; Castells 1996; and see Dicken, 
Kelly et al. 2001). In light of an instrument for economic growth, Cooke and Morgan 
propose the network paradigm to underline the coordination of intra- and 
inter-organisations in clustering configuration (Cooke and Morgan 1993). In 
focusing upon external networking practices, three distinctions may be identified: (1) 
“close and long-lasting ties between producers and users to capture 
learning-by-using”; (2) “networking and joint ventures as a method for reaping both 
specialisation and coordination gains”; and (3) “long-run and cooperative 
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subcontracting as far as possible in order to promote joint technological innovations” 
(Cooke and Morgan 1993).  
I intend to take an ‘UMC clan’ as an example to illustrate that individual firms 
are more than contractual entities and corporate relationships are not simply 
legally-based. UMC was transformed from an IDM into a made-to-order foundry by 
spinning various design divisions off in the middle 1990s. The UMC clan is known 
as a group of IC companies composed of UMC and those design houses separated 
from UMC. Before I go further, the sectoral trajectory where the vertical 
disintegration of the Taiwanese IC industry has been formed should be added.  
The prosperity of numerous small Taiwanese design houses that make up some 
one quarter of worldwide fabless value can, to a certain extent, be attributed to an 
exclusive relationship with strong indigenous foundries. The first domestic design 
house, Syntek, was spun off from ERSO, in 1982 (Liu 1993; Chang, Shih et al. 1994). 
Up to 1986, there were only four design houses in Taiwan, but the numbers rose to 
more than 40 by the end of 1987 (Chen and Sewell 1996). The interaction between 
domestic fablesses and foundries was initially limited. The percentage of work 
contracted out to foundries at home, though, increased from 34% in 1990 to 94.9% in 
1994 according to the Yearbook of IC Industry (ESRO 1996). Taiwan’s chipmakers 
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had insufficient capacity with outdated processing technology prior to 1990, so that 
the design houses used to contract out to IDMs in the US or Japan at that time (Chen 
1997). With a ‘manufacturing-only’ pattern being adopted, a chipmaker becomes 
concentrated upon advancing process technologies more efficiently. Manufacturing 
procedures are modularised to meet a variety of customer demands. Because 
foundries remove design competition with fablesses, they strengthen a deeper trust 
from design customers. In this sense, foundries can establish a long-term relationship 
with customers on the basis of a tailored service and trust; meanwhile, it also speeds 
up the learning curve by co-working with foreign professional design houses (Chen 
and Sewell 1996). The beneficial results of vertical disintegration have come into full 
play as the technological level of the foundry sector has evolved by cooperating with 
foreign customers. In turn, vertically disintegrated cooperation, together with the 
advantages of spatial proximity, facilitated the boom of domestic design houses.  
I will now move on to the case study of the ‘UMC clan’. As has already been 
said, the UMC was originally founded as an IDM. Because customers have to reveal 
proprietary design details to their foundry partners, they may be unwilling to contract 
with chipmakers in possession of in-house design departments for fear that their 
firm-specific design may be shared. In order to focus its business upon foundry 
activities, and to obtain more orders from design customers, UMC decided to 
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transform itself into a pure-play foundry. As a result, UMC separated its IC design 
divisions into independent companies in 1995. By doing so, it became easier for 
UMC to win trust from customers, because this helped to reduce customers’ doubts 
about the spillover of proprietary technologies. There were five design houses spun 
off with different market niches: they are MediaTek (optical storage IC), Novatek 
(LCD driver IC), ITE (PC I/O IC) and Faraday (IC design service) in Hsinchu, along 
with ITeE (ADSL IC) in Silicon Valley. Sequentially, two more IC companies, 
Holtek (MCU) and SiS (chipset), joined the UMC clan by M&A in 1998 and 2004 
respectively. The design members embody a total commitment to unique market 
niches and perform well in individually professional spheres. In Table 5.2, five 
design members were listed in the top ten design houses in 2005.  
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Table 5.2  The top ten designers in Taiwan: 2005 (million NT$) 
Rank Company Annual revenue Main output UMC partner 
1 MediaTek 46.49 Optic storage ICs √ 
2 Novatek 25.98 LCD driver ICs √ 
3 VIA 19.13 Chipset  
4 Sunplus 18.78 Consumer ICs  
5 Himax 17.78 LCD driver ICs  
6 SiS 11.53 Chipset √ 
7 Realtek 10.64 Communication ICs  
8 Etron 6.71 Power management ICs  
9 Holtek 6.31 MCU √ 
10 Faraday 5.75 IC design service √ 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (March 2006) 
New firms spun off from the original members were also subsumed into the 
UMC clan. For instance, XGI was spun off from SiS in 2003, when SiS was acquired 
by UMC, to commit resources and personnel to the design of professional graphic 
chips in an independent company. Both SiS and UMC hold XGI’s stocks (30% and 
27.59% respectively) and license in-house IPs to XGI. The spin-offs not only obtain 
financial support by an equity arrangement with UMC but also have access to 
technological resources with UMC and other design members. A senior manager 
(Des.16-1) makes clear that  
[we] separated them off, [because] those colleagues expect [it]: ‘I’d like 
to start up [a] company. I have an endless dream and wish to become 
MediaTek [the biggest Taiwanese IC design house specialising in optical 
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storage chips] someday.’ 31 What SiS or UMC can do is to stake them or 
license IPs to them. Now, IP licensing is very important [for advanced 
design] … so the very thing that SiS or UMC group handles [is to license 
IPs] including UMC’s in-house IPs, say, the patent library sale (implying 
the IP library), or the [technological] contracts signed with foreign 
companies. By doing so, [the design members] may share [IPs]. This 
enables many new, small start-ups to employ the IPs, rather than to 
develop all alone or to purchase [IPs]. Thus, we can find that UMC group 
is quite unique among the design houses in Taiwan or worldwide. 
In addition, a periodic fluctuation in chipmaking was related to “ordinary 
cyclical mismatches between capacity and market growth” (Schoenberger 1988: 323) 
in the macro-economy. Therefore, the design members may have more commitments 
on their manufacturing capacity from their foundry partner during IC boom periods 
owing to a tight partnership with UMC. During boom periods, the production 
capability of a foundry cannot match designers’ demands; in turn, foundries struggle 
for orders during a downturn. The design members of a network benefit from close 
technological collaboration and the cheap and speedy output of newly designed chips 
with an assured quality. The way that the members of the UMC clan collaborate with 
one another is not rigidly bound but is a flexible and complementary cooperative 
partnership to accommodate technological and financial resources and to moderate 
the uncertainty of manufacturing cycles.  
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 Certainly, the action of spinning off corporate divides is partly under consideration of business 
strategies and partly based upon a sense of entrepreneurship. 
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There are two common and interrelated points in association with the formation 
of corporate networks in the agglomeration. One is the sense of reciprocity among 
interactive agents, and the other is the involvement of knowledge/information during 
interaction. The constitution of networks is the practical operation of ‘support 
infrastructure’, including reciprocity, trust, learning, partnership and empowerment, 
facilitating the regional economy by activating the technological dynamics. In short, 
the reciprocal relationships evolve into a pattern of pseudo-IDMs, which means 
flexible link-ups of production coordination or business alliances at an inter-firm 
level, in the IC complex of northern Taiwan.  
5.3.2  In the ‘proximities’? 
Spatial proximity is an explicit starting point in analysing economic 
agglomeration. The advantage of physical proximity is related to ‘pecuniary 
externalities’ by which individual companies can benefit from “pools of common 
factors of production” (Harrison 1992: 472). The potential of territorial propinquity 
is associated with externalities generated by the local economy that reduce costs. The 
California School, among others, focuses on an “inner momentum of falling 
production costs” (Scott 1988: 176) as the source of the success of ‘new industrial 
spaces’ (NISs). However, the transaction-intensive position tends to simplify a firm’s 
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responses to uncertainty32 . Any possibility of corporate behaviours is seen as 
market-oriented. As a result, the explanation for economic agglomeration revolves 
around cost-based externalities at the expense of “the political economy of a specific 
society” (Lovering 1990: 163) and the socio-spatial dimension acting to incubate 
local industrial atmosphere (Henry 1992).  
The nature of competition between many companies has shifted towards quality 
improvement rather than price competition (OECD 1996); the price-signals of local 
supply alone are insufficient to explain local sources of competition in the context of 
the knowledge-based economy. The impasse of technological lock-in will not be 
resolved through contractual exchange (Storper 1992; Storper 1995) in the sense that 
“firms are islands of planned coordination in a sea of market mechanisms” (Taylor 
and Asheim 2001: 318). In order to explore the beneficial effects of spatial proximity 
upon technological development, the research concern turns towards an examination 
of how local ties of sociality facilitate the learning process and innovation 
performance (Saxenian 1994; Morgan 1997). Storper argues that the favourable 
condition that sustains regional advantages in prosperous places is the 
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 External transaction is a key mechanism in reducing risks of overcapacity, transferring the tension 
of dispatching labours (Brusco 1982) and enabling returns of an “interrelated whole” increase (Young 
1928: 539).  
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“interdependencies which are untraded, including labour markets, and conventions, 
or common languages and rules for developing, communicating and interpreting 
knowledge” (Storper 1995: 206, emphasis in original).  
The nature and quality of the cluster’s “local nexus of relational assets” (Amin 
and Cohendet 1999: 89) determine how existing knowledge and new ideas are fused 
to generate superior products and services (Storper 1997; Amin and Cohendet 1999). 
The social analysis of economic behaviour is strongly influenced by the concept of 
‘embeddedness’ proposed by Granovetter (Granovetter 1985). The cluster is, 
accordingly, seen as an entire society. To use Gordon and McCann’s (Gordon and 
McCann 2000: 520) words,  
all economic relations (even the ‘pure’ market relations of the 
agglomeration model) are socially embedded in the sense that these 
depend upon norms, institutions and sets of assumptions shared among a 
group of actors and are not, in themselves, simply the outcome of 
economic decisions … industrial clusters differ from the agglomeration 
model in that there is a belief that such clusters reflect not simply 
economic responses to the pattern of available opportunities and 
complementarities, but also an unusual level of embeddedness and social 
integration. 
In this matter, the region is a source of knowledge creation because corporate 
interactions in the proximity facilitate to localise the learning process (Malmberg 
1996; Amin and Cohendet 1999).  
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It is true that “[e]ven the world’s largest and most international firms can no 
longer ‘bet the company’ on the next generation of semiconductors or jumbo jets; in 
many industries the cost of a competitive R&D budget has risen to the point where it 
is no longer possible to ‘go it alone’” (Kobrin 1997: 151). With an increase in 
technological complexity of IC output, the specialty among different sectors becomes 
intensive. Collaboration arrangements between design houses, foundries and 
equipment vendors in the IC industrial district of Taiwan are exemplary. The 
inter-firm governance of technologically-sophisticated inputs along the process of 
chipmaking reveals a multi-lateral collaboration of closeness and extension.  
I shall state the situation of a pilot run in the wafer production first. The pilot 
run is a tentative stage to verify the function of chips in small volumes before batch 
production. During the initial run, engineers from both design houses (i.e. customers) 
and foundries (i.e. manufacturers) have to check out every bottleneck occurring in 
the production process, and then sort out related problems (such as an engineering 
parameter or a design error). This is an iterative and time-consuming process of trial 
and error required to work through a refined run of production; it can take up to six 
months for product engineers from both sides to engage with modification via 
continuous discussion and communication.  
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In practical terms, customers and manufacturers need to reach a common 
cognition surrounding the designing targets and the processing so that the expertise 
from the two sides can be exchanged and understood to the full. Each firm 
specialises in its own form of complicated expertise, so it can only work by 
complementing each other to reach “some kind of coordination” (Malmberg and 
Maskell 2002: 438). The design details are often associated with the customers’ 
intellectual novelty with a highly commercial value, which must not be leaked out. 
Therefore, a basis of high-level trust accumulated by repeated personal contact over a 
long period of time is fundamental so that the design customer would be agreeable to 
reveal proprietary knowledge to their production partners (Zucker 1986; Leyshon, 
Thrift et al. 1998). The foundries and the equipment vendor necessitate a series of 
mutual adjustments in an interpersonal sense during the transacting processes, as 
foundries and design houses do. Because the wafer-related equipment becomes more 
and more complicated as a result of a growing requirement to meet evolving designs 
and process technologies, many machinery hitches or mechanical malfunctions are 
beyond product engineers’ knowledge (von Hippel 1977). A machinery engineer is 
the engineer assigned to a station in customers’ fabs from vendors.33 He should 
                                                 
33
 Making prompt responses is imperative for the sponsor. As Vnd.1 reports, he “must respond in two 
hours and turn up in four hours if customers (i.e. chipmakers) call up … [on] an occasion during 
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understand the principles of machinery architectures so that he can deal with any 
machinery hitch or mechanical malfunctions on the lines.  
But proximity is more than a spatial term. Various senses of proximities are 
identified to expand upon the coordinating process (Gertler 1995; Gertler 1997; 
Gertler 1997). Coordination of information delivery across organisational divisions is 
illustrative. As mentioned above, the technical assistance of the machinery supplier 
in chipmaking is carried out through a compromising solution according to the 
degree of difficulty. The in-situ services or ordinary demands for techniques or 
components are mainly conducted by the local branches or distributors, otherwise 
special technical personnel and key components demanded would be transferred 
from parent companies exclusively. The sponsors, as listening posts, are conducive 
to machinery amelioration by delivering customer feedback vertically to parent 
companies abroad in an organisational proximity/distance.  
Furthermore, a sense of cultural proximity/affinity34 can be employed to 
account for information delivery and knowledge transfer in a wider organisational 
                                                                                                                                          
off-duty; in office hours, [sponsors] basically must be on call”. 
34
 The point here is to reveal the learning milieu generated by interpersonal, informal communications 
among engineers in a place, so I draw a techno-cultural dimension, rather than a national-cultural one 
(Gertler 1997), in relation to a smaller spatial scale (Malmberg and Maskell 2002). 
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scope. A cultural commonality is shared by firms and engineers from different 
backgrounds. There is a common language surrounding technical expertise and 
training experience and a shared attitude and commitment to one goal in a productive 
environment (cf. Brown and Duguid 2001). Unscheduled meetings and quick 
progress checks are not only crucial to fulfilling the productive process per se; far 
beyond the costs of transaction and lead time, the dynamics of complementarity 
contribute a lot to cumulative improvement and even critical technological 
breakthroughs (Angel 1994; Benner 2003):  
Q: When you put the 90-nm process into production, is it … that your 
customers verify their design function and you test your process 
technology at the same time? 
A: That’s right. [But] basically, this sort of case requires three parties [to 
be involved], added [to] by one party; namely, [the] equipment 
vendor. … It is because everyone is learning actually. … Machinery 
vendors don’t even have the experience [to produce facilities for the 
90-nm process]. It is just the case that [IC] design capability may work 
out. However, they are not sure if it (i.e. designed circuits) can be 
produced. So, it often requires three parties to work together. Because it 
is a sense of [strategic] alliance, everyone goes for development together 
and shares the cost. 
– Fdy.3-1 reports 
There is a deepening process of technical specialisation in relation to the mutual 
adjustment for problem-solving and innovation. One famous example around the 
industrial circle is the ‘immersion lithography programme’, a critical bottleneck for 
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chipmakers to mask an extremely-minimised circuit. This programme was an 
innovative technique first proposed by a senior engineer from TSMC in 2006. With 
an intensive co-developing process, a new set of equipment for the programme was 
materialised by an R&D team of Applied Materials Inc. (AMI) to cross the technical 
threshold. Such joint technical innovations are associated with inter- and 
intra-organisational feedbacks from the equipment vendors’ point of view – 
externalised information exchanges and internalised information transfers 
respectively.  
To sum up, the multi-literal collaboration can be regarded as a collective 
learning process, echoing Bathelt’s statement that “innovations must be viewed as a 
result of social relations and reflexive behaviour and not of individualistic 
endeavours” (Bathelt 2002: 587). This process is a ‘learning-by-co-working’ pattern 
achieved by intensive contact via proximity-based transaction/interaction. As the 
proximity benefits getting through material input-output linkages efficiently and 
catalyses a non-hierarchical and substance-filled communication to cultivate a 
relational mutuality and cognitive commonality between participants, it is relational 
in nature – surpassing a territorial sense of proximity (Gertler 2003). On the basis of 
Gertler’s insight, it is appropriate to refer boundaries of organisations and localities 
to a porous attribute considering extensionality of relational processes. It suggests 
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that a force of extra-local dynamics is an important dimension to the growth of 
industrial agglomeration besides the logic of endogeneity localisation literature 
stresses.  
5.3.3  Issues of technological lock-in 
With understanding as to how the proximity-based ties of technical community 
actually work and their effects on the local production system, it should be possible 
to take a further step to reflect upon the geographical scope of networking that 
underlines the extension of multi-layered collaboration. The requirement for 
redefining the scale of a network depends on the strength of a company’s response to 
the limits of ‘lock-in’. Technological lock-in results from a habitually technological 
trajectory; in other words, “it is more difficult to change from one path to another as 
external economies in production or use increase, and it may even become difficult 
to move further along a given, narrowly defined product path if production 
technologies become specific” (Storper 1992: 78). The contemporary economy is 
characterised by the far-reaching permeation of economic activities through 
boundaries and the accelerating pace of technological evolution. But, under what 
circumstances are some specific industrial districts able to sustain their competitive 
advantages rather than succumb to the widespread internationalisation of economic 
165 
and technological contexts? Guerrieri and Pietrobelli provide a useful approach to 
examining the possibility of cluster evolution by citing the conception of 
‘technological regimes’ from evolutionary economics (Guerrieri and Pietrobelli 
2004). This framework surrounds a central point, that localised clusters’ condition of 
‘opportunity, appropriability and cumulativeness’ is crucial to their technological 
capability of accumulation and innovation; that is, regional competitiveness.  
The dense interactions among local companies make material the crucial 
exchange of tacit knowledge through informal personal contacts or face-to-face 
communications in the vicinity. The creation of lasting knowledge in the locality 
requires enlarged technological bases sourcing relevant knowledge and information 
to overcome the problem of lock-in. From this techno-economic point of view, the 
spatial implications of the network metaphor are twofold: the first is the web of 
interdependence linked among agents within the clusters, and, extensively, the 
second is to take each relevant cluster as a node which interacts with other clusters 
via networking (cf. Amin and Thrift 1992; Leyshon and Thrift 1994). The latter 
suggests that some sustaining clusters are driven by the evolving forces of local and 
global knowledge networks.  
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The course of technical community is a case in point. Hu and his colleague (Hu, 
Lin et al. 2005; Hu, Lin et al. 2005) refer to a local innovation network constituted by 
the cooperative interactions among organisational agents, including firms and R&D 
institutes in north Taiwan, in several ways: formation of spin-off companies, 
establishment of supply production coalitions, and flow of technology professionals. 
It is argued that professional expatriates play a mediating role in leveraging the 
exchange of industrial technology and business information between north Taiwan 
and Silicon Valley (Hsu 1998; Hsu and Saxenian 2000; Saxenian and Hsu 2001). 
This bridging process, based upon a practice of professional community socialisation, 
enlarges the sources of technology and, in a spatial sense, connects the industrial 
districts with global production networks. The production system localised in north 
Taiwan is endowed with knowledge-intensive networks at various geographical 
levels by the socialising practices of knowledgeable agents. In that regard, an 
industrial cluster may gain “the chance to reach out much further, breaking through 
geographical borders without losing its identity and preserving its specificity and 
uniqueness” (Guerrieri and Pietrobelli 2004: 903). The consolidation of the 
cross-Pacific technical community embodying communities of practice is a strategic 
strength “for the firm as a whole to compete effectively at the global and local 
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levels” relying on “a process of spatial integration (intra-firm networks) and local 
embedding (inter-firm networks)” (Yeung 2005: 315).  
The disposition of the networking process has been altered by the extensive 
application of telecommunication technology. It is true that “telecommunications 
now play a crucial role in corporate repertoire of product, process and organisational 
innovation” (Morgan 1992: 325). I shall reveal an alternative process of linkage with 
reference to impersonal interface/information flow rather than technological 
community/know-how learning. Virtual communications work as a supplement to, 
not a substitute for, the localised practice of proximities and networks and acts, by 
extension, to reshuffle the spatial organisation of the IC industry (Graham 1998). 
5.3.4  The e-foundry: Communication, reintegration and extension 
There is an e-commerce portal – the so-called virtual foundry or e-foundry – 
that redefines the disposition of vertical disintegration at an instrumental level 
(Business Week June 18th 2001; TechVantage May 2003; http://www.tsmc.com). 
This is a generic term referring to a set of Internet-enabled software a foundry 
develops to enhance efficient coordination between the foundry and design 
customers at arms’ length.  
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Technically, there are “parameters and constraints within which the design 
engineers and design architecture must work” (Macher, Mowery et al. 2002: 162) 
established by the foundry. Correspondence of design layout with the rules is 
requisite for completion of chip output. Website-based tools are launched by the 
foundry to link the designers with accurate design rules and up-to-date process 
technologies through the Internet. Take UMC’s i-design for example; software 
products of layout reviewers enable engineers from the design houses and the 
foundry located in multiple sites to coordinate with one another immediately, 
simplify design rule check, and even estimate costs of various feature sets (Macher, 
Mowery et al. 2002).  
One other device – a ‘silicon intellectual property (SIP) library’ – also improves 
the efficiency of design lay out. IP refers to a set of modularised circuits with 
specific functions. It is reusable in a variety of chip designs and is saleable in the 
market. The design houses are used to outsource SIPs from an IP mall of 
virtualisation where the SIPs are traded or mutually licensed in that each module 
requires a time-consuming verification. Applicable SIPs are alternatively available 
by accessing the portal of the e-foundry where the free IP library is elaborated by the 
foundries. For stabilising partnerships, the foundries have a tendency to offer 
contracted designers with an eligibility to pick up applicable SIPs, as well as 
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engineering knowledge of processing technologies in reference to designing and the 
EDA tools. The database pools the coded knowledge explored in-house and those 
deriving from other allied designers (e.g. the reciprocity of the UMC Clan) or SIP 
vendors.  
Design houses share the achievement that foundries have made to improve 
process technology, minimising yield loss35 and producing reliable volumes of wafer 
output in time. The telematics system accelerates the designers to hand design 
specifications to the foundries quickly, and vice versa. Formerly it took a couple of 
days for foundries to confirm one design client’s orders, while the orders can now be 
confirmed immediately via open business-to-business systems on line. Parallel to the 
merit of time-saving in contacting or order checking, the system is associated with 
reformulation of industrial governance. To give some sense of this, I shall make 
particular reference to an instrument for communication – a real-time monitoring 
apparatus.  
Previously, when an IC was put into batch production, its wafer would be set on 
schedule and run all the way automatically by programming. Production information, 
                                                 
35
 It is the failure proportion of output: produced wafer that is disqualified. The higher the yield loss 
the higher the production cost. 
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e.g. the bugs occurring beyond expectations or the rate of yield, was unavailable until 
all the wafers were output once the wafer was put in the processing lines. This was 
an information block unfavourable to the advance of production efficiency. 
Nowadays, each piece of wafer on the processing line is read automatically through 
the use of RFID (i.e. radio frequency identification) and computers. It is a system 
that pools, transmits and receives reports and feedback, so that design clients will 
learn about the digitalised data without any delay or error and even halt the running 
lines if necessary, provided that they log on to the portal site.36 The data updated for 
the client are not merely drawn upon the course of wafer fabrication but may 
embrace the whole range of manufacturing procedures. This is a turnkey service that 
authorises the foundry to manage a continuation of assembly and testing tasks (and 
logistics and final shipping as well).37 In turn, the production data offered by those 
partner companies are converged to fabs’ real-time monitoring apparatus for 
customers’ reference. That is, the expedient arrangement of design, engineering and 
logistics surrounding the foundry-fabless collaboration is virtually materialised. 
                                                 
36
 Surely, the flexibility to intervene in running lines is at the expense of a rise of manufacturing cost 
and lead-time risks resulting from process re-programming needs to be taken by customers 
themselves. 
37
 Where the assembly and test chips may be assigned by the designers themselves or entirely decided 
by the foundry.  
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The remote reviewers and the SIP circulation are more than a matter of 
transaction carried out by electronic devices in cyberspace, and the case of 
monitoring systems does not simply refer to a tool of more direct oversight by which 
the design houses have an immediate control over fabricating. Those virtual devices 
(and ideas) above come down to one demonstration of functional reformulation. The 
sectoral functions of specialisation become mutually immersible to a deeper degree, 
while the administrative fiats of individual firms remain independent (Markusen 
1999). The verticAlly disintegrated format of tHe IC industry may not alter much in 
shape but its articULation is evolved in a ‘soft’ manner – the productive 
fragmentation Is virtually reintegrAted, while this sort of governance “allow[s] 
buyers easily to connect to and disConnect義 from a set of merchant service providers 
with a wide variety of technical and geographically-specific attributes” (Sturgeon 
2000: 14). 
One caveat is required when taking virtualisation into Account. Coded 
knowledge, reports, feedback and commands are passed in no time via telematics 
systems. The cybernetic immediacy that constitutes ‘mirror worlds’ reflecting 
digitalised data in a screen (Gelerntner 1991). The status is said to do away with “the 
formal qualities of geographical spaces”; alternatively, it is found that the mechanism 
of impersonal and off-site communications gives rise to an anxiety about the 
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‘managerial dilemma of virtuality’ – an expiry of trust (Handy 1995). Those views 
have different concerns but come to a presupposition that “an independent dynamic 
of mechanical invention, modification and perfection imposes itself onto a social 
field transforming it from outside” (Crary 1994: 8; cited in Thrift 1996: 263). It is a 
fallacy of technological determinism of which one should be aware. First of all, the 
data fluidity may be extensible but not footloose in spaces. The access control 
represents the power of exclusive use in light of cyber-segmentations (cf. Sassen 
1997). It is only available to individual units (various firms of different sectors) 
working correspondingly within the legally-contracted scopes. For example, one 
design house is entitled to use the database served by its chipmaker to do much of the 
design work and to learn the current progression of manufacturing from the system 
of reporting-monitoring if it were to log in to an individual account. The exclusivity 
at a corporate level is functionally indicated by the sectoral articulations of 
differentiated but integral engineering tasks in the industrial repertoire.  
The practical evidence reminds us that communications are subtle in terms of 
the ways in which they can be modularised, codified and digitalised. It is feasible to 
explain the status of a portal site by analogy with an information node through which 
data is threaded or is cut off. The latter does not mean that the data flows come to a 
standstill but that the data can and need to be represented at a specific point. This 
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point in cyberspace is involved with spaces at industrial, technological, 
organisational and associational levels. The electronic exchanges of all sorts make a 
type of managerial solution to spatial barriers, “which in turn, necessitates the 
construction of new (relatively) fixed and confining structures” (Swyngedouw 1993: 
306; cited in Graham 1998: 176). Furthermore, Graham makes clear that “the use of 
faster and faster telematics systems actually increases the demands for face-to-face 
contact so that the interpretative loads surrounding information glut can be dealt with 
rapidly and competitively” (Graham 1998: 180). In this regard, the e-foundry is more 
than a technological mechanism to reconfirm a spatial division of labour; it 
symbolises (and functions as) a site of ‘situated practices’ in a nodal sense where 
professional communications and communities consolidate (Amin 2002). The IC 
cluster in north Taiwan represents a cohesive feature due to a “collectivity of dense 
linkages between individual actors” (Amin and Thrift 1992: 20), which share similar 
characteristics regarding the spatial practice of production system with other 
industrial districts. The way to diverge/converge information and technology-specific 
knowledge is well handled owing to a position of communication nodality, which is 
beyond a territorially-defined closeness. The growth of Taiwan’s IC industry within 
an economic agglomeration embodies an industrial node of specialisation inserting 
itself into a broad, large-scale production network.  
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5.4  Conclusion  
The preceding discussion reveals the evolutionary trajectory of the Taiwanese 
IC industry. The input of governance infrastructure and public resources supported 
the IC industry in its embryonic period. But the construction of intense 
inter-organisational networks was conducive to rapid industrial growth. Furthermore, 
my analysis of industrial governance in organisational, geographical and 
instrumental dimensions indicated that the high-technology industrial district in 
Taiwan was not territorially-contained. The territoriality of industrial behaviour is 
refined since the cross-border actions and phenomena that embody the presence of 
globalising practice and process are blurring boundaries. Particularly, as 
“information has become central to the practice of modern economic theory and 
practice” (Thrift and Olds 1996: 316), the substantial proximity and networks in 
place are reinforced and strengthened across spaces with the help of virtualisation – 
such as, the instantaneous nature of data delivery and the exclusive access to the 
computer-mediated devices of specialisation. This instrumental manner that acted 
with an emerging time-space reconstitution of industrial activities is a supplement to, 
not a substitution for, the agglomerative embeddedness.  
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In summary, the local cluster is extensively connected to the outside world and 
demonstrates the global connectivity of social organisations. Such local-global 
articulation is associated with, and significantly impacts upon, the growth and 
development of the global IC production network. This chapter has represented 
transnationality in terms of organisational governance. These Taiwanese firms have 
also transformed themselves into TNCs. My focus in the following chapters will be 
upon the outflow of IC capital and geographical deployment of industrial operations, 
so as to understand the capabilities, pressures and discursive strategies that 
developing-country TNCs deploy in justifying their overseas investment.  
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CHAPTER SIX   
THE POLITICS OF CROSS-STRAIT PRODUCTION 
6.1  Introduction 
A businessman is stateless.  
– A Chinese proverb 
The formation of the IC industrial system and its agglomerative manifestation in 
Taiwan is a product of a planned industrial strategy. The development literature on 
Taiwan (and its East Asian counterparts) has pointed to the dominant role of the state 
in fulfilling industrialisation since “[its developmental] achievement has lain in [the 
state’s] “ability to both implement national planning priorities and expose their 
economies to market disciplines, especially international” (White and Wade 1984: 2, 
emphasis original). The state’s attempt to internationalisation domestic productive 
capital is represented by the governmental involvement in the formulation of 
export-oriented industrialisation. Such state effort is effective, and promotes change. 
Closer relationships with the world market make the indigenous IC firms more 
accommodating to a capitalist logic. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the dynamics at play when firms endeavour 
to take the initiative in governing spatially-extensive production chains. I shall 
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present this argument in the following manner. Section 6.2 outlines Taiwan’s 
regulatory framework which is imposed upon the cross-Strait economic activities at 
an inter-state level. It will point out that a long-term political conflict between 
Taiwan and China has made a considerable impact upon Taiwan’s attempt to 
regulate economic exchange with China. Section 6.3 reveals the corporate point of 
view on the westward investment which is diametrically opposed to the state’s 
attempt. Section 6.4 draws upon the domestic debate upon the repeal a legislation 
which banned the transplantation of 8-inch wafer lines (with process technologies up 
to 0.18µm) to China during 2002 and 2003.  
6.2  Policy formulation 
6.2.1  An overview  
Relations between Taiwan and China were almost suspended during the Cold 
War owing to their political opposition to one another. Since then, Taiwan has 
become embedded in the world system by engaging in the international division of 
labour compared to the policy of national self-sufficiency pursued by China until 
1978. For over half a century, the Communist threat across the Taiwan Strait 
provided Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) government a rationale 
for maintaining a strong state in the name of national security (Snyder, Gregor et al. 
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1980). The cross-Strait linkages were restricted according to the ‘Three-Nos 
Policy’ – no contact, no negotiation and no compromise – which launched by 
Taiwan’s President Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1979. Under the legislative imperative, all 
interactions with China, including economic exchange, postal communication and 
transportation, were forbidden.  
However, there was a pragmatic turn in policy marking a significant 
breakthrough in 1987 when 29 products and raw materials were permitted for 
indirect import from China, while Taiwanese citizens were permitted to make family 
visits to the Mainland. Conditional relaxation in the prohibition of trade and 
investment was made by enacting the ‘Act Governing Relations between Peoples of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’ in 1992. Since then the cross-Strait trade 
and investment of granted items going through third parties have been allowed.38  
The regulatory ban on the cross-Strait economic exchange was lifted to 
gradually take account of economic reality. The trade exchange between Taiwan and 
China has become more frequent and intensified. As shown in Figure 6.1, the total 
value of the share of cross-Strait trade of Taiwanese foreign trade nearly tripled 
                                                 
38
 The sanction on Taiwan’s direct investment in China was proposed by the resolution of the 
Economic Development Advisory Conference held by Taiwan’s Office of President in 2001.  
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between 1992 (7.4%) and 2007 (21.9%). This indicates a rapid growth of market 
dependency upon China. The figure also displays an excess of Taiwanese exports to 
China. Machinery and parts took the lion’s share of the export items which were 
mainly supplied by Taiwanese investors who ran proceeding trade in China to take 
advantage of the vertical division of labour across the Strait (Lin ; Chen 2003). In 
other words, the trade surplus was associated with Taiwan’s westward investment. 
Despite this, the fast growing and high dependency upon the Chinese market worried 
the Taiwanese Government. Political uncertainty (such as the Tiananmen incident), 
changeable regulations and local bureaucracy were negative factors which increased 
the risk costs in doing business there. A further concern was the nature of 
export-oriented industrialisation which has been fundamental to Taiwan’s economic 
growth. The national development strategy necessitates an extensive involvement 
with the international economy, while market dependency on just one geographical 
region was a potential weakness of a trade-based economy.  
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Figure 6.1  An increase in trade dependency on China: 1992-2007 
Source: Adopted from the statistics of the Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan (www.mac.gov.tw).  
Note: Dependency rate is the share of cross-Strait trade related to the total value of Taiwanese foreign 
trade. 
6.2.2  Preventing over-dependency 
For Taiwan as a whole, however, the risk of doing business with China is not 
merely the rate of return on investment. State sovereignty is at the crux of the matter 
that explains why the government was so reluctant to welcome closer economic ties 
with China. An ideological divide between Nationalist Taiwan and Communist 
China has became peaceful since the mid-1980s when Taiwan progressed to 
economic liberalisation and political democratisation and China became more 
involved with the world economy. Nonetheless, the cross-Strait conflict has by no 
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means been settled. Taiwan diametrically opposes the ‘One-China Policy’ that is 
held by China on the strength of Chinese nationalism.  
‘No haste, be patient’ 
The political tension between the two countries is frequently inflamed by 
constant political and military manoeuvres performed by China. There was an array 
of missile drills that China held during the period between the visit of President Lee 
Tung-Hui to the US in June of 1995 and the first general election held in Taiwan in 
March of 1996. The intensive military menaces and diplomatic means to isolate 
Taiwan’s international status worsened the political dialogue and reconciliation 
hopes between both sides of the Strait. The way that China has repeatedly claimed 
territorial rights over Taiwan and has kept threatening to use force if Taiwan ever 
moved to declare independence39 had exactly the opposite effect. The provocative 
actions prompted President Lee to promulgate a guideline of ‘No-Haste-Be-Patient’ 
(NHBP) that urged domestic enterprises to refrain from making excessive 
investments in China (Lee 1999). This was for fear that Taiwanese investors might 
be held as economic hostages by Beijing; that is, those who invested a massive 
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 The political discourse of independency is constructed by historical legacies of Japanese 
colonialisation and Nationalist autocracy. However, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss this 
in any detail.  
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amount of fixed costs there could be politically forced to express views in opposition 
to the home state.  
The Taiwanese state was conscious that the cross-Strait economic integration 
had nothing to do with any reduction in anxiety about China’s troop disposition in 
the southeast coastal areas of the Mainland. In 1999, ‘Special State-to-State 
Relations’ were proposed to define relations between Taiwan and China so as to 
comment on the idea of ‘One Country, Two Systems’40 that China unilaterally 
insisted upon. In a word, westward investment is more than a business matter: it is 
deeply entangled with the relative economic competitiveness and national strength of 
Taiwan and China. The NHBP policy establishes the guiding principle of cross-Strait 
economic affairs which was formally proclaimed after the relaxation of national 
restrictions against exchange with China. Nonetheless, the evidence displayed in the 
later part of the chapter demonstrates that the government has failed to fully work out 
its economic guidelines.  
                                                 
40
 In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping formally put forward this principle regarding the future of Hong 
Kong and Macao when the two places were reunified with mainland China. Its intention is to retain 
their established systems under a high degree of autonomy for at least fifty years. China also proposes 
to apply this principle to Taiwan, which is highly unpopular in Taiwan and has been adamantly 
refused by the Taiwanese Government.  
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Such inter-state rivalry led to a pessimistic view of Taiwan’s economic 
autonomy. In a sense, over-dependency on the Mainland has made trade and 
investment vulnerable to China’s economic sanctions and military threats. For that 
matter, economic activities were highly politically sensitive since inter-state tension 
was a critical element in provoking anti-China feeling within Taiwan. An underlying 
crisis of autonomy triggered ardent Taiwan nationalism, and consolidated domestic 
opposition to the Mainland, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)41 as the 
leader, asserting Taiwan’s sovereign independence from China. Such opposition was 
triggered in part by signs of Taiwan’s increasing economic entanglement with China; 
the rate of export dependency upon China exceeded 20% since 2001 (20.3%), and 
continued to rise to 30.1% in 2007. This indicates an undue concentration upon one 
single country’s market which increases the vulnerability of Taiwan’s 
export-oriented economy. It was envisaged as a serious risk to the sovereign rights 
behind an accelerating integration of cross-Strait economy which would provide 
China with further leverage against Taiwan. Those opposition groups warned that 
increasing market dependency and de-industrialisation renders the Taiwanese 
economy vulnerable to China and jeopardises state sovereignty.  
                                                 
41
 Before coming into power in 2000, the DPP was the counterforce standing against an autocratic 
regime ruled by the KMT. 
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A ‘go-south’ scheme 
The state has long perceived that Taiwan’s resource-poor and export-oriented 
economy is vulnerable. Various types and levels of global forces, including foreign 
interventions (i.e. pressure by the US Super 301) and institutional imperatives (i.e. 
pursuit of GATT/WTO accession) determine the schedule of trade liberalisation in 
view of sustaining prosperity. Take tariff cuts, for example: the average nominal 
tariff rate was reduced from 26.46% in 1985 to 10.74% in 1989, and then to below 
10% in 1995, and the ratio of total customs revenue to total imports continued to fall 
after 1974 (28.03%) to 8.75% in 1996 (Liu 2002: 978, Table 1). The removal of 
restraints on trade had been achieved by 1996 primarily in order to support a bid for 
entry into GATT. Together with the trade liberalisation, the policy reform contains 
deregulation of financial control, privatisation of publicly-operated enterprises, the 
opening-up of access to licensed monopolist industries, etc. despite difference in the 
speed of implementation. 
In addition, a macro economic programme to develop Taiwan into an 
‘Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Center’ (APROC) was devised to internationalise 
the national economy in 1995. One of the major objectives was to target Mainland 
China as an economic hinterland and to incorporate it with the operation centre. 
However, the unstable relation with China, as was mentioned earlier, was an obstacle 
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to this approach. In other words, the Taiwanese Government considered whether 
national security would be exposed to risk once an embargo on cross-Strait 
transportation was lifted. Such considerations reflect policy constriction in line with 
the NHBP principle. Nonetheless, in contrast to the suspension of political dialogue 
between the two states, non-governmental communication and exchange gradually 
increased. For that matter, a strategic policy of ‘go-south’ was constructed to cool 
‘China fever’. The go-south strategy advocated transplanting less profitable 
production lines to Southeast Asian countries. This strategic thrust was formally 
inaugurated as a ‘Southward Policy’ by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1994; 
one year after the ASEAN countries passed a resolution to sign the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) for the advance of economic regionalisation. In 
a word, an expected boom reinforced the official determination to take part in this 
trade liberalisation on a regional scale.  
Substantial measures were adopted by the KMT-dominated government to try to 
achieve “advantage of a certain complementarity … across national boundaries” 
(Yeung and Lo 1996: 37). Firstly, the state worked hard to secure a number of 
bilateral agreements to protect investment with these countries through conferences 
at a ministerial level. The policy was certainly politically wise in facilitating 
multi-dimensional connections to these countries considering the absence of 
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diplomatic relations between Taiwan and ASEAN countries. Next, financial 
assistance was offered to the Philippines (in Subic Bay), to Indonesia (in Batam 
Island and Medan) and to Vietnam (in Haiphong) to set up industrial parks in which 
Taiwanese enterprises could base manufacturing-based ventures to reduce labour 
costs and land rents. Take Subic Bay, for example (Chen 1996). There, a 300-acre 
industrial park was specially developed as a JV by a Taiwanese consortium and the 
local authority. Taiwan was the largest single-country investor in Subic Bay; 105 
acres of land was occupied by the end of 1995. One Taiwanese firm employed some 
4,000 workers and turned out 180,000 sport shoes each month. Furthermore, the state 
even took a lead in making investment that it then directly channelled southward into 
funds of public enterprises and KMT-owned enterprises 42  in the neighbouring 
countries.  
The policy was originally a three-year programme from 1994 to 1996, but has 
subsequently been implemented twice more (Wang 2003). The second time was 
during the Asian Crisis of 1997. Concrete measures mainly consisted of offers of 
financial aid. In 2002, the DPP-ruled government (which was in office between 2000 
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 When taking over Taiwan after World War II, KMT received a great deal of properties and lands 
from Japan as party-owned assets (Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001).  
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and 2008) proposed the third Southward Policy. In an international conference on the 
US-Japan-Taiwan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2002, President Chen Shui-Bian 
stressed the importance of intra-regional integration and asserted that 
Taiwan needs to get along its own way … it is to seek for cooperation 
with democratic states within the [Asian-Pacific] regional market in order 
to promote security in the Asian-Pacific region and to strengthen 
democracy and prosperity. 
There are consequences concerning the governmental understanding of overseas 
investment. The economic guide to capital flow provides an explicit contrast to the 
restraint on cross-Strait exchanges, although the achievement of the Southward 
Policy appeared rather limited. In a sense, participation in the emergent economic 
bloc of ASEAN (as opposed to the China Economic Circle) was envisaged as a 
beneficial measure to redirect the approach to the world economy for the sake of 
averting “a catastrophic ‘siphoning’ effect into mainland China” (Chen 2003: 92).43 
As well as promoting the exploitation of local markets and reducing production costs, 
the Southward Policy has a noticeable characteristic of directionality that points to 
governmental guidance for industrial relocation to destinations out of China. 
Modification of excessive westward investment was based on the presumption that 
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 In reality, Taiwanese foreign investment was channelled mainly towards Southeast Asia before the 
1990s when China emerged as a major attraction for Taiwanese capital (Kung 2001).   
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economic marginalisation from the world market would ensue after economic 
incorporation into – rather than integration with – (a rise of Greater) China. 
To sum up, from a macro-historical perspective, the geopolitics of a West-East 
divide has been reversed since socialist China turned to the world economy, and this 
has reshuffled the global geo-economy. Such radical changes put Taiwan into a 
predicament: should the Taiwanese economy go with the flown of the global market 
or become marginalised considering that political threats from China persist. In a 
word, the governmental effort to orient capital outflows discloses that Taiwan’s 
economic situation is strongly influenced by geopolitics, although, as do business 
enterprises, the state recognises the necessity and reality of “internationalisation of 
national economic spaces through growing penetration (inward flow) and 
extraversion (outward flow)” (Jessop 2002: 22). The rhetoric of ‘go-south’ 
underlines that the state’s concern with the outflow of domestic capital does not refer 
to outward investment in general, but to westward investment in particular.  
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6.3  Going ahead, not running away? 
Issues about investment in China were regulated by ‘Regulations Governing 
Investments and Technical Cooperation with Mainland China’.44 Any investment 
project, either in the name of individuals or of firms, must have approval given by an 
Investment Commission, under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA). Projects 
that amounted to more than US$50 million or that were involved in strategic 
technologies and construction of infrastructure (e.g. establishment of power stations) 
were subject to stringent regulations in accordance with the NHBP principle. 
Investment items were divided into three types (ordinary, forbidden and special 
categories) under considerations of ‘national security’ and ‘industry development’ – 
the two were specifically declared in writing.45  
The classification was simplified to ‘ordinary’ and ‘forbidden’ categories in 
2002. Most IC-related investing activities belonged to the forbidden category. The 
production of silicon wafers and lead frames, fabricating, testing and packaging chips 
and engaging with IC design were banned by formal decree. The penalty for 
                                                 
44
 It was legitimised in 1993 in accordance with Article 35 of the ‘Act Governing Relations between 
Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’. ʳ
45
 It was legitimised in accordance with Article 86 of the ‘Act Governing Relations between Peoples 
of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area’. 
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violating the prohibition was 4% of the investment amount; a repeated offender 
would be fined up to five times this. In comparison, a fine for illegal investment in 
the ordinary category was 0.5%- 2% of the investment amount.  
It is argued that “different actors and agents bring equally different, 
idiosyncratic and dynamic spatialities to the unequal relationships that are central to 
their survival and reproduction and their differential integration into a globalising 
world economy” (Taylor, Ekinsmyth et al. 1997: 59). Most semiconductor magnates 
and industrial associations (such as the Taipei Computer Association) appealed for 
the liberalisation of westward investment on many public occasions, imposing a 
counter-discourse of ‘go-ahead’ that contested the de-industrialisation discourse. 
They made efforts to convince the government that the aim of promoting indigenous 
industry to a global level necessitated doing business with and in China. Some 
managers expressed a low opinion of the industrial prospects in Taiwan, arguing that 
“[staying] in Taiwan has slim hope [to compete]”, as Des.8 said pessimistically (see 
also Business Week June 11th 2001). The intention to ‘find a way out’ through China 
refers to a material strategy “to create its own conditions of existence” (Yeung 2000: 
403). The firms recognised China an as exploitable market and, of greater 
importance, an emerging link in the global production chain in terms of 
competitiveness. To be competitive, there was fundamental consensus recognising 
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collaboration with China as an imperative for domestic firms to maintain industrial 
niches (or to survive) in a global economy.  
The business community presents further opinions which are rooted in a 
liberalist conviction at diverse levels (cf. Thrift 2002). Laying stress on a global 
horizon of action (cf. Jessop 2002), Morris Chang, the CEO of TSMC, argued for 
thinking globally and gave advice on the removal of investment restrictions:  
There has already been an evident shift of the semiconductor industry 
towards China. Instead of leaving China to fumble its way and ruin the 
rule of game, [we should] make [an] effort to assist China in engaging 
with a[n] [industrial] structure of globalisation so as to promote a positive 
development of the entire industry.  
(Business NEXT September 15th 2002) 
In a more constructive sense, Taiwan’s industrial capability of tackling 
trans-local governance was construed as an advantage. The Monte Jade Science and 
Technology Association of Taiwan is representative of the business community, and 
a central objective of the association refers to advance cooperation among ethnic 
Chinese on an international scale. It was conceived so that Taiwan could be an 
industrial interface to link up with Silicon Valley and the Mainland to consolidate 
ethnic Chinese high-technology business. For example, the idea of an ‘ethnic 
Chinese IT belt’ was proposed in a business workshop, substantiating this mission 
(China Times July 21st 2005).  
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Chipmaking, for example, has hitherto been taken as Taiwan’s ‘economic 
lifeblood’ in view of its extremely heavy capital investment, highly advanced 
technology content and exceptional output values every year. Therefore, the 
government kept an eye on any move that the IC manufacturers made towards 
Chinese investment. As early as the mid-1990s, Taiwanese chipmakers embarked 
upon the deployment of their production abroad in order to have closer access to 
customers. In 1996 TSMC established a foundry in the US to serve a growing 
number of local design companies (Puget Sound Business Journal December 6th 
1996). UMC acquired an ailing Japanese DRAM manufacturer in 1998, and turned 
losses into profits by making chips for Japanese companies, such as Sony and Sharp 
(TechVantage March 2001). However, in comparison with a more tolerant attitude 
towards (or even active support of) foreign investment conducted elsewhere, the state 
always felt hesitant about ventures in China. An investment embargo was imposed 
on account of the supposition that locating IC manufacturing there might produce 
technology spillovers which would enable China to overcome its technological lag 
with Taiwan. However, instead, Taiwanese firms invested heavily in China for fear 
of lagging behind Japanese, Korean and American firms which were taking 
beachheads in the newly-opened, promising Chinese market. The business strategy 
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that the firms employed to take advantage of China competed for dominance with 
deploying the production system against the national regulation.  
I intend to highlight the dissension between the state and business firms by 
focusing on the domestic controversies about the investment ban on chipmaking. 
One caveat is required before I proceed any further. It is not to be supposed that there 
was a rupture of cooperative relations between the state and IC firms in light of 
industrial promotion. Actually, the state kept investing a great deal of public 
resources to upgrade the industrial environment with the purpose of 
internationalising the IC industry. For example, MoEA invested public resources in 
support of an e-commerce programme initiated by TSMC, UMC, ASE and SPIL 
during 2001 and 2003. The programme successfully formulated the worldwide 
standards of B2B Partner Interface Processes (PIP) by which up to 50% of the time 
and cost spent in delivering complicated transnational ‘work orders’ from design 
houses through fabs to assembly plants can be saved. Its achievement is to confirm 
Taiwan’s leading position in made-to-order IC production at a national level and to 
contribute further consolidation of the vertically disintegrated system at an industrial 
level. The complex triangular relationship between firms (i.e. Taiwanese IC firms), 
the home state (i.e. Taiwan) and the host state (i.e. China) is outlined in Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2  Illustration of the evolutionary state-business nexus  
Notes: A) implies the period when all cross-Strait exchange was severed; B) implies the political 
economic status after mid-1990s.   
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6.4  Fab external investment in dispute 
6.4.1  Contesting policy revision 
Chipmakers (including made-to-order foundries and DRAM producers) have 
long been encouraging the state to ease restrictions on building 8-inch wafer plants 
and use technologies up to 0.18µm in China. It is for the purpose of deploying wafer 
lines for carving out business. The state persisted in its negative opinion, in 
opposition to the corporate perspective which sought to consolidate a niche for the 
global IC industrial chain by moving straight into China. The quarrel about the 
investment policy was fierce. It was a continuation of the dispute over loosening 
restrictions on exporting 8-inch lines and related technologies into China at the turn 
of the century.  
The uproar during 2002 is an illustration of the antithesis between the political 
objections of the national government and corporations’ ambition to expand 
industrial territory. The appeal for a more open policy became pressing because three 
IC manufacturers – Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC, in 
Shanghai), Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (GSMC, in Shanghai) and 
Hejian Technology Corp. (HJTC, in Suzhou) – were successively launched in China 
during 2000 and 2001. The new chipmakers had some characteristics in common, 
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three of which significantly came to the notice of Taiwanese chipmakers. (1) A VLSI 
technology was applied to production lines, which made a considerable leap from the 
previous generation in technology (Appendix D). (2) They were run on a foundry 
model, instead of IDM. (3) The China-based fabs were JV in ownership but were 
operated by Taiwanese managers. For example, the establishment of GSMC was 
note-worthy because its founders Wenyang Wang and  
Mianheng Jiang – came from impressive backgrounds. Wang is the son of 
Yongqing Wang, the chairman of Formosa Group which is the biggest Taiwanese 
manufacturing enterprise. Jiang is son of Zemin Jiang, the former prime minister of 
China.  
It is certain that the emergent Chinese foundries have been unable to match 
TSMC and UMC, the top foundries in the world, concerning the processing 
technology and the yield rate to date. Nonetheless, their participation in a 
made-to-order market ignited a fierce price war. The Taiwanese chipmakers suffered 
very much. After a chip boom of 1999 and 2000, the global IC industry saw a 
periodic slump in 2001 and 2002 when the international market for chips was 
seriously ruined by cut-throat competition (Economist August 11th 2001). For 
instance, the market price for one piece of 8-inch wafer was about US$1,600 in 2002, 
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but the Chinese foundries cut the price by half to win the market. A case in point is 
the performance of SMIC, when it leapt into fourth place in global foundry sales in 
2004 from its launch in 2002 (IC Insight August 10th 2004) (Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3  From the foundry Big Three to Big Four: 2002-2004 (%) 
Source: Adapted from IC Insights (August 10th 2005: Figure 1).  
Note: Chartered is a Singaporean-based IC foundry. 
In the face of that competitive dilemma, the indigenous firms lobbied the 
government to permit them to process wafers with technologies down to 
0.25m/8-inch in China. They planned to remove the lagging-edged lines, namely 
the wafer lines for circuit line-width over 0.25m, to China. The technological level 
for 0.25m or lower in 8-inch processing lines has matured in Taiwan but remained 
advanced for the market demand in China at that time. Additionally, the domestic 
fabs had 30% of their capacity idle during the period. For that matter, their argument 
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for transferring these outdated lines was on the strength of three prospective devices 
regarding the organisational flexibility of industrial operation: (1) to increase 
utilisation rate of lower-end wafer lines to minimise a heavy sunk cost deriving from 
facility depreciation; (2) to seize China’s market where the technology demand was 
still low, and; (3) to upgrade the fabs to 12-inch lines at home by vacating the dated 
ones. Simply put, it was a formulation to upgrade-by-transplantation.  
In addition to these enterprises, the concerned authorities in Taiwan were under 
pressure from the rapid line construction in China. Specifically, the knowledge that 
Taiwanese veterans went to start an enterprise in China came to the notice of the 
DPP government which was deeply anxious about investment in and trade with 
China. It indicated that a potential chain reaction of head-hunting in Taiwan would 
follow, and this has proved true. Knowledge spillovers were reinforced by a 
brain-drain when successive numerous managers and engineers (particularly those 
who specialise in the IC manufacturing segment) left for China. The loss of precious 
manpower was expected to lead to the collapse of the domestic IC industry. Because 
of this, the government remained suspicious that any relocation of wafer lines to 
China might help to reduce the technological lag by promoting local productivity and 
so blunting Taiwan's technological edge. Vice President Annette Lu pointed out that 
“go-west does not necessarily arrive at [an economic aim for] globalisation; China is 
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merely one of numerous countries in the world” and indicated the high risk in 
“put[ting] all eggs in a single basket” (Liberty Times February 25th 2003).   
A Debate on Westbound Investments of 8-inch Fab Policy held in early March 
2002 demonstrated a fundamental chasm between the two parties. The groups in 
favour of lifting the barriers stressed the significance of spatial deployment to 
upgrade (or to retain) an industrial niche in global competition, while the arguments 
against a removal of the investment ban focused attention on risk management with 
regard to national security. The argument of those in favour was resolutely refuted by 
the indigenous political communities which had an anti-China slant because, as the 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) pointed out, “China is Taiwan’s rival, rather than a 
complementary partner”. That is, loss of technological and economic advantages to 
China would no doubt enable Beijing to obtain political leverage over Taipei with all 
the dangers that entailed. At that time, there was a demonstration led by the Taiwan 
Association of University Professors, one of the pro-independence associations, 
together with other related organisations. The rally protested against any relaxation 
of the ban on relocating the domestic fabs on the basis of a nationalist-conscious 
discourse. Table 6.1 summarises key contentions that both sides proposed.  
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Table 6.1  Comparison of opposing opinions on the fab removal issue 
Dissidents’ views Proponents’ views 
The kernel technologies would be spilt along 
with transplantation of wafer lines.  
An advantage of agglomeration would be lost 
since a whole range of IC industrial systems 
would follow the move-out of fabs. 
Unlike labour-intensive industries, the IC 
fabrication has a high margin so that it does not 
need to be relocated overseas. 
Brain-drain effects would occur in line with 
relocating lines. 
Once the wafer lines are shut down, the domestic 
unemployment rate would be raised. 
The dated lines which lay idle could be fully 
utilised if they are moved to China.  
The transfer of overage facilities would spare 
domestic plants, which assist in promoting 
technological levels of lines in full. 
The price competition from Chinese counterparts 
is eroding Taiwan’s market share. 
A serious shortage of engineering manpower has 
become a bottleneck for industrial development. 
Transplantation would not cause unemployment; 
instead, the indigenous labour force could be 
advanced because the lines are upgraded. 
Source: According to fieldwork results and the record of the Debate on Westbound Investment of 
8-inch Fab Policy (held by the Public Television Service on March 9th 2002) in 
http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/ttt/servlet/n.  
6.4.2  Temporary expedients 
In fact, that this formal debate over transplantation issues was allowed to be 
held is attributed to a distinct political consciousness. A new economic and trade 
policy towards China was taken by the DPP government. Under pressure from the 
stagnant economy and the serious chip slump, President Chen decided on a policy, a 
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New Middle Line46, to replace the NHBP policy for ‘Proactive Liberalisation with 
Effective Management’. A Public Statement of Proactive Liberalisation with 
Effective Management declared (November 17th 2001): 
Current circumstances of national and international economies are 
drastically in comparison with that in the period when the 
No-Haste-Be-Patient policy was formulated. Particularly, in the face of 
new positions referring to an advance of globalisation and Taiwan and 
China’s accession to WTO, it is necessary to deliberate upon the 
imperative to upgrade enterprise global competitiveness by means of 
incorporating the cross-Strait economic and trade affairs into the global 
market. The passive action of No-Haste-Be-Patient made to resist the 
investment in the Mainland is not appropriate to last. 
On these grounds, the controversy subsided slightly owing to a compromise so 
as to “strategically extend the flexibility of corporate governance in the globe and 
across the Strait and to establish a safety net for the investment in the Mainland by 
the effective regulation of transparency and institutionalisation at the same time”, 
according to the policy announcement (http://www.mac.gov.tw/index1.htm). In late 
March 2002 the government developed a policy to allow Taiwan chipmakers to 
relocate their idle 8-inch wafer plants in mainland China, and proclaimed ‘Measures 
                                                 
46
 President Chen stressed that this policy was inspired by the ‘Third Way’ ideology of Anthony 
Giddens. 
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of Investment in an IC Foundry Plant in the Mainland’ to reconcile competing stands 
on the fab removal.  
Even though the fabs were able to make the move, the tight restrictions were not 
eased indiscriminately. The measures were an interim procedure bound with a series 
of examining devices stipulated by ‘Guidelines Governing the Review and 
Supervision of Investment in an IC Foundry Plant in Mainland China’ which were 
issued four months later. Corporate applicants were only permitted to make 0.25m 
chips at their directly-owned plants in China. The restraint was in accordance with 
the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) regime of export restrictions47 and one US 
embargo on exporting equipment capable of processing 0.25m wafers. Key points 
are abstracted below. 
 The applicant had to have already set up at least one 12-inch wafer plant 
at home, and the wafer plant was required to be in operation with orders 
for over six months.  
 The investor had to be in major control in its business in China.  
 The process technology was restricted to 0.25m and below. 
                                                 
47
 Since 1996 it has come to replace the NATO Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (CoCom) export restrictions which was phased out at the beginning of the 1990s. It is the 
first global multilateral agreement on export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use 
goods and technologies by 33 co-founders in 1996 (http://www.wassenaar.org/).  
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 The maximum of total approvable cases in Taiwan was limited to three 
8-inch wafer plants prior to the end of 2005.  
The guidelines were formulated in a sense of finite relaxation under 
governmental supervision. The approved projects required direct investment, so that 
the flow of corporate capital could be properly regulated by the concerned authorities 
(Strait Business Monthly August 2002). The measure of accommodation, from the 
authoritarian point of view, was expedient to restrain the indigenous chipmakers 
from exporting cutting-edged technologies to China and, meanwhile, to encourage 
companies to rapidly upgrade their foundry lines at home.  
Applying for the approval 
TSMC was the first foundry, and still the only one, to gain approval from the 
governmental authorities. As early as when the government decided to lift the 
investment ban, TSMC had come to terms with the Shanghai Municipal Government. 
According to the agreement, the local authority would put up capital to establish 
infrastructure and factory buildings in advance; TSMC would then either buy out or 
rent the plants from the municipality once it had received official approval from 
Taiwan. TSMC avoided transgressing Taiwan’s law but saved time by not needing to 
wait for plant construction in Shanghai. In addition, the firm registered around 3,000 
semiconductor-related patents before investing in China in a bid to fully protect the 
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intellectual property right (Computex May 24th 2002). Its operation of 12-inch fabs 
fulfilled all the requirements that the home government had asked for prior to June 
2002. A branch plant, TSMC (Shanghai), was opened and succeeded in batch 
production in September 2003, one year after the submission of a formal application. 
This fab-removal project was expected to be completed in four years with an 
investment of US$898 million. 
TSMC was a unique case that went thorough the bureaucratic procedure before 
going west. Two leading DRAM companies, ProMOS and Powerchip, intended to 
follow the same approach. They competed for the remaining slots, but political 
collisions soon stirred economic activities. Their application collided with a 
presidential campaign for Taiwan’s second general election during 2004. Affairs in 
relation to China became embroiled in electioneering disputes. Such large-scale 
investments – every project might amount to some US$900 million – were so 
sensitive at the time that they were delayed, as in the status I illustrated in Chapter 
Four. The situation did not improve after the election. Taiwan was in an uproar over 
an ‘Anti-Secession Law’ that China passed in March of 2005. The Law provoked 
much agitation because it formalised China’s use of non-peaceful means against the 
Taiwanese independency movement. Due to this aggressive Law, the promise 
already made to make available the remaining vacancies was suspended for the time 
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being.48 ProMOS, for example, recruited a team of senior managers to deal with the 
preparatory tasks in 2003 and met the regulatory requirement for application by the 
deadline of 2005. The official sanction was not given until the end of 2006 when the 
concerned authorities, MoEA and the Mainland Affair Council, granted permission 
for the chipmakers to relocate the 0.18m/8-inch lines to China.  
Illegal moves 
The government seemingly retained the capacity to regulate the economy, but 
the reality is that the productive capital found an alternative way to exit. Having been 
impatient at the government’s hesitation in easing barriers to investment, several 
investors were bold enough to find alternative ways out. As mentioned above, the 
start-up of SMIC in 2001 was a shock not only to the IC industry worldwide but also 
to both governments across the Strait. SMIC, the first 8-inch foundry in China, was 
opened by an offshore holding company registering in the Cayman Islands. The 
founder of SMIC is Dr Richard Chang49 who returned from Silicon Valley to take on 
                                                 
48
 KMT re-held the reins of government in the third general election of 2008. The party has veered 
sharply from its original stand of anti-communism toward focusing on improving relations with 
mainland China. It stands for the go-west investment and regards it as a panacea for solving domestic 
economic problems.  
49
 Chang (no relation to TSMC’s Morris Chang) was born in China, grew up in Taiwan and served 
some two decades in TI.  
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the presidency of the Worldwide Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (WSMC) in 
1997.50 After WSMC was merged with TSMC in 1999 without notifying Chang, he 
turned to China and set up the new foundry company. The semiconductor expert 
received a big welcome from Chinese authorities. SMIC was started with capital of 
some US$1.48 billion raised from local capital, such as the Shanghai Industrial 
Investment Corp. (fully owned by the Shanghai Municipal Government), and 
international venture capital, such as Goldman Sachs. In fact, some Taiwanese 
electronics firms also became involved with the investing projects of SMIC through 
their overseas holding companies (Business NEXT April 1st 2004).  
With full support from national policies and local municipalities the first fab of 
SMIC was built up in only 13 months and began batch production in 2001. In 
addition to a favourable policy environment, its rapid growth was attributed to a team 
of senior staff recruited from abroad to run the fabs in China where was a lack of 
experienced engineers. According to SMIC’s report in 2006, foreign staff made up 
over 10% of the total employment – of whom some 55% were Taiwanese-based (559 
engineers) and came mainly from TSMC. Indeed, at the time, the establishment of 
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 WSMC was founded in 1994 on the privatisation of the Sub-Micron Project sponsored by ITRI in 
Taiwan. 
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SMIC became a landmark in China’s IC industry by importing higher process 
technologies (≤ 0.18µm). Soon after, it opened two other 8-inch fabs in Shanghai and 
acquired one 8-inch fab from Motorola in Tianjin in 2004. This case was 
controversial at the time because WA restrictions and the US embargo on exporting 
equipment capable of processing 0.35µm were not been released until 2004. One 
12-inch fab was launched in Beijing, which had been in production since 2004. Its 
technological capacity made great progress - up to 90nm, 65nm and 45nm in 2005, 
2006 and 2007 respectively – by licensing cutting-edged technologies from the top 
IC manufacturers, such as IBM (EE Times January 26th 2007). 
The expansion of SMIC was so impressive that its market share increased from 
only 1% in 2002 to 6% in 2004, jumping to become the third largest foundry in the 
world (IC Insight August 10th 2004). Although SMIC was still far behind TSMC 
(47%) and UMC (24%), its contribution to the promotion of China’s IC industry has 
come to the notice of the Taiwanese Government. Chang, as a Taiwanese citizen, 
was accused of opening chipmaking facilities in the Mainland that broke bans 
intending to foster China’s IC industry. The government penalised him with NT$5 
million and requested him to repay the investment within six months (EE Times 
March 30th 2005). Stalemate resulted. Chang “[denied] any wrong doing” (Business 
Week June 5th 2004) but made a declaration of alienage in August 2005, while the 
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government turned down his petition and imposed a further two penalties on his new 
investing projects in Tianjin (in 2003) and Beijing (in 2004) (EE Times March 11th 
2005). Despite his lack of fear of the prosecution, the government has threatened to 
seize his property.  
Another investment involved with litigation is even more dramatic. UMC was 
called into question about its intricate relationship with the establishment of HJTC in 
Suzhou. When Taiwanese IC investors called urgently for an easing of investment 
control, UMC announced it had little interest in China. Instead, its geographical 
placement was arranged in Japan and Singapore by means of M&A and JV 
(TechVantage March 2001). Paradoxically, UMC was, in fact, one of the pioneers, 
among the Taiwanese IC firms, to set up branch sites in China. As early as the 
mid-1990s, SinoWealth was opened to conduct back-end design (rather than chip 
fabrication) in Shanghai. The investment was conducted by passing through Hong 
Kong in 1994.51 In addition, UMC planned to get involved in a programme of fab 
upgrading in collaboration with a Chinese IDM, Shanghai Belling, even though this 
cooperation broke down in 2002 after a long negotiation (Commercial Times June 
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 The ownership of SinoWealth was then shifted to Novatek, one of the UMC-clan member, after 
UMC reshuffled the organisation by spinning off its design sections in 1995. 
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19th 2001). A team of technical staff who had originally been posted to portage 
technologies in Shanghai Belling then transferred to work in HJTC.  
HJTC was nominally founded by an ex-employee of UMC, Chien-Hwa Hsu, 
with an investment of over US$1.5 billion in 2001. This investment project passed 
through British Virgin Islands (BVI). The performance of HJTC was promising in 
that it was ranked in the top ten chipmakers in China in 2005 according to the China 
Semiconductor Committee. The emergence of HJTC was ascribed to its 
extraordinary association with UMC. Some 200 senior staff in HJTC were 
ex-employees of UMC. The processing systems in the two foundries were reportedly 
compatible. This harmony between the two foundries was considered irrational. It is 
in conflict with conventional concerns relating to a strict attitude towards intellectual 
protection in the IC industrial circle. In comparison, for example, TSMC initiated a 
lawsuit accusing SMIC of patent infringement and the theft of trade secrets through 
ex-employees of TSMC jumping ship to SMIC (Financial Times December 22nd 
2003). According to Morgan Stanley’s market survey, UMC referred parts of orders 
with lower technology requirement (≥ 0.18µm line-width) to HJTC (China Times 
January 12th 2005). The way in which UMC took HJTC as its backdoor solution for 
participating in China appeared to be an open secret within the sphere of the IC 
industry.  
210 
For the Taiwanese Government, however, the situation was undoubtedly that of 
a flight of technology to China by cultivating a Chinese foundry without secured 
permission. In 2005, a raid was made on UMC to gather evidence of alleged 
investments and other industrial aids that might prove UMC’s illegal link to HJTC. 
At the same time, more than 20 employees of HJTC were detained for further illegal 
investigation when they returned to Taiwan for home leave. In face of the sudden 
raid by the prosecution, the executive of UMC, Robert Tsao, made public statements 
to clarify that the relationship between UMC and HJTC was on the basis of a 
business strategy (EE Times February 18th 2005). He explained that he had 
personally arranged to foster a Chinese start-up, i.e. HJTC, and would subsequently 
acquire this partner foundry once the investing bans were lifted. Tsao admitted 
redirecting orders to HJTC and providing administrative assistance to help the latter 
make profits in the short term, while denying that UMC had ownership of the 
‘friendly partner’. The second open letter was published later to call for the ending of 
probes. The letter refuted any capital involvement or patent transfer, but revealed that 
a verbal agreement had previously been made between the two foundries. The letter 
revealed that HJTC had been willing to transfer 15% of the stake, valued at over 
US$110 million at current prices, to UMC in return for the latter’s aid in 
management (EE Times March 21st 2005). This announcement sharply turned an 
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alleged charge of illegal investment into a public indictment. While the defendants, 
including HJTC’s Hsu, were not indicted due to insufficient evidence of a crime, 
Tsao and two other executives were charged with committing a breach of trust 
because the undisclosed assistance of personnel and technology in HJTC had 
damaged the benefits of UMC’s shareholders. 
6.5  Conclusion  
This chapter has shown the political economic tension occurring in the 
transplantation of domestic IC industry to China. It has found that the state steps up 
the pace of liberation and that the firms become deeply inserted into global 
production networks in concert. However, the Strait separates their respective 
orientations towards economic globalisation. Inter-state rivalry accounts for the strict 
restraints on the connection to China, while the statutory barriers to the cross-Strait 
exchange have been worn away. The government sees it as a cul-de-sac that blocks 
up the path of national development. For the enterprises, doing cross-border 
manufacturing in China is deemed the requisite access to connecting with the global 
IC production chain. In other words, the tendency that the domestic IC firms show in 
turning to embrace the Chinese market drives the authorities in Taiwan to worry 
about the possible political aftermath of the economic hollow-out.  
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It is argued that “explanation itself has become a political force, helping to 
create the institutional realities it purportedly merely describes” (Piven 1995: 108). 
The firms construct their own discourses and strategies in response to the state 
involvement in channelling Taiwanese foreign capital to places outside China and in 
blocking the flight of capital and technology across the Strait. The mode of the 
cross-Strait economic linkage is kept indirect. It is somehow because of the 
regulatory structure that the firms made a detour to avoid the national domain by 
controlling the industrial organisation. The preceding narrative concerning policy 
revision and unsettled lawsuits does not imply that spatial permeability of economic 
activity is a counter force to territorial impedimenta to global flows, but underlines 
such conflicting spatialities “involve[ing] the stabilization of power relations across 
the organizational field of action” (Clegg 1989: 188; cited in Taylor, Ekinsmyth et al. 
1997: 59). Production transplantation is not a simple business matter. 
Transnationalisation of domestic capital actually uncovers the existence of 
discontinuous territoriality lying between the state and the outward-looking firms, 
while such discontinuity was varnished by the national objective in the promotion of 
economic development. The next chapter discusses the mechanism underlying the 
intention (and/or imperative) that Taiwanese IC firms move their industrial 
organisation across the Strait to pursue global IC production.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN   
IN THE DIRECTION OF CHINA 
7.1  Introduction 
In this chapter an attempt is made at unpacking the motives for firms deciding 
to carry out international production in China and their spatial practice. The foreign 
investment that the Taiwanese firms have undertaken in China has seen a change in 
its type, volume and distribution. There has emerged a surge of the IC-related 
investments to the Mainland since the later 1990s. China is a Greenfield site for IC 
business with explosive growth potential. My discussion mainly revolves round the 
relationship between Taiwanese firms and the Chinese economy. The rest of this 
chapter is divided into four sections. An outline of Taiwanese investment in the 
Mainland is provided through statistics in the first part of Section 7.2. The second 
part of the chapter reveals some conceptual implications of the Taiwanese FDI 
experience. Taiwanese firms conduct cross-border activities by associating their 
ownership-specific advantages with China’s location-specific advantages. It is 
helpful to situate the firms within a changing international division of labour. Section 
7.3 points out a structural transition within the Chinese economy at a macro level. It 
provides a background against which it is possible to understand the increasing scope 
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of China’s IC market which international firms favour. Section 7.4 explores the 
reasons that drive Taiwanese investors to China. It addresses how the firms, located 
within the global IC chain, are industrially, organisationally and territorially related 
to the locales in which they decide to situate. The dynamics whereby firms’ 
industrial status is associated with corporate behaviours are dissected in depth. The 
chapter attempts to reveal how the firms investing in China perform and are 
reorganised in line with shifts in the global IC production network. Section 7.5 
illustrates the practical conditions of collective transplantation. Three aspects are 
highlighted: (1) a geographical shift of the industrial system; (2) impacts of the shift 
on the firms and on the interaction between the firms and the territory where they 
locate; and (3) the connections between the transplant and the IC production chain.  
7.2  Go-west: An overview  
7.2.1  Investment trends 
A geographical inclination towards China has become conspicuous in reviewing 
Taiwanese foreign investment. Taiwan has been separated from the rest of China 
since 1949. Little trade and investment, if any, was undertaken between the two 
regimes for about 40 years owing to political hostility. Economic exchange between 
Taiwan and China restarted at the end of the 1980s. After the prohibition of trade and 
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investment with China was officially lifted in 1992, China became the major 
destination for Taiwanese capital. By 1993, about US$ 3.17 billion of FDI (over 65% 
of Taiwanese total) flowed into China, while China has accounted for more than 60% 
of Taiwanese outward investment since 2002 with the highest figure reaching US$ 
7.7 billion in 2003 (Figure 7.1). Correspondingly, Taiwanese investment was ranked 
in third place among foreign investment in China by 2000 (Kao 2001). This implies 
that the economic connection across the Strait has become significant in a relatively 
short period of time (Borrus 1997).  
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Figure 7.1  Approved investment in China: 1991-2005 (billion US$) 
Source: Adapted from Investment Commission, various years. 
As investment has grown, so the kinds of activities undertaken by Taiwanese 
firms in China have changed. The first change is the sectoral composition of 
investment; the second is its geography. The World Investment Report (UNCTD 
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2002) reveals that the production activities operated by the Taiwanese-funded firms 
in China changed from labour-intensive industries, such as toy- and shoe-making, in 
the 1980s to more capital-intensive and more technology-intensive activities in the 
late 1990s. An important sector is electronic and electrical appliances. The sector is 
not only the leader in invested items among all sectors but also continues to enlarge 
its share of Taiwan’s westbound investment. Figure 7.2 displays that this sector 
accounted for 48% of Taiwanese investment in China during 1998 and 2004, 
compared to 18% in the period from 1991 to 1997.  
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Figure 7.2  Taiwanese investment of an electronic sector: Comparison of 1991-1997 
and 1998-2004  
Source: Adapted from Investment Commission, various years. 
In addition, a spatial shift of investment can be identified. Jiangsu was the only 
Province to capture more than 50% of Taiwanese investment in China from 1998 to 
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2004 (Figure 7.3). To give a concrete example: the transplantation of the assembly 
Taiwanese notebook production to China began in 1996, and the last production line 
to run in Taiwan was closed down in 2005 (China Times November 4th 2004; Xinhua 
September 19th 2005). All the major laptop producers, and their component suppliers 
too, had relocated to the Suzhou Municipality by 2003 (Yang and Hsia 2004; MIC 
2005).  
Such rapid transplantation is characterised by a highly geographical 
concentration. The process of converging towards some specific territories is known 
as a collective action, led by a couple of top system firms (Chang 2001; Yang and 
Hsia 2004; Yang 2006). For example, there were 14 IT component suppliers rooted 
in branch plants in Suzhou in 1993, propelled by the BenQ Group, a Taiwanese 
brand-name. Organisationally, in other words, there is a hub-spoke structure whereby 
component suppliers (i.e. the spoke firms) offer system firms (i.e. the hub firms) 
parts for assembly activity. The hub-spoke model was first seen not in ‘go-west’ 
investment but in ‘go-south’ investment, as in the case of the Inventec Group (an 
electronic ODM) that organised over 50 satellite companies (part suppliers) to invest 
together in Penang, Malaysia in 1989. This has been known as the ‘industrial 
transplantation’ of Inventec Commons (Jou and Chen 2001). The phenomena of 
collective transplantation demonstrate the intensive networks of vertical 
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disintegration regarding the Taiwanese industrial systems and their geographical 
capability of extension.   
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Figure 7.3  Comparison of Taiwanese investment in Guangdong and Jiangsu: 
1991-1997 and 1998-2004 
Source: Adapted from Investment Commission, various years. 
Note: The data of Guangdong and Jiangsu on behalf of PRD and YRD respectively. The former 
contains three out of four Special Economic Zones (SEZs); the scope of the latter covers most 
productive parts of the YRD (including the data of Shanghai).  
7.2.2  The implications of investing in China 
Taiwan had accumulated considerable technological capability and capital 
potential because of its insertion into the new international division of labour after 
the 1960s. A further momentum for exporting capital was macroeconomic changes in 
the 1980s. Taiwanese-based firms began to explore offshore production from then on, 
as four problems emerged which threatened the international competitiveness of the 
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domestic firms: (1) rising wages and land rents in the home economy; (2) a shortage 
of domestic labour; (3) an appreciation of the Taiwanese currency against the US 
dollar, and (4) competition from neighbouring countries (in Southeast Asia and 
China), which became more market-oriented (Chen 1996; Hsueh, Hsu et al. 2001).  
The places where the firms do business are “most frequently in the region where 
they belong” (Chen 1983: 168). Geographical proximity represents simply a spatial 
description, which requires theoretically convincing explanations for the why. A 
review of work on the ways in which Taiwanese firms arrange cross-border 
production of, say, apparel, footwear and electronic industries in China (Hsing 1998; 
Cheng 1999; Gereffi 1999; Hsing 1999; Chang 2001; Jou and Chen 2001; Yang and 
Hsia 2005; Chang 2006; Wang and Lee 2007; Yang and Coe 2009) reveals the 
locational selection at two correlative levels on multiple spatial scales.  
The first is a supply dimension in relation to the functional status of Taiwanese 
firms in a framework of global production chains. Similar to counterparts from other 
Asian NIEs, Taiwanese firms, following considerable technological improvement, 
have been capable of exporting technologies to lower cost neighbouring countries 
(Heenan and Keegan 1979; Chen 1983; Yeung 1994). As a result, the role they play 
has shifted from being the ‘primary production contractor’ to one of an intermediary 
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which carries on contracting from overseas buyers on the one hand and engages in 
offshore production operations on the other.  
The way that Taiwan’s investors take part in the restructuring of the 
international division of labour is in line with the changing strategies of international 
buyers and host economies. There are processes of negotiation between international 
buyers, who possess considerable purchasing power, and Taiwanese OEMs who 
supply the manufactured goods: the buyers press the OEMs to set up production sites 
in China to reduce costs.52 To put it another way, Taiwan’s foreign investment was 
forced by stringent requirements from buyers. Taiwanese manufacturers played a 
role of OEM in ‘a defensive sense of globalisation’ (Jou and Chen 2001); however, it 
may after all be accepted as an efficient way for those OEMs to “[construct] the entry 
barriers obstructing the latecomers’ catch-up and replacement desire” (Kung 2005: 
61) in terms of organisational governance. Despite the business pressure, they were 
able to stabilise output quality and balance production costs by operating in the 
difficult environment of China’s transition economy. This is largely attributed to an 
                                                 
52
 A piece of informant report cited in Yang and Hsia (2004: 31) clearly substantiates the pressing 
force from international buyers typically: “… it’s simple, cost. [I] hear of going to mainland can 
reduce 25 dollars [of production cost], [so] I want to cut 25 dollars [off the price]. Go or stay; it’s up 
to you”. 
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inherent advantage in socio-cultural terms. Taiwanese manufacturers managed to 
regain their international orders, confirming the advantages of the interface role they 
played in adjusting the production chain geographically and organisationally.  
The position in which the OEMs can rapidly adapt themselves to the 
environment and then assist in improving linkages between brand names and Chinese 
factories refers to the second level of offshore manufacturing. It draws upon the 
interconnectedness of firms and places in institutional terms. Cultural affinity and 
institutional familiarity are firm-specific features that Taiwanese investors inherited 
from their “cultural and administrative heritage” (Dicken 1998: 202). These 
corporeal properties enabled firms to deal with cross-border production when 
encountering geographical difference. Literature on the socio-cultural subtlety of 
informal public-private alliances offers several examples. Mutual benefits of 
Taiwanese enterprises and local authorities are grounded upon a transition of Chinese 
political economy. Local states in China seized more administrative autonomy 
following a series of devolutions in the mid-1980s (Li 1999). As a result, they have 
been able to act flexibly as entrepreneurs in their own right helping to improve the 
local economy. These regulatory changes in China became an opportunity for 
Taiwanese firms.  
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The practice of ‘gift exchange’ embodies a relationship of reciprocal trust – a 
sense of guanxi – shared among ethnic-Chinese society, and plays a key role is 
communicating with local officials (Hsing 1996; Hsing 1998). Another model of 
public-private alliances in line with the culture of gift exchange is concerned with the 
regulatory flexibility of local states that alter ownership patterns of business 
establishments: Taiwanese-founded branch plants are opened in the name of JV with 
rural enterprises in the locale, yet the production operation is actually handled by the 
investors themselves (Wu 1997; Cheng 1999). Their intra-firm trades are nominally 
externalised to coordinate with the locally export-oriented policy and to “reduce the 
risk of being exposed to a corrupt environment and thereby alleviate the problems of 
rent-seeking under fuzzy property relations” (Wu 1997: 321). The corporate 
strategies consolidate the corporations’ non-material linkages, regarding social 
conventions and political manoeuvre, with local institutions. Such a shared 
foundation represents an ownership-specific advantage that Taiwanese companies 
hold, compared to other foreign counterparts, in gaining access to location-specific 
resources in China.  
In general terms, China’s cheap wages, rents and a huge market are the factors 
that drive inward investment. Particularly, investors from Taiwan have various 
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patronages (namely, preferential treatments) created by local officials (and the 
central government as well) within an administrative domain (Wu 1997).  
Put simply, the situation means that the generation of locational-specific 
resources contingently corresponds with the firm-specific properties. As Dunning 
argues, “the locational configuration of a firm’s activities may itself be an 
O[wnership]-specific advantage, as well as [having an impact on] the modality by 
which it augments, or exploits, its existing O advantages” (Dunning 1998: 60). To 
understand the phenomenon of  Taiwanese IC capital investment in China, its 
geographical outcomes should not be “separate[d] from the broader structures of 
which they are a part” (Dicken and Malmberg 2001: 347). In this regard, a 
‘firm-territory nexus’ is a key point of departure. I will now move onto China – the 
destination for the investment – to display how its industrial environment is changing 
within the context of national economic reform and of global economic 
transformation.  
224 
7.3  The growing IC market in China 
7.3.1  Rejoining the world economy 
Having developed regional self-sufficiency through central planning in the 
Maoist era (1949-1978), China’s economic strategy was turned towards the outside 
world in pursuit of ‘modernisation’ (Wong, Lau et al. 1988: 1) in the late 1970s. The 
Economic Reform Programme and the Open-Door Policy launched by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978 embodied China’s determination to develop a market economy. 
Thereafter, China began to approach the world economy by developing a ‘Socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics’.  
Following China’s economic reform and openness programmes, an increasing 
volume of FDI has gone to China in search of its large reservoir of cheap labour. 
China received US$40.8 billion of FDI inflows in 2000, a ten-fold increase over a 
decade (US$3.5 billion in 1990) (UNCTD 2003). Despite the global downturn in 
2002, China’s FDI inflows continued to increase and accounted for over 55% of all 
capital inflows to Asia (UNCTD 2003). Note that FDI in China moved from 
labour-intensive sectors during the 1980s towards more capital- and 
technology-intensive sectors during the 1990s (UNCTD 2001). China underwent a 
“rapid diversification of manufactured exports”, which is “directly linked to its 
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integration in the international segmentation of production processes” (Lemoine and 
Unal-Kesenci 2002: 829). The industrial expansion in China seems almost hard to 
believe. Generally speaking, the outwardly-oriented, highly-competitive industries 
there are mainly dominated by foreign-owned branch plants. These affiliates 
commanded an 81% share of all high-technology exports in 2000 (Table 7.1).  
Table 7.1  Exports of high-tech products from China by ownership of production: 
1996-2000 
 Total (billion US$) State-owned enterprises Foreign affiliates 
1996 12.6 39% 59% 
1998 20.3 25% 74% 
2000 37.0 18% 81% 
Source: (UNCTAD 2001: 26, Box table) 
TNCs are responsible for a growing export share of high-technology sectors 
even if their branch plants focus upon processing tasks. Such manufacturing 
activities, as in China, are greatly conducive to drawing capabilities of importing 
higher quality intermediates, better production and management techniques and a 
tighter association with the international market (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci 2002). 
Among the high-technology sectors, the IT industry is the largest destination for 
foreign investment in China, and the country’s biggest exporter. Foreign investment 
groups set up in China accounted for over 23% of the IT sector in 2003. Regarding 
the trade of high-technology products, the share of the IT industry has increased 
226 
continuously (Figure 7.4). Obviously, the TNCs make a great contribution to 
China’s high-technology production, the IT sector in particular.  
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Figure 7.4  Trade in high-tech products to/from China: 1997 and 2003 
Source: Adapted from the database of China Science and Technology Statistics 
(http://www.sts.org.cn) 
Note that more and more large IT companies, firms such as Intel, IBM and 
Microsoft, have begun to establish R&D teams or distribution centres in China, in 
addition to production activities. For example, the number of R&D centres in Jiangsu 
increased from 14 in 2000 to 58 in 2003, so that the installation of TNCs is expected 
to benefit the improvement of China’s industrial standards over a long period of time. 
China is now not merely the source of traditional products (such as textiles, toys and 
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shoes), but it is also viewed as the electronics-equipment manufacturing hub of the 
world.  
7.3.2  An IC supply lag 
China’s immense population acts as the magnet for FDI. With large supplies of 
low-cost labour,53 China’s initial entry into the electronics industry was through the 
assembly of appliances. Later, the range of electronics goods produced in China 
expanded to computer-related commodities, with Taiwanese IT hardware makers 
making a significant contribution in this upgrading process (Simon 1998; Fuller 2005; 
Yang and Hsia 2005; Yang 2006). Followed by other Taiwanese IT peripherals 
manufacturers, the leading Taiwanese computer manufacturers have started to 
expand their business into China (mostly in Shanghai and Suzhou) since the 
mid-1990s. Take the sector of computer notebooks, for example (China Times 
November 4th 2004; Business NEXT September 1st 2002). Taiwanese-based 
manufacturers supplied 80% of global output in 2004. Nonetheless, over 70% of the 
output was produced in the Mainland, and the last two processing lines in Taiwan 
were moved to China in 2005, due to a deep fall of profit margins (from 18% in 1998 
                                                 
53
 The average salary of an employee in China was 10% of that in Taiwan or 3% of that in Japan 
around the outset of the 2000s (Computex April 23rd 2004). 
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to less than 6% in 2004) in the global computer manufacturing sector. More than 
55% of Taiwan’s IT products were made in China in 2002 (Computex August 16th 
2002):  
In terms of consumer electronics, the largest [market] still lies in the 
developed countries. … This is the case of terminal [consumer] market. 
The production [of electronics goods], I mean the end commodities, is 
produced in the Mainland. No matter what kinds of processing lines, 
[they] are set up in the Mainland. Previously, there were some 
[production] in Southeast Asia, South America, and so on. But, currently, 
[production] is almost attracted [to China]. 
– reported by Des.15-2 
According to the annual survey of Reed Electronics Research, an international 
market intelligence company, China had become the third largest producer of global 
electronics in 2004 (Figure 7.5). Associated with sustained economic development, 
the rapid expansion of the domestic consumer market emerged as another 
competitive advantage. Economic growth in China reached 7% per annum.54 The 
largest domestic population, combined with cumulative purchasing power, means 
that China represents a huge and fast-growing domestic market, so that both local 
and foreign owned brands/producers are seeking to capture market share in China. 
                                                 
54
 The GDP in China has grown from US$388 million in 1990 to US$1,080 million in 2000 
(UNCTAD 2003). Some estimates are that the economic growth in China in the last few years may be 
double-digit, even if there was an official growth rate of 8.5% in 2003.  
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China will continue to gain a share of global electronics production with reference to 
the scale of its domestic market and the size of its manufacturing sector.  
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Figure 7.5  World electronics production: 2000-2005 (billions US$) 
Source: Adapted from Yearbook of World Electronics Data, Reed Electronics Research 
(http://www.rer.co.uk) 
In spite of a boom in electronics manufacturing, the capacity of chipmaking in 
China has long failed to match the output of finished commodities in either quality or 
quantity (Simon 1988; Simon 1992). China was responsible for 21% of $192.4 
billion IC consumption globally in 2005, up from only 6% in 2000 when the IC 
market in the US was more than five times the size of China (IC Insights January 9th 
2006) (Figure 7.6). However, the domestic capability of IC supply was far behind 
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the vast demand that electronics producers required in China.55 Around 80% of IC 
consumption in China relied upon imports, according to a survey conducted by the 
China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) in 2004 (IT Time August 6th 
2005).  
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Figure 7.6  The global top three IC consumption markets: 2000 and 2005 
Source: (IC Insights January 9th 2006: Figure 1) 
In reality, the IC supply lag was worse than the statistics suggest for at least 
three reasons: (1) a large amount of smuggled chips were not counted in the import 
statistics; (2) the estimation of domestic IC output capacity contains wafer 
fabrication and chip packing, so that the same batches of chips were double counted, 
and (3) about 80% of domestic IC output was contracted from foreign customers, 
                                                 
55
 By 2004, 50% of cameras, 30% of TVs, 30% of air conditioners, 25% of washing machines, and 
20% of refrigerators were produced or assembled in China. 
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which was not available to satisfy the domestic demand (IT Time August 6th 2005). 
That is to say, the actual gap between supply and demand was probably even wider 
than the published statistics. Chipmaking in China, though strongly policy-supported, 
retains a capacity for further development, which becomes a big lure for international 
IC manufacturers. 
7.3.3  Relocating to the Yangtze River Delta 
As shown in Figure 7.7, three IC industrial clusters – Beijing-Tianjin-Pan 
Bohai Bay (PBB), the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and the Pearl River Delta (PRD) – 
have emerged in China’s coastal area. Among these, the YRD appears to lead its 
counterparts (Hu 2006). More than the direct effects of national economic policy, 
institutional benefits of economic devolution in the early 1980s from the central 
government (Wong 1992) and the coordination among local authorities, have assisted 
in the economic growth of the YRD since the 1990s (Hsing 1998). According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, the YRD accounted for 18.7% and 28.4% of 
GDP and export nationwide respectively in 2002 (http://www.stats.gov.cn).  
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Figure 7.7  Output value and R&D expense in China’s IC clusters: 2003 
Source: Adapted from (Chen, Xiao et al. 2004: 2-6, 2-9, 2-12, 2-18, 2-21) 
Note: This data added the costal area of Fujian Province to the scope of the PRD. 
As the Shanghai Integrated Circuit Association (SICA) reported, the YRD 
commanded a two-thirds share of total output in China in 2004, of which over 70% 
of IC investment came in the form of FDI and JV. It is noteworthy that Shanghai is 
an IC hub of the YRD, which accounted for 42% of the national output value in 2004. 
Historically, the IC industry has been incubated in Shanghai since the mid-1950s, 
even though the progress of commercialisation was so sluggish until the late 1970s. 
A favourable period began with a series of IC industrial promotion projects in the 
1990s – Projects 908 and 909. They were mapped out mainly by the central 
government in pursuit of commercialisation. The national programmes of IC 
industrialisation came at an opportune moment when Shanghai was turned into a new 
YRD 
PBB 
PRD 
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economic pivot of China in the 1990s in place of Shenzhen which was the chief locus 
of economic reform during the Open-Door Policy of the 1980s (She, Xu et al. 1997). 
The programmes and industrial outcomes are detailed in Appendix D. 
As for Taiwanese investors, the YRD is seen as appropriate habitat for 
transplantation. This intention has been recognised in an annual survey on corporate 
options undertaken by the Taiwan Electric and Electronic Manufacturing Association 
(TEEMA) since 2000. There is great diversity in accounts of locational choice, while 
numerous Taiwanese IC firms (as well as several Chinese returnees’ start-ups and 
foreign affiliates) approve of the investment-friendly environment of the YRD. 
According to interviewed managers (many of whom have been assigned to different 
places around China) administration and environment are two of the qualities of the 
regions.  
The authorities in the YRD are reported to be more efficient and have policy 
tailored to foreign investors’ needs (cf. Lee and Saxenian 2008). Financial support, 
good quality infrastructure and land preparation are basic conditions that meet 
investors’ requirements. One more point of attraction is efficient customs that speeds 
speed up procedures to simplify the movement of goods and shorten shipping times. 
It is worthy of remark that the relocation of the Taiwanese IT industry contributes a 
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lot to the improvement of outmoded customs practices (Chen 2003; Wang and Lee 
2007). In the past, for example, goods were required to sit in customs bays for a 
minimum of 24 hours before clearing. Such customs delay was unsatisfactory to the 
Taiwanese PC manufacturers since computers need to be shipped within three days 
of the order confirmation. With an understanding that rapid delivery is an imperative 
for industrial competitiveness, the government soon expedited the customs 
procedures so as to accommodate the Taiwanese investors (Commercial Times May 
22nd 2002). 
Newly-built industrial parks also embody the efforts that the concerned 
authorities make. The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) is a case in 
point. This Park was co-developed by the Chinese Government and the Singaporean 
Government in 1994. The level of international cooperation facilitates the 
introduction of advanced and up to date managerial ideas/know-how, embodied in 
the infrastructure planning and park governance, according to the SIP Administrative 
Committee. The exchange of knowledge via the joint administration of the park by 
Suzhou and Singapore has continued so far, although the Chinese Government has 
become a controlling stockholder in place of the Singaporean Government since 
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2000. Second, the park is run by the local state,56 but the administrative committee is 
nationally authorised to approve firms intending to relocate, to issue official 
passports and to have an independent system of customs.  
The environmental dimension is another consideration, including physical 
conditions, living surroundings and business milieu. Chipmaking requires a large 
volume of water in their manufacturing and a strict requirement for air quality. It 
requires nearly one ton of clear water every day to run one 6-inch fab with a monthly 
capacity of 20 thousand wafers, for example. Constrained by a water shortage and 
the dust storms of north China, the establishment of fabs in the PBB suffer from 
inherent barriers to production. Second, knowledgeable manpower is always a key 
index of industrial competitiveness.57 Amenity is acknowledged as a significant 
                                                 
56
 The local authorities in the Suchou Municipality had performed a distinguished ‘Sounan model’ 
since the mid-1980s of which ‘collectively owned Township and Village enterprises’ (TVEs) were 
anchors of local industrialisation (Walder 1995; Jacobs 1999; Marton 2000). But, its bureaucrats were 
not so notorious for playing around foreign investors for ‘rent-seeking’ unlike the counterparts in the 
south, as shown in Section 7.2. Such a local state corporatism was reconstructed approvingly as 
service depots in ‘tugging foreign capital’ and technologies in the 1990s considering an updated 
strategy of ‘outward-looking economic development’ (Chang and Chiu 2002; Chang 2006).  
57
 A Chinese expatriate (Des.4), who runs China’s first RFIC design houses in Shanghai with a 
certain proportion of Taiwanese capital involved, shows his favour to Zhangjiang, Shanghai, “there 
are over two thousand doctors, six thousand post-graduates, [and] totally 60 thousand operators in 
such a tiny Zhangjiang … [compared to Taiwan’s HSIP,] the scale and industrial [technology] will 
remain five-year lagged I’m afraid. But [look,] there is potential. Two thousand doctors stay here. So 
we believe Shanghai has superiority”. 
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factor to gaining human resources (Florida 2002). The living standard in the YRD is 
said to be much better than its clusters elsewhere in China: 
If you compare here with Shenzhen, you would feel here is much 
better. … From the talent [recruitment] point of view … the living 
standard here is more favourable. The environmental well-being here is 
conducive to attract human resources. 
– reported by Des.11 
It is worth also commenting upon what can be described as urban fetishism 
(Chang 2006). The generation of fetishism is highly law-driven. On the one hand, 
under the central planning, China used to implement the residential registration 
system to govern internal migration, and this led to a dualistic socio-economic space: 
industry/urban (well-off) and agriculture/rural (badly-off) (Chan and Zhang 1999; 
Cai, Wang et al. 2002; Fleisher and Yang 2003). On the other hand, the citizens 
holding the right of abode (hukou, e.g. Shanghai’s blue card) are entitled to enjoy 
social welfare, educational and medical resources, etc. Those staying in a city 
without city hukou are excluded from the public welfare the municipal government 
provides. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the market mechanism in the YRD is 
considered to be most mature and active within the ‘Socialist market economy of 
Chinese characteristics’:  
Actually, Shanghai is more internationalised and thus easy to attract 
human resources. … Well, Beijing is somehow red-taped. Of course, the 
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governmental support is indispensable. But when I just came back [to 
China], I preferred the free-market style [in Shanghai]. 
– reported by Des.4 
It suggests that a market-friendly milieu in the YRD is evident. The financial 
market in Shanghai, for instance, is getting stronger and internationalising. 
Supplemented by a range of industrial services, it enables companies to manipulate 
their capital and to have the specialised production services accessible (cf. Sassen 
2000).  
The YRD is an attractive location, on a subnational scale, which Taiwan’s IC 
firms favour for locating their outward-bound capital. However, its strong points, 
presented by piecing numerous ‘objective’ conditions together, fail to furnish a 
properly substantive account. The locational merits can only be confirmed when 
coupled with corporate conditions (Saxenian 1994). What follows is concerned with 
how requirements and conditions of the Taiwanese IC industry per se are 
interconnected with the host economy, China in general and the YRD in particular, 
by virtue of clarifying the considerations under which Taiwan’s firms are inclined to, 
or are forced to, move westward.  
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7.4  Investment motivations 
Of course, the aim [for] you [to] set up a fab in China is for access [to] 
China’s market. [So, the fab] here would give a higher priority to local 
customers in China. … The reason [we] come to China, just like other 
factories from worldwide, is for the same purpose. We can say that the 
biggest attraction of China is nothing but China’s market, [and] the 
second [attraction] is China’s talent. 
– reported by Fry.3-2 
We are a typical design house, [and] focus upon R&D [activities]. … 
There [are] two main considerations to build up the bases in [the] 
mainland. The first is that we find a limitation of Taiwan’s talent. 
[Namely, it’s] insufficient. Particularly the quantity; the quantity is not 
enough. … The second concerns that there is a market. So, we hope to set 
up some sites to enter, to approach [the] market.  
– reported by Des.2-1 
The motion for Taiwanese IC companies to move production facilities across 
the Taiwan Strait is crystal-clear: to enlarge their market share and to acquire human 
resources. One is an external force, as the rest of the supply chain within Taiwanese 
IC-related investment moves westwards, while the other is the internal pressure of 
labour demand that pushes IC companies out of Taiwan to search for knowledge 
workers in China. It is not enough to deem the two facets simply as business logic 
though. There are some variables, including the resources and restraints of the host 
economy, the status of a firm itself within the IC chain, and industrial conditions at 
home where the firm is based (cf. Dicken 2000; Dicken 2002). The practical actions 
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of cross-Strait investment worked out are entangled with the diverse possibilities of 
geographies.  
7.4.1  Heading for a growing market 
Production chains 
China, unquestionably, has been in the spotlight owing to its position as the 
‘world’s factory’. Electronics manufacturing there grows by leaps and bounds, which 
triggers an urgent demand for chips:  
Where are our customers? [They’re] all around the world. Where is their 
manufacturing centre? [They’re] either in Taiwan or in the Mainland. 
Actually, those firms that cooperate with us set up their [branch] plants in 
the Mainland. 
– reported by Des.22 
Indeed, no fabless would pass up this huge market opportunity. The Taiwanese 
IC firms are keen on getting involved with chip sales in China. Seven out of the 
Taiwanese top-ten fablesses had made over 60% annual profits from the market in 
Hong Kong/China by 2000 (EE Times May 31st 2002). Having been the main 
destination to which Taiwanese-designed ICs were shipped, the  percentage of the 
Chinese market increased from 30.8% of the export market in 2002 to 50.9% in 2004 
according to the ITRI/IEK Project (June 2005) (Figure 7.8).  
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Figure 7.8  The shipping distribution of Taiwanese-designed ICs: 2002-2004 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (June 2005).  
Note: Most components, including chips, shipped to Hong Kong are transferred to south China for 
‘supplied/imported materials processing trade’ in order to avoid duty. 
In comparison with their counterparts in Silicon Valley, the firm-specific 
advantages that Taiwanese design houses hold to win orders from electronics 
customers is not cutting-edged chips but their capability to supply “more speedily, 
cheaply and reliably” (Breznitz 2005: 205). They are adept at ‘technology fusion’ 
(Kodima 1992) to integrate diverse technologies effectively,58 albeit not the most 
advanced technologies. This ‘second-mover’ advantage is greatly reinforced by cost 
                                                 
58
 MediaTek is illustrative in terms of a customer-based innovation. It made a successful adaptation 
of CD-ROM chipsets, DVD dual chipsets and the like, which were soon put into mass production at 
the end of the 1990s. Volume output of fabrication enabled a quick cost-cut. Such a price edge led to a 
speedy expansion of the market share. Consequently, the firm made a great profit – but also facilitated 
a spread of DVD players worldwide. It is currently one of the top ten fablesses in the world.  
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superiority and ‘time economy’ (Stalk 1988) as a result of the solid foundation laid 
by the industrial efficiency of vertical disintegration. That is, the highly proficient 
domestic foundry services in support of lowering costs and time-to-market enable the 
design houses to provide customers with value-added ‘total solutions’ to assist 
customers in cutting production cost (EE Times May 31st 2003). In addition, the total 
solutions the designers offer are almost inclusive: to introduce new products and the 
latest technological developments, to analyse demands of the current market for 
customers to tailor powerful products. And once the chips are designed, the post-sale 
support (such as de-bugging or testing services) would be provided in customers’ 
plants to tune the products up. Such an extended series of services requires frequent 
and close communication with customers, most of which have been transplanted to 
China:  
My customers’ plants are located in the south [of China], such as the 
areas of Shenzhen and Dongguan, so that I have to offer post-sale 
services nearby. This is the primary imperative. So, we must set up a 
technical support [team], [namely] FAE, around the areas of Shenzhen 
and Dongguan. … It’s no way out, because customers are there. 
Customers call [you] up in the morning, and you’d better turn up by 
midday. [You] must not arrive three days later, but [you] have to 
straighten out [problems] right away.  
– reported by Des.15-2 
In reality, the model of vertical disintegration has been successfully practised 
not merely by the IC industry but also among all electronics-related industries in the 
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high-technology complex area of north Taiwan (Hsu 2000; Hsu and Cheng 2002). As 
global electronics manufacturing activities move into China, the IC design sector 
soon follows after the electronics manufacturing companies to engage in customer 
services. The investment vehicles open affiliates to provide field application engineer 
(FAE) services for customers (typically OEMs or system firms and have been mostly 
relocated in China) in the neighbourhood.  
Having said this, the majority of Taiwan’s design houses that participate in the 
Chinese market do so primarily  because of China’s position in the world 
production base. But, undeniably, the rise of local electronics-related industries is 
considered as a developing market. Take TFT-LCD panels, for instance. The 17-inch 
TFT-LCD panel is the key competence applied to the screens of monitors and 
notebooks. Each panel requires about 11 pieces of chips to run. In other words, 
volume production of the panels would increase orders for chips, implying an 
opportunity for the IC manufacturers to make profit. Currently, there are two local 
panel plants in operation and another two are under construction in China. A surge of 
investment in 17-inch TFT-LCD panel plants in China has encouraged a number of 
Taiwanese LCD driver IC designers (such as Novatek, Himax, Mayson Century, 
Cheertek, etc.) to locate production facilities there.  
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Market opportunity is one thing but profitability is quite another. The current 
situation shows that the full exploitation of the Chinese market remains a long way 
from being achieved. The technology level of most local electronics manufacturers is 
still weak, requiring an entire complement of technical support from design houses. 
This increases design firms’ costs and burdens concerning chip supply and the task 
of technological support. As a result, the orders from international customers and 
Taiwanese manufacturers – which locate production lines in China – make up the 
major business that the Taiwanese design firms have engaged with in China so far. 
That the firms embark on enlarging the range of Chinese customers is an on-going 
process and one that must be placed in the context of the potential growth of the local 
electronics industry. For instance, Huaya, specialising in the TV ICs design, 
accounted for some 10% of China’s domestic CRT TV market in 2005, and aims for 
one-third of the market share in the future.  
Tax and local growth 
The condition in the foundry sector is more evident in terms of market 
expectancy. As DigiTimes (September 12th 2005) comments, “as the migration of 
manufacturing bases for IT, communication, and consumer electronics production to 
China continues, international chipmakers all have their eyes on big pieces of this 
cake”. The chip market is large in China and amounted to some US$30 billion in 
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2004. But, this market is mostly consumed by the TNCs which operated export 
facilities in China. One ponderable issue is the technological competence that is 
much lower among local start-ups. Despite an increasing number of local design 
houses, the majority are small, with less than a dozen personnel. They have limited 
capability to commercialise in-house designs, compounded by limited capital 
resources as well as small IP pools. A marketing manager (Fry.1-2) comments that  
[a] basic ability that general design houses own is to carry out testing 
after chips are outputted. Who provides the testing programmes? [The 
design houses] themselves need to provide [this]. … [But] some of them 
(local design houses) cannot even do that. They are unable to write the 
programme; software and firmware, neither. … All right, when we 
cooperate with downstream customers, we will offer a team [to] 
co-ordinate. … I’ll tell you some concepts. [If] you’d like to play these, 
you need certain concepts. You must sort out your spec, so that I’m able 
to support you. If you cannot even develop spec, how should I work with 
you? After the spec is done, I need to ask the back-end assembly and test 
plants to help, to integrate with front-end … It’s quite tough. 
Concerning the current situation, the local firms apparently fail to fill up the 
production capacity of any 8-inch foundries. An illustration of the status quo with 
statistics may offer a clear outline of limited demand from indigenous firms for 
foundry services. The annual revenue of China’s design sector was about US$1 
billion in 2004, which could be converted into some US$400 million of revenue in 
chipmaking regarding the 8-inch lines. However, a considerable part of chip output 
was actually made by outdated process technologies with line-width of more than 
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0.35µm, so that the 8-inch fabs in China made up half the foundry revenue in total, 
i.e. some US$200 million per annum. Simply put, an output value of US$200 million 
is negligible, compared to the annual profit of the foundry giants, TSMC, which 
gained US$7.7 billion in the same year.  
The sector is still relatively underdeveloped, and can not support pure-play 
foundries.59 The low level of local customers for the foundry market implies the 
newly-opened 8-inch fabs in China are currently run by the orders from worldwide 
customers, including Taiwanese firms. It begs the following question: why are 
Taiwan’s chipmakers so anxious to locate plants there? Clearly, market potentiality 
is the point that the foundries highlight: 
Q: Is your fab founded here for China’s design houses? 
A: [If we run only] for them, we would be starving. It is because the 
proportion of imports remains very low at the moment … merely 10% or 
so. [Actually] that is pretty good, acceptable [so far]. …We hope to 
increase [proportion of local firms] up to 20% [of our customer scale]. … 
Look, since 2002 when we came; … it has grown up extremely fast year 
by year almost in 40%, 50%. … Currently, all the top ten [design houses 
in China] together may not match up to one Taiwanese design house [in 
revenue], [but] they will move up in a couple of years. It is because there 
is a continuous movement toward here, [I mean] global production … 
                                                 
59
 International chipmakers posited there are IDMs (such as Infineon, Intel and Motorola). Even local 
manufacturers of scope (such as ASMC, Belling and SHHIC) do not run a made-to-order model 
service with very few exceptions.  
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and [manufacturing] won’t move out; it seldom moves out. … I often 
term here is a black hole; [industries] move in but never move out.  
– reported by Fry.1-2 
On second thoughts, though, the application of cyber-links to foundry services 
impacted upon communication and collaboration in the processing function. The 
electronic communication, having been discussed previously, helps to transform the 
spatial organisations and practical patterns of the vertical disintegration in the IC 
industry – IC design and chipmaking, hence, need not be tied up spatially. Take 
TSMC for example; it has customers worldwide, of which 75% are in the US. In this 
regard, the Taiwanese chipmakers should be able to serve China’s rising market, 
regardless of distance. However, why did the chipmakers feel compelled to open 
production lines in China rather than fulfil orders at home?  
The Chinese Government was keen on attracting chipmakers, whether 
indigenous or foreign funded, to produce chips domestically. It aimed to slow down 
an increasing reliance on imports, and to improve the standard of the indigenous IC 
industry. Tax incentives were a key tool in this strategy. The Encouragement Policies 
on Software and IC Industry Development (i.e. ‘State Circular 18’) initiated in 2000 
were critical. The Circular had incentives of tax exemption and ‘drawback facilities’ 
to actualise industrial targets (Appendix D). A rebate in excess of 6% for chips made 
in China was deducted from the 17% value-added tax (VAT) charged for all chips 
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sold there. The tax rebate rate was decreased to 3% in 2001, which further enlarged 
the cost gap between local output and import chips. 60  Given the tight price 
competition of chips and the growing importance of the Chinese chip market, front- 
and back-end chip manufacturers were willing to build up production sites in China. 
This policy discriminated against ICs produced overseas, with an impact upon 
competitiveness. It affected the logic of sourcing chips – and also manufacturing 
governance: the point was that Taiwanese foundries opened wafer lines in China 
aimed at establishing business footholds that might eventually target the Chinese 
market. To put it bluntly, China’s market power was institutionally manipulated – it 
was a market bounded by taxation.61  
7.4.2  Manpower, cost and industrial status 
The demand for knowledgeable labour 
The IC industry requires a high proportion of its workers to be highly skilled. 
With the miniaturisation of chips, the difficulty and complexity of design tasks and 
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 However, China called off this trade-related investment measure in 2004, submitting to the WTO 
regulation.  
61
 However, the taxation flowed over continuous superiority of those fabs located in Taiwan as a 
result of quality instead of price.  
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production processes are increased. For example, the system-on-chip (SoC), 
where one piece of the chip is in possession of comprehensive functions, is 
developed to reduce the size of ICs for use in portable devices, such as mobile 
phones, digital cameras, etc. More elaborate design skills and onerous manufacturing 
proceedings are involved with combining various components upon a single chip. 
Seeing that the technical division of labour along processing segments is extremely 
complicated (Figure 7.9), I will not illustrate the manpower requirements of each 
section in detail but draw upon the specialty of chip design as a concrete example  
of companies’ demand for high level human resources.  
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Figure 7.9  A variety of engineering manpower of the IC industry 
Source: According to fieldwork results. 
Chip design, coinciding with component miniaturisation, is highly 
market-driven. Marketability is the top priority for companies to map out developing 
strategies and are associated with two related competitive features. First, a process of 
market diversification has facilitated large numbers of specialised but low-volume 
market segments. Concentrating upon specific market segments is acknowledged to 
be a best practice for design houses to “stay at the forefront of each of these diverse 
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and fast changing technologies” (Saxenian 1991: 425). As such, there would be a PM 
(i.e. product marketing or project management) team62 that takes responsibility for 
the definition of products – to select marketable and feasible products by means of 
information collection. There are two dimensions of this. One the first implies a 
market survey to collect customer feedback and demands for the purpose of 
mastering up-to-date product features. Another dimension is technology analysis, 
including knowledge of current standards and the review of in-house capability, 
which measures corporate technological ability, leading to a decision on what kinds 
of IPs should be sourced externally for targeted products. All the information is taken 
into account in order to set up a production specification to follow R&D activities. 
Second, considering the shrinking life-cycle of various electronics products, the 
capability for time-to-market is one crucial competitive edge (Stalk 1988). The speed 
of putting new products on the market is closely related to the profit margin:  
Sometimes the consumer IC products change quite fast. Say, Elan, 
Sunplus, Sonix and so on, they are consumer IC [design houses]. What 
they stress is TAT, [namely] turn-around-time. [Even if] one product is 
put on the market just a couple of days [later], lots of similar types [of 
chips] are coming out. You know, price is very ‘bloody’.  
– reported by Drm.1 
                                                 
62
 The detailed function of the PM team in firms can vary but, generally, they are engaged in product 
marketing and project management prior to project launch. 
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There is a very fine division of labour within design houses. From a project 
launch, through the chip design process, to design tape-out for outsourcing 
fabrication, an assortment of engineers are involved. In addition to in-house R&D 
activities or manufacturing process, there would be FAE teams appointed to work 
with customers in pre-sale services (including technical presentations, 
demonstrations and benchmarking) and post-sales technical solutions (such as 
tuning-up and debugging). By doing so, the application of chips to electronics goods 
has to be well-formulated as soon as possible. It is essential to strengthen corporate 
capabilities for product creativity, technological innovation and technical support in 
the face of the market volatility and the economics of time; this requires companies 
to capture sufficient human resources to carry on continuous innovation.  
Talent shortage at home 
The high-technology industry in Taiwan has been facing a serious shortage of 
labour because the annual supply of graduates is insufficient for the labour market. 
The technical personnel that domestic IC firms require is mainly focused upon the 
professional fields from electronics engineering or information engineering 
backgrounds with a preference for those who are awarded a Masters degree. There is 
a high overlap with respect to the talent requirement among various electronics 
industrial sectors (Table 7.2). A fast-expanding LCD-TFT industry, in particular, 
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attracting manpower straight out of school has shrunk the supply of the talent pool 
for the IC sector in the last five years (Taishang Newsletter April 26th 2004). The 
S&T Advisory Group, under Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, had estimated the demand 
for IC-related engineers was up to 9,700 in 2005, but the number of available 
workers was as low as 6,200. 
Table 7.2  The background requirement for labour force of selected industries in 
Taiwan: 2005 (%) 
Educational background Professional background  
BS MSc PhD Electronics 
Eng. 
Computer Sc. 
& Info. Eng. 
Mech. Eng. Others 
IC Design 33 65 2 53 23 9 15 
IC Manuf. 33 60 7 25 20 10 45 
IC Ass. & Test 90 9 1 20 2 30 48 
LCD-TFT 35 55 10 43 3 9 45 
Telecomm. 35 60 55 45 30 0 25 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (December 2004).  
The IC design industry in Taiwan, as in other electronics sectors and in other 
states, finds itself without enough engineers (novices or veterans) to fill the available 
positions. Sourcing overseas manpower becomes an alternative option to make up 
the gap in light of the skilled labour. A potential stock of well-educated labour in 
China drives Taiwan’s IC design houses to enlarge their corporate talent pool for fear 
that the talent shortage may threaten to run down their innovation capacity. However, 
Taiwanese regulations forbid the Taiwanese design houses to carry out circuit design 
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of chips in China on the one hand, and restrict the firms in recruiting Chinese 
engineers to work in Taiwan on the other hand. It is because the government regards 
the technology of hardware design as a leading edge of national competitiveness that 
the  prohibitive edicts are proclaimed in order to preserve this advantage, by 
preventing a loss of expertise (to China in particular). In this regard, two segments of 
the labour force are currently the main concerns – i.e. FAEs and software engineers – 
even though quite a few Taiwanese design houses have built up an R&D team to 
engage in hardware design in China in a manner that is effectively ‘under the table’.  
In addition to the concerns over the legal position of such activities, the 
disposition of companies prowling for certain segments of Chinese manpower is 
associated with the problems of labour costs and the specificity of Taiwan’s labour 
market. The employment of local FAE staff is directly related to cost reduction. As 
mentioned earlier, the FAE functions as a customer service, so they are not core 
R&D personnel responsible for decisive technologies but perform a customer 
relations’ role by supporting customers and delivering market feedback to head 
office. The implementation of technical support requires instant communication and 
inspection on customers’ shop-floors. The local hire of an FAE team is for the 
convenience of access to nearby customers and to save the costs of undertaking long 
distance but intensive business trips. 
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The situation is more complicated with regard to R&D personnel. Generally 
speaking, the IC design industry requires R&D staff, consisting of circuit designers 
(for hardware design) and system designers (for software application) to engage in 
project development. The hardware design involves setting up the specification of 
the chip, while the software application acts to create different versions on the basis 
of the defined specification. A single piece of chip must be developed to have two 
essential qualities: first, so that the product life of the chip can be extended, and 
second, the chip can be tailor-made to meet specific demands that customers require. 
In other words, the chip has to have a standard version from which more specialised 
versions can be developed. 
In general terms, an ideal ratio of hardware design to software development is 1: 
2 or 1: 3 for the product development. However, the ratio is merely about 1:1 in 
Taiwan; the current structure of domestic manpower is unsatisfactory. The reason for 
the large gap of software talent within the design sector is in relation to an aspect of 
engineering: a failure in chip design can be wasteful in production; such problems 
can cost as much as US$1 billion in regard to one mask making a 12-inch wafer, 
while the development of software is revisable and issued repeatedly for successive 
versions. The design task within the hardware section is fundamentally responsible 
for the success of products. It explains why design houses tend to lay much more 
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emphasis on hardware design, and why hardware design offers a strong competitive 
advantage to Taiwanese engineers in comparison with software development. On the 
supply side, many qualified software engineers (with professional backgrounds from 
the field of computer science and information engineering) prefer to find a place in 
software companies rather than design houses. In a sense, they consider the position 
of software engineers to be slightly inferior to that of hardware engineers within the 
IC design sector:  
If I were a software talent, I would choose software companies, such as 
Cyberlink or Ulead (two Taiwanese leading software companies which 
specialise in imaging products). It is because what they are engaged with 
is genuine systematic software. But the role of software [engineers] in 
design house[s] is subordinate, so that an excellent software talent won’t 
come to a design house to be in a minor role.  
– reported by Des.16-2 
A certain portion of the software application and field application can be 
externalised both organisationally and geographically considering that these tasks are 
not the core of design houses’ competitive edge. Design houses thus tend to search 
for manpower in China to make up for the deficiency of software engineers in 
Taiwan and, incidentally, to reduce their labour costs.  
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The cost mechanism 
The lower wage levels of Chinese electronic engineers do indeed draw in 
foreign investment. Take the design of RF (radio frequency) ICs for example. Every 
generation of chip requires an R&D team of 20-30 engineers to work out for about 
three years until tape-out. It costs at least US$25 million to implement if the team is 
located in Silicon Valley. However, the cost can be reduced to about one-third or 
one-fourth of ordinary expenditure by locating in China thanks to the low labour 
costs there. From a defensive point of view, the need by TNCs to open branch sites 
in China in pursuit of labour-cost minimisation is a means of “defend[ing] a 
‘quasi-monopoly’ of knowledge” (Pitelis 1993: 529, quotes original). That is one 
crucial reason why a number of foreign design houses, and the US-based ones in 
particular, with worldwide capital resources are particularly attracted to the prospect 
of saving a great deal of money by exploiting locational advantages in China to 
develop up-to-date products, as it provides access to low paid but suitably qualified 
engineers.  
Despite popular belief, it is a mistake to view the level of labour wage as a 
primary factor in attracting Taiwanese capital to China. The issue of labour costs that 
Taiwan’s firms take into account when appointing some engineering tasks to 
branches in China is more complicated than the point of wage level. First of all, 
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regulatory differences should be factored into the cost accounting of personnel 
expense, of which social security is particularly germane. Employees’ social benefits 
(i.e. the four premiums (sijin), which employers are required to fund in China, are 
higher than those in Taiwan. Take companies in Shanghai and Suzhou, for example; 
the sijin that employers should pay is up to 44% of salary according to a local 
management centre of a housing provident fund (HPF, zhufang gongjijin). 63 
Comparatively, the social security of employees that enterprises in Taiwan have to 
pay is some 20% on average. In other words, the burden of personnel expense per 
capita is nearly 1.5 times the actual pay in China, compared to about 1.2 times in 
Taiwan. Hence, the combined labour costs are not as low as one might suspect from 
the Taiwanese companies’ perspective.  
The second factor regarding the labour cost is concerned with the rate of wage 
drift. During my research a rapid hike in the wages of technical personnel in China 
was in progress as a result of a scarcity of IC labour. The rapid rise of the Chinese IC 
industry means that the engineering workforce has not been able to make up the 
labour requirement. The data shown in Table 7.3, conducted by the electronic 
industry press in 2002, revealed that the average pay of IC-specific engineers 
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 It is a non-profitmaking unit subordinated to a local authority.  
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increased fastest among electronic engineers and experienced the highest annual 
growth rate. It reflects that an increasing demand for IC-specific engineers in China 
picked up strongly as the IC industry expanded. The wage gap between Taiwan and 
China has narrowed over time. This implies that Taiwan’s firms have declining 
labour cost advantages by locating production in China.  
Table 7.3  The salary level of selected engineers in China (US$) 
 IC Telecomm Consumer electronics 
2001 7,022 7,802 6,056 
2002 10,618 9,426 8,707 
Growth rate (%) 51.2% 20.8% 43.8% 
Source: (EE Time September 28th 2002) 
The main reason that the Taiwanese firms are keen on exploiting the talent 
reservoir in China is not the value of wages per se. A variety of contexts (e.g. capital 
sources, technological bases, industrial positions or functional requirements) upon 
which the various transnational capitals are founded require a subtle understanding. 
As Smith and others (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 47) conclude,  
[r]eferences to labour processes are almost entirely concerned with the 
issue of labour cost as a factor in determining the international patterning 
of production, assembly, distribution and retailing activities within a 
chain. Little, if any, attention is given to the organisation of work and 
employment at the intra-firm level, clearly limiting an assessment of the 
impact of a place’s location within a commodity chain. 
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Here a comparison can make the location decision clearer. The US affiliates, for 
example, are assigned more R&D tasks to carry out, thereby undertaking processes 
as constitutive roles in circulating, codifying and loading information and knowledge. 
Taiwanese investment is currently not focused on advanced R&D tasks. Taiwanese 
firms aim to enhance the servicing of clients located in China, so that they pay more 
attention to reducing the overheads of cadre deployment, although the wage gap 
between Taiwan and China has narrowed over time.  
7.5  Straddling the Strait  
7.5.1  Shifts in the industrial system 
Most of Taiwan’s leading firms in the sectors of design, fabrication and 
assembly sectors have sought to spread out their business/production activities in 
China according to the ITRI/IEK (Chen, Xiao et al. 2004), although it is clearly 
difficult to offer precise quantitative estimates of the IC company numbers investing 
there. Table 7.4 reveals 20 Taiwan-funded design houses, of which the firms ranked 
as the Taiwanese top ten design houses of 2005 are included. The information I 
compiled is based upon various corporate annual reports, formal statements 
published by the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and fieldwork results. The 
table illustrates that Taiwanese IC capital is spatially concentrated in Shanghai and 
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adjacent cities (such as Suzhou, for example) around the YRD. The spatial 
distribution corresponds to the locational considerations that have been outlined in 
Section 7.4.  
Table 7.4  The investment of leading Taiwanese design houses in China 
Parent 
company 
Affiliates Est. 
year 
Location 
(√ in the YRD) 
Notes 
MediaTek 
Software 
2002 Shenzhen  # Cayman and Samoa MediaTek* 
MediaTek 2003 Hebei, Anhui 
Prov. 
 # Cayman and Samoa 
SinoWealth 2001 Shanghai √ In the name of individual shareholders Novatek* 
Novatek 2002 Suzhou √ # BVI and Samoa 
VIA 2000 Shenzhen  # BVI and Hong Kong 
VIA Software 2000 Hangzhou  # Cayman and Samoa 
VIA 2001 Beijing  # Cayman and Samoa 
S3 Graphics 2001 Shanghai √ In the form of JV with S3 
# Cayman and Samoa 
GAPT 2003 Shanghai √ In the name of individual shareholders 
Run for assembly task 
VIA* 
VIA 
Telecomm 
2003 Hangzhou, 
Zhejiang Prov. 
√ # Cayman and Samoa 
Sunplus 1999 Beijing  In the name of individual shareholders Sunplus* 
Sunplus 2001 Shanghai √ # Belize, Mauritius and Cayman 
Himax* Himax 2004 Suzhou √ # Samoa 
SiS* SiS 2005 Suzhou √ # Samoa 
Realtek* Realsil 2001 Suzhou √ # BVI and Mauritius 
Etron* GTBF 2001 Dongguan, 
Guangdong Prov. 
 In the form of JV 
# BVI 
Run for assembly task 
Phison* N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Faraday* Faraday 2002 Shanghai √ # BVI and Mauritius 
continued over page 
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Table 7.4 continued  
Parent 
company 
Affiliates Est. 
year 
Location 
(√ in the YRD) 
Notes 
Elan 2002 Shanghai √ # Hong Kong and Mauritius Elan 
Elan 2003 Shenzhen  # Hong Kong and Mauritius 
Holtek Holtek 2001 Shanghai √ # BVI 
Ali Ali 2000 Shanghai √ # BVI 
ULi ULi 2004 Shanghai √ # BVI 
Winbond Winbond 2001 Shanghai √ # BVI  
Cheertek Cheertek 2002 Shanghai √ # Samoa 
SmartASIC Huaya 2001 Shanghai √ # BVI and Cayman 
Princeton Princeton 2002 Shenzhen  N/A 
InnoSiS 1999 Suzhou √ Macronix 
Macronix 2005 Suzhou √ 
InnoSiS was restructured as Macronix in 
2005 
Myson 
Century 
Chiplinks 2003 Shanghai √ In the form of JV with Shanghai Belling. 
# Malaysia 
Sources: According to fieldwork results, financial statements of various firms and Market Observation 
Post System of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (http://newmops.tse.com.tw/). 
Notes: (1) * means Taiwanese top ten design houses in 2005; (2) √ refers to the location of affiliates in 
the YRD; and (3) # means the third parties through which investment projects pass.  
In addition, dimensions of timing and ownership can be identified. (1) The firms 
began to locate within China at the turn of the last century. (2) The flow of capital is 
indirect, most of which goes by a circuitous route via offshore companies , such as 
BVI, Cayman and Samoa. Although their investment items may not be prohibited, 
the firms set up the offshore companies for ‘cash parking’ for financial reasons. The 
capital deposited in these tax havens can be transferred to China (and then back again, 
if necessary) more freely because the raison d’etre of offshore financial centres 
makes it more difficult for the Investment Commission or other agencies to supervise 
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the flow of funds. In addition, many investment projects are conducted in their 
capacity as individuals which qualify for tax relief. Enterprises were required to 
include all income gained from overseas business when calculating their tax liability, 
while personal income tax was levied only upon income earned within Taiwan. For 
that reason, the firms were apt to evade paying tax by an expedient of conducting 
offshore investment in the name of individual shareholders.  
Attention now is paid to interpreting the input-output system and organisational 
governance in relation to implications of territorialisation. A consideration of the 
temporal dimension of IC design house investment in China demonstrates that the IC 
sector was the second-round investment by the Taiwanese electronics industry going 
west. The IC business is run in the form of project-based coalitions following the 
evolution of vertical disintegration. The tight interlinked segments of the IC industry, 
embracing design, fabrication, assembly and other associated supporting industries, 
are geographically transplantable. Foundry activities serve as the locomotive engine 
within the IC industrial sector in driving investment in China. A group of the 
UMC-clan design members (such as Novatek and Holtek) and some other design 
houses (such as Realtek), which have long developed a good rapport with UMC, 
started to build production capacity in the YRD in 2001 and 2002. This investment 
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was actually encouraged by UMC, who wanted its design partners to support the 
establishment of HJTC in Suzhou in 2001.  
In addition to the case of the UMC-clan, there is a strong pull by foundries to 
bring back-end assembly houses together. Both TSMC and UMC have their own 
assembly partners in Taiwan. As Table 7.5 reveals, ASE and SPIL followed TSMC 
and HJTC respectively to open branch plants in China even if the two world leading 
assembly plants64 have dealt with lower-end packaging tasks there to date. The 
branch plant of SPIL is located next to HJTC’s fab in the Suzhou Industrial Park. 
Besides the assembly partners, design service providers, such as Faraday (a member 
of UMC-clan) and FameG (a partner of TSMC’s design centre alliance) also moved 
along with the rest of the industrial chain by opening branch offices in Shanghai.  
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 ASE and SPIL, solely, accounted for about 45% of the output value among assembly contractors in 
2003 (China Times June 24th 2004; http://www.chipscalereview.com/). The two firms have seen the 
market share enlarged in line with continuous advance of processing technologies. 
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Table 7.5  Comparison of TSMC and HTJC 
 HJTC TSMC, Shanghai 
Est. year 2001 2003 
Location Suzhou Shanghai 
Investment Founded by UMC ex-employee Directly invested by TSMC 
Tech. capacity 0.18µm/8-inch wafer line licensed from 
amity firm, UMC.  
0.25µm/8-inch wafer line ported from 
parent company.  
Facilities  Purchasing used equipments from 
worldwide.  
Moving equipments of Fab7 from 
Hsinchu.  
Staff in total 1,600 persons 1,000 persons 
Taiwanese 
staff 
Some 200 staff recruited from Taiwan 
(UMC mainly).  
Some 100 staff assigned by 
Headquarters.  
Assembly 
partners 
SPIL set up plants in Suzhou in 2002.  ASE set up branch plants in 2003 in 
Shanghai and Kunshan (in Jiangsu 
Prov.) in 2004 and had strategic alliance 
with GAPT*.  
IP vendors 
partners 
Faraday set up a branch office in 
Shanghai in 2002.  
FameG set up a branch office in 
Shanghai in 2003.  
Source: According to fieldwork results in 2005.  
Note: * GAPT, a packaging and testing plant in Shanghai, founded by MS Cher Wang, the chairman 
of VIA. 
7.5.2  System, assemblage and territorial reflexivity 
That the firms undertake transplantation collectively produces a geographical 
shift of the entire industrial system. It generates a territorial manifestation of the 
industrial sector (Dicken and Malmberg 2001). Three further dimensions can 
therefore be determined in order to understand that “the particularities of a firm 
enmesh the particularities of a firm with the particularities of that territory” (Dicken 
and Malmberg 2001: 347). First, considering the scale and structural nature of 
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Taiwanese IC firms, it can be profitable to carry out offshore production by 
concentrating just a part of the industrial system within a new geographical territory. 
An immediate gain is made by reducing transaction costs. For example:  
TSMC is located in Songjiang (in western Shanghai), HJTC is in Suzhou 
and GSMC and SMIC are in Pudong (in eastern Shanghai). All are 
confined within a couple of hours drive. Once I got one piece of a part 
broken, [the equipment vendors] should dispatch the components [to me] 
in no time. … [But] if I set up [branch plants] in the inland, a flight 
would take half of a day, added by passing through customs or the like. 
The cost of time would reflect on [production costs]. I should run [the 
equipment] 22 hours a day. If waiting for a piece of a part takes me six 
hours, the productivity would be low and the cost would be lifted. 
– reported by Drm.1 
The achievement of time economy in component supply or malfunction 
reparation underlines the necessity for the firms to re-agglomerate activities in 
certain locales (Figure 7.10). As Scott has argued, “a large assemblage of producers 
[is] tied into an interdependent whole by means of their external transactional 
relations” (Scott 1988: 28). Further matters relating to the re-situated industrial 
system, and its interaction with places to which they are transplanted are discussed in 
more detail below.  
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Figure 7.10  The agglomeration of Taiwanese IC firms in Shanghai and Suzhou 
Notes: (1) This map displays some of the Taiwanese design houses listed in Table 7.4 and several 
chipmakers; (2) SIP is short for Suzhou Industrial Park; and (3) Des is design house, Fdy is foundry 
and Ass is assembly house. 
Taiwan’s inter-firm networks of ‘social embeddedness, flexibility, efficiency’ 
(Xie 1991; Buck 2000) are adjusted in the locales. The industrial system moving 
abroad does not, and should not, represent a hermetic business circle. It is peculiarly 
specifically important to combine with other co-located counterparts to produce 
efficiencies. While the dimension of creating innovation or learning milieu has not 
Fdy: TSMC 
Des: Novatek, S3, 
Sunplus, Elan, Huaya 
Fdy: GSMC, SMIC 
Des: ALi, Cheertek, 
FameG, Faraday, Holtek, 
SinoWealth, ULi, Winbond 
Des: Himax, Macronix, 
Novatek, Realsil, SiS 
Fdy: HJTC 
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materialised in the YRD so far, the assemblage of production facilities here is crucial 
for investors to share the expense of information collection and to enhance the 
exchange of knowledge. The power of coherence is an “inner momentum of falling 
production costs” (Scott 1988: 176) that generates great interest within corporations. 
A geographical concentration assists in agreeing appropriate policies and expediency 
in the face of China’s regulations that are notorious for their complexity and 
capriciousness. Solidarity between producers makes for bargaining counters when 
negotiating with local authorities, and even lobbying the State Council on policies. 
For instance, a preferential clawback made on export duties was reduced from 17% 
to 13% in January 2004. Once a diminution of 4% in tax refund is put into practice, 
cost superiority of Chinese fabs over Taiwanese ones would have been barely 1%, 
compared to 5% previously. All voices converged as one and the same opinion to 
argue against the cancellation of favourable policy. Unity was indeed strength. The 
foundries located in Shanghai particularly took a lead to excuse the IC industry from 
this tax reform.65 Their common appeal was submitted to the central government by 
way of the SICA. This effort had a positive response from the State Council in 
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 At that time, the majority of foundries were concentrated in Shanghai and most of them were 
Taiwanese-based. They rushed out their dissentient view against the revocation of preferential export 
treatment. The policy revision eventually took effect on April 1st, 2005.  
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November 2004; that is, the IC industry was, finally, allowed to retain the tax rebate 
of 17%.  
For Taiwan’s IC firms, the re-agglomerative dynamics additionally facilitate to 
reproduce the positive effects of the Taiwanese industrial system in the territory 
where the transplanted firms are situated. Following the arrival of the Taiwanese IC 
investment in the YRD, the IC production chain in the YRD has moved forwards to 
great capacity in both breadth and depth. Of more importance, the local base of 
industrial knowledge and know-how was upgraded to a certain degree owing to the 
introduction of experienced engineers or managers to the YRD. The establishment of 
site offices and branch plants were usually managed by senior staff assigned or 
recruited from Taiwan or Silicon Valley.66 Equally significant is the fact that the 
newly-open fabs required a great deal of proficient personnel to steer manufacturing 
procedures – fine-tuning equipments and transporting technologies from parent 
companies – at least in the initial stage. Hence, teams of engineering staff were often 
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 Those ‘top’ managers recruited or assigned from Silicon Valley are not necessarily Taiwanese; 
Chinese are also included. Quite a few of them had fellowship, for example as alumni or colleagues, 
with Taiwanese investors in the US. Besides the talent, there was one technical reason why several of 
the Taiwan-based design houses engaged Chinese returnees as an executive. It was a concern with 
even more tax relief that the Chinese Government has provided to them for the purpose of 
withdrawing stopping the brain-drain.  
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recruited or assigned from Taiwan for assistance. The managerial and technical 
expertise they brought help to get fabs or offices up to speed ready to run. More 
critically, local engineers and other staff could shorten their learning curve by means 
of co-working with assigned staff in the workplace. In short, the Taiwanese firms 
investing in China have not only internationalised their production/business activities 
but also helped to improve the ‘location capacity’ given the positive effects they have 
upon industrial territorialisation (Storper and Walker 1989; Yang and Hsia 2004). 
These location-specific advantages are produced by the investors collectively and 
have geographical outcomes. This, in turn, reinforces the locational attraction to 
followers.  
7.5.3  Industrial ‘roundabouts’ 
Divisions of labour between branches/subsidiaries and home bases vary from 
case to case. In the design sector, for instance, a conventional pattern is that head 
offices take charge of R&D and marketing and allot FAE tasks to site offices. More 
and more site offices are enlarged in scope to constitute a talent pool so as to 
undertake a portion of design tasks. In some cases, the scope of business in 
subsidiaries is totally separated from headquarters in terms of market targets or 
product segments. However, it can make more sense to take the production chain as a 
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whole into account as an explanation for the spatiality of trans-local manufacturing 
than to sort out various ownership models that individuals govern. At this point, the 
following illustration (Figure 7.11) portrays a simplified form of 
‘design-manufacturing-assembly’ chain for reference.  
The figure outlines the input-output system and organisational governance in 
relation to multiple sites. Firms chosen for the figure are actual, not fictitious, cases. 
The situation with which the chain proceedings are associated with the division of 
labour is explained by revolving around one foundry and its business-related firms.  
(1) The dotted-line frames indicate three types of ownership concerning cross-Strait 
governance, even though the patterns are much more complex in reality:  
 Des.S vs. Des.H:  
Des.H was 100% owned by Des.S via a Cayman company in 2000 and 
received technological and managerial assistance from the head office. It 
aims at the Chinese market. It has transformed into a joint-stock company 
since 2003, independent from the Des.S in equity.  
 Fab(SH) vs. Fdy:  
Fdy is an exceptional case, having opened a branch plant in China by 
means of foreign direction investment among Taiwanese chipmakers. 
 Ass vs. Ass(SH):  
Ass(SH) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a BVI company, while the BVI 
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company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of one Taiwanese firm in which 
Ass holds over 50% equity stake. 
 
Figure 7.11  Illustration of the cross-Strait production within a global chain  
Note: Firms are coded anonymously for confidentiality. 
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(2) The dash-line frames indicate certain places of industrial territories (i.e. the north 
of Taiwan and the YRD). 
(3) The solid-line frames indicate functional fields of economic activities, including 
trans-shipping sites and ‘marketplaces’.  
(4) The lines with arrows mean industrially-functional connections that  one firm to 
another. Fdy is a Taiwanese chipmaker which runs several fabs in Taiwan and China. 
Sup signifies suppliers of various materials and equipment in long-term concert with 
Fdy. Four design customers of Fdy are enumerated as representatives of distinction 
in location, ownership and targeted market: 
 Des.B is a top US design house which is located in Silicon Valley. It aims 
at the worldwide market.  
 Des.C is a design house which is managed by a Chinese returnee in 
Shanghai. Taiwanese capital and venture capital were involved in the 
start-up. It aims at the worldwide market. 
 Des.H is invested by a Taiwan-based design house (i.e. Des.S) but run by 
a Chinese returnee in Shanghai. It aims at the Chinese market.  
Des.S is a Taiwanese design house in Taipei. It aims at the worldwide market. 
Production schedules in Fdy are arranged in a centralised way regarding 
organisational governance. The Headquarters receives differentiated orders from 
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individual design houses around the world. The allotment of the orders, no matter 
where they come from, is made to fabs in Taiwan or China according to 
comprehensive estimates concerning fabs’ capacity, results of consultations with 
customers, programmes of strategic alliances and other technological and managerial 
considerations. Ass, in association with Fdy, carries on back-end manufacturing by 
operating its packaging facilities in either Taiwan or China. In a geographical sense, 
the assembly tasks are not necessarily tied up with fabs where the wafers are 
fabricated owing to the existence of technological differences. Ass(SH) has lower 
technological capacities and so fails to cater for higher-level outputs. As to superior 
designers, their fabricated wafers are often transferred from any fabs of Fdy to Ass’s 
plant in Taiwan to accomplish assembly and testing at cutting-edge levels by 
contract.  
Made-up chips are then delivered to the final market. As far as the Taiwanese 
IC industry is concerned, the so-called ‘end market’ is divided roughly into two 
geographical spheres: one is the worldwide market and another is China’s market. In 
logistical terms, the procedure for shipping finished-ICs (and other types of 
components as well) to the Chinese market is complex because the chips are products 
for export from China but, meanwhile, components for import to China. The logistics 
are highly policy-related in the economic context of China and render shipping 
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routes tortuous. ‘A day-trip to Hong-Kong’ was a notorious practice undertaken in 
the light of custom procedures. First, the movement of chips – produced in the 
YRD – out of China’s territorial space can have VAT refunded. Next, the chips that 
were moved from distributors to agents/channels or offshore centres of system firms 
within Hong Kong were duty-free. Finally, the chips – now as components – were 
shipped to factories in China and were exempted from import duty because of 
government-approved transactions. This is preferential treatment of the ‘export 
processing trade’ (Sanlaiyibu): a foreign party purchases Chinese manufactured 
goods or has raw materials and components processed on a consignment basis in 
China, in both cases with the inputs imported free of duties and VAT. In short, 
transfer points are of significance concerning delivery because they are key loci for 
both suppliers (i.e. design houses) and buyers (e.g. system firms and distributors) to 
avoid export and import duties respectively.  
A short summary can be made on empirical grounds as shown above. The 
simplified figure here is expected to make clear the condition that the 
internationally-operated IC production chain crosscuts the spatial reorganisation of 
the Taiwanese industry system taking place trans-locally. Therefore, there stress is 
laid on the spatiality of the cross-Strait manufacturing which is not only deposited by 
the assemblage of individual Taiwanese firms but also by a reconstitution of 
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industrial geography led by an intersection of transverse corporate reorganisations 
and lengthwise industrial linkages. Outsourcing from designers to chipmakers has 
geographical outcomes. In light of manufacturing proceedings, wafer fabrication is 
assigned to fabs or chip assembly is limited to packaging plants that are in 
appropriate locales. Moreover, the final delivery of chips to markets extends the IC 
production chain to the downstream sector of the electronics manufacturing in a 
circuitous way. In a geographical sense, it is intriguing that the niche of Taiwanese 
electronics firms is of vital importance internationally, and their achievement is 
reached by making good use of the world’s factory – China. The manufacturing 
arrangement displays clear spatial phenomena of convergence and divergence. 
7.6  Conclusion 
Within the chapter I have endeavoured to trace out the dynamic practices of the 
cross-Strait production operated by the Taiwanese IC firms. In analytical terms, such 
corporate conduct was referred to the ownership- and location-specific properties. 
Instead of atomising the firms as individuals, the transnational behaviours of 
developing country TNCs were understood by situating the firm-place relevance in 
the context of capitalist production systems. I think it useful to give an in-depth 
account to look into the mechanisms behind the locational selection of geographical 
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proximity and to avoid over-socialising the dynamics of the discernible sociality 
concerning the Chinese-ethnic similarities.  
Firms establishing operations in Taiwan start to attempt to segment production 
facilities both functionally and spatially by trans-local production. A coupling of 
corporate strategies and local conditions is not merely a premium set by the sociality 
of the Chinese-ethnic characteristics presented in previous layers of ‘go-west’ 
investment. The rapid emergence of electronics manufacturing in China has led to 
the country assuming a new status in the global market and has brought about a great 
spatial shift in the IC chain. There are three elements that substantiate how industrial 
relocation is critical to the dynamics of the global IC production chain, which has 
seen investment flow in the direction of China. First, the governance of vertical 
disintegration as conventionally implemented in Taiwan plays an important role in 
extending the domestic industrial systems overseas. Second, market momentum is 
artificially augmented by the Chinese Government; the effect of taxation enables the 
Chinese market to tie chip making to the locale to draw the complete set of 
productive activities from overseas. Third, an urgent lack of engineering talent in 
Taiwan encourages firms there to carry out recruitment in China to exploit human 
resources for sustaining the corporate advantages with knowledge-intensive 
development.  
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Finally, I illustrated that the routes by which commodities physically flow along 
the input-output system are tortuous. The capital flows and the transit of chips from 
and back to the Mainland represents an adroit strategy of tax avoidance. It indicates a 
strategic dimension of chain organisation in response to the regulatory interference 
which is the sort of governance in force outside the chain. A considerable part of the 
global IC production chain is vertically associated with the trans-local industrial 
operation constituted by the Taiwanese firms. Corporations (based in Taiwan, China 
or elsewhere and ranging over design, manufacturing, supporting services, logistics, 
etc.) are geographically discontinuous.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION 
8.1  Summary  
 Transnational production is a crucial element of globalisation, which is 
characterised by an increasing degree of production fragmentation owing to 
geographical dispersion and the organisational de-centralisation of business. This 
thesis has depicted industrial re-territorialisation as the experience of outward foreign 
investment from a late-industrialised state by an analysis of the cross-Strait 
production networks of the Taiwanese IC industry. I have sought to contribute to an 
understanding of contested territoriality of economic transnationalisation produced 
by the dynamics of economic globalisation. In the first section of this final chapter I 
shall summarise briefly the argument of this thesis, underlining the evolution of the 
Taiwanese IC sector and the spatial dynamics of cross-Strait production.  
 I have argued that there are finely detailed divisions of labour with special 
knowledge related to individual stages of IC production, and the tendency towards 
miniaturisation within chip manufacture strengthens this technical divisibility. Those 
sectoral features mean that the industry system is particularly conducive to 
organisational de-centralisation. The vertical disintegration of production 
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organisation is bound up with shifts of industrial geography. The offshore migration 
of US semiconductor manufacturing to East Asia is the mechanism mainly 
responsible for the reshuffle of the industrial landscape. Made-to-order fabrication 
has been an important development which has promoted the division of labour, not 
only in functional terms but also in geographical terms. Specifically, such an 
organisational innovation has significantly acted to the benefit of Taiwan, where the 
new production model has been created, by occupying a niche in the global IC 
production chain.  
The trajectory of the Taiwanese IC industry was also discussed and analysed. I 
illustrated how Taiwan’s IC industry has grown rapidly to world leading levels of 
productivity and innovation through state support. It was revealed that the national 
innovation system responsible for knowledge acquisition, assimilation and diffusion 
systematically promoted technological progress within the domestic IC industry. 
Technology transfer to local firms offered efficient latecomer advantages as the firms 
are firmly integrated within an intensively networked production system in the 
industrial district. The local production system shows strong evidence of clustering, 
but also contains strong evidence of transnationality. That is, the extension of 
extra-local connections indicated that the territoriality of industrial linkages, 
organisational governance and corporate strategy evolved in line with the 
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transformation of the global IC industry along dimensions of technology, structure 
and space. The outward investment of Taiwan’s IC capital was made manifest by the 
development of production capacities within Mainland China. Figure 8.1 gives a 
general timeframe to outline spatial characteristics of the industrial progress. Note 
that previous features are not replaced but retained and related to the sequential ones. 
 
Figure 8.1  Spatial progress of IC industrial practice in Taiwan 
There are three points of note indicating features of the cross-Strait production 
which will be illustrated, together with extensive interpretations drawn from my 
examination of the empirical evidence. First, firms began transplanting production 
facilities to the Mainland in the mid-1990s. There are many conjectures as to why 
this took place. (1) With regard to the industrial trajectory at a global level, there has 
been a tendency for the electronics market and chip fabrication to move to East 
Asian countries, and to China in particular. (2) The growing importance of China’s 
IC market was reinforced because the trade-based taxation that China imposed 
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produced favourable price advantages for Chinese-made chips compared to imported 
chips. (3) IC firms in Taiwan suffered from a shortage of skilled labour which led to 
a high demand for engineers. In short, from the mid-1990s onwards, despite China’s 
expensive commodity and labour markets, it has become a very attractive location 
for export-oriented and knowledge-intensive IC industries in Taiwan.  
Second, on a subnational scale, the transplantation of Taiwanese IC production 
represents a functional convergence with the YRD. This geographical relocation has 
brought about the creation of local production systems which are based on, and 
associated with, the primary industrial organisations in Taiwan. To a degree, the 
locational qualities of the YRD are enhanced because a geographical shift of the 
entire industrial system contributes a territorial manifestation of the industrial sector 
to the region. It is a case of territorial reflexivity: these location-specific advantages 
are produced collectively by the investors and have geographical outcomes and this, 
in turn, reinforces the locational attraction to other interested parties.  
The governance of cross-Strait IC production is based upon conventional 
features of vertical disintegration that are efficiently practiced in Taiwan. Spatially, 
the Taiwanese industrial system is reproduced in both the home base (i.e. the 
industrial district in north Taiwan) and the destination (concentrated upon the YRD) 
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at the same time – to cite one of the topological presuppositions of economic 
practices suggested by Thrift and Olds (Thrift and Olds 1996: 321-322). For 
Taiwanese IC firms, the reshuffling of industrial systems at trans-local levels is a 
dynamic strategy to couple with the global-scale IC production chain by stretching a 
certain link of the chain to other locations.  
Third, capital migrates and commodities and resources materially flow in 
unclear and contested ways. This can be demonstrated along two strategic 
dimensions. One is that investment funds are channelled in a circuitous way owing to 
the constraints imposed upon them by the Taiwanese state. Capital moves through 
offshore companies registered in tax havens, which enables it to avoid official 
supervision. To a degree, the corporate responses implicate that government action 
has certain influence upon the way that chains are formed, although the government 
action is “constituted outside a production chain” (Smith, Rainnie et al. 2002: 47, 
emphasis in original). A second dimension is the existence of logistical ‘industrial 
roundabouts’. That is to say, chips produced in China-based fabs are shipped away 
from Chinese territory before being delivered to the places assigned by the clients. 
Actually, most of the destinations are somewhere in the Mainland. This movement of 
materials takes advantage of tax abatement in China.  
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For that matter, the territorial extent of cross-Strait production is wider and 
more intangible than the bounded and physical localities – that is, north Taiwan and 
YRD – where the enterprises are located. “[T]hink[ing] of scale in relational terms” 
(Amin 2002), helps us to understand the way by which the firms set up offshore 
companies and/or make use of overseas staff to run the businesses in the Mainland, 
and confirms the power of transnationality through which the firms are able to ‘jump 
scales’, in Smith’s terms (Smith 1993). The case of China-based Taiwanese IC 
production shows that the arrangement of cross-border production chains challenges 
the state’s institutional domain. The way in which the firms carry out transnational 
production is more than merely conducting business across borders; it is a spatial 
tactic which manipulates and obscures judicio-territorial borders.  
8.2  Some reflections 
Some reworking of the GCC approach has been made in analysing extensive 
evidence of the cross-Strait industrial practice. Firstly, I have taken a network 
metaphor to emphasise complexity of economic interconnections. This is to avoid an 
impression of top-down determinist linearity of economic activities while 
recognising that a chain is imaged as a system of productive sequences. Secondly, it 
has been found that the GCC approach to development studies is analytically 
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insufficient with regard to its stress on relevance of firm-level organisational power 
in the constitution of transnational production linkages. Taiwanese firms’ efforts to 
coordinate with lead firms in response to pressure of the international market, to 
exploit local resources to tackle problems of talent shortage and to create 
opportunities by engaging enhancement of regional assets have evidenced evolution 
of power balance. That is, the way in which lead firms impose influence upon 
subordinate ones has increasingly shifted towards multiple directions of 
organisational forces. This reveals that a bi-modal stylisation of inter-firm 
governance in the GCC approach is analytical ossification since it fails to reflect 
multiplicity and variability of governance mechanisms. Thirdly, the evidence has 
also demonstrated that corporate actors are not exclusive as regards organisation 
governance. It requires embracing other types of economic actors to see what roles 
different actors play in governing value creation and its flow across production 
networks and how interaction among those actors affects the configuration of 
production activity. In particular, I have attached importance to a dynamic role of 
state actors in intervening in transnational business behaviours in order to reveal 
“broader political economic environments in which chains operate, including the 
institutional and systemic factors that shape the commodity chains and condition the 
outcomes associated with them” (Bair 2005: 154).  
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On the basis of this analysis, some general conclusions can be made which 
return us to the theoretical discussions presented earlier. I focus upon two central 
concerns in light of the spatial dynamics of collective corporate behaviours and 
discontinuous territoriality of strategic actions.  
8.2.1  Going beyond clustering 
Definition in this sense [of place] does not have to be through simple 
counterposition to the outside; it can come, in part, precisely through the 
particularity of linkage to that ‘outside’ which is therefore itself part of 
what constitutes the place.  
(Massey 1993: 67, original emphasis) 
I have argued that spatial convergence of production activities in north Taiwan 
is predicated upon the entrepreneurial momentum of the private sector working in 
tandem with the bureaucratic state. The business enterprises are of an 
outward-looking nature, encouraged by national export programmes. Taiwan’s firms 
tend to be engaged in flexible manufacturing. The characteristic of such a system is 
the belief that ‘small-is-beautiful’. Socio-cultural cohesion in the locale reinforces 
the (re)production of locally-based assets, underlining the sense of ‘embedding’: the 
local socio-economic embeddedness serves as the industrial basis where individuals 
coordinate/compete with each other. An implicit role of joint social life and common 
cultural context in intensifying economic exchange underlines the advantages of 
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clustering, so that the firms and related agents consolidate as an ensemble in the local 
complexes. This, in turn, produces advantages of collectivity through business and 
learning opportunities.  
However, rather than producing a restricted spatiality of connections, 
socio-economic relations embedded within a regionally cooperative system of 
industrial governance extend out of the local complexes on a global scale. Along 
with technological promotion, local firms are largely furnished by intellectual 
communications as vital sources of knowledge. Consequently, the firms are 
embedded in an open innovative milieu, showing that production and its social mixes 
in contemporary capitalism are place-based but not necessarily place-bound. For 
example, a technological coupling between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu is 
strengthened by a group of technical communities enhancing a frequent, vital 
industrial exchange between the two ‘technopoles’ across the Pacific (Saxenian and 
Hsu 2001).  
A distinctive configuration, transformation and prospect of the Taiwanese IC 
industrial district displays “greater propensities for networking across district lines, 
rather than within, and a much greater tendency to be exogenously driven” 
(Markusen 1996: 294). The enthusiastic participation of the Taiwanese IC firms 
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demonstrates that the domestic industry and its production systems are dynamically 
connected to other productive sites along the global chains. Empirically, there exist 
variations of organisational governance in the IC production chain. For example, 
cooperation between the UMC-clan members indicates the emergence of a 
pseudo-IDM model, and the utilisation of telematic systems along the input-output 
processes promotes the virtually reintegrating tendency of the IC industry. The 
evidence strongly confirms the importance of “[t]hese webs of intra- and 
inter-organizational relationships [woven] across geographical space in ways which 
not only connect organizations, and parts of organizations, together but which also 
connect highly dispersed places together through the networked flows coordinated” 
(Dicken 2002: 26, emphasis original).  
In summary, the advance of domestic industry moving together with global 
production underlines the status of the Taiwanese IC complex as an aggregation of 
extensive and intensive networks. As such, the conventional idea of a 
geographically-defined industrial district is challenged by a nodal sense of place with 
the characteristics of porosity and connectivity. The territoriality of industrial 
behaviour is redefined because all the cross-border actions and phenomena that 
embody the presence of globalising practice and process are blurring boundaries.  
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8.2.2  The state-business nexus in transit 
[W]e are witnessing a proliferation of spatial scales (whether terrestrial, 
territorial or telematic), their relative dissociation in complex tangled 
hierarchies (rather than a simple nesting of scales), and an increasingly 
convoluted mix of interscalar strategies as various economic and political 
forces seek the most favourable conditions for their insertion into the 
changing international order.  
(Jessop 2002: 24) 
Together with the geographical processes of production reorganisation is 
another set of issues relating to the discord between corporate spatial strategy and 
national jurisdiction. The interaction between the Taiwanese ‘run-away’ IC capital 
and its home state is dynamic, taking into consideration that “[l]ocal companies that 
have emerged from particular social and institutional contexts evolve over time on 
the basis of trajectories that are in part a reflection of these contexts” (Henderson, 
Dicken et al. 2002: 451-452, emphasis added). Taiwan’s IC industry has grown out 
of a model of guided capitalism in the Asian developmental context. In this vein, the 
status of the Taiwanese firms appears negligible (and even invisible) vis-à-vis the 
dominant role of the state in steering economic affairs in analysing the economic 
performance. However, it is inappropriate to underplay other mechanisms related to, 
and associated with, the top-down nature of economic growth. For example, 
Taiwanese firms are engaged in more flexible manufacturing. Their “sustain[ed] 
entrepreneurial vitality and commercial adaptability of [a] decentralized industrial 
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system” (Chan and Clark 1994: 137; cf. Buck 2000) is complementary to the 
bureaucratic autonomy that governs industrial promotion.  
To a degree, reinforcement of corporate potentialities for dealing with 
transnational activities enables the domestic firms to conduct lucrative strategies 
which are not necessarily under a political rubric of national development, as used to 
be the case. The result is a transition in the state-business nexus. Nowadays, although 
the state apparatus remains relevant to the internationalisation of domestic firms, 
governmental command in the past has proved inferior. Evidently, the IC firms are to 
collaborate with the state in formulating industrial strategies to compete for 
advantages of standardisation while still keeping an opposing stance against the state 
in capital movement and transnational production. The complex, competitive and 
bargaining relationships imply that the conventional dominant-subordinate model 
constituted by the strong state becomes diversified in a context of global capitalism.  
The scene in which firms move in and out of the Mainland is in conjunction 
with the prolonged dissension deriving from opposing polities and contradictory 
national identities between Taiwan and China. This represents an intriguing case that 
displays discrepancies – an unceasing wave of production transplantation to China 
against the state functionaries’ hostility towards China’s professing threat pari passu. 
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The opening of production sites by Taiwanese firms in China is associated with 
inter-state rivalry. As Figure 6.2 illustrated, triangular articulation of the 
state-business relationships is entangled with contingent spatio-temporal matrices, 
including economic liberalisation in Taiwan, an opening-up of the Chinese market to 
global IC industry and the cross-Strait geo-politics during the post- Cold War era. 
Structurally, the domestic debates over transplantation presented a “nexus of multiple 
and asymmetric interdependencies involving local and wider fields of influence” 
(Amin 1997: 153). 
To sum up, as the IC firms have augmented an astute capacity for spatial 
elasticity in “taking advantage of the territorial fragmentation of the international 
economy” (Cox 1996: 23), there has been a lifting of conflicts of imperative 
territoriality – the corporate perspective in favour of neo-liberalist globalisation 
vis-à-vis the national scale as ‘taken-for-granted primacy’ (Jessop 2002) for official 
governance. Such conflicts embodying politics of economic territoriality are a result 
of the cognitive gap which exists between making profit and securing sovereignty 
rights. However, it may be too simplistic to view the power balance between the state 
and firms as the zero-sum game that Reich envisages (Reich 1990; Reich 1991). 
Analytically, instead of a comparison of power levels, what matters is to look into 
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the implicit vectors of strategic discourses that the agents formulate to reflect their 
own geo-economic images and positions in a broader (political) economic context.  
8.3  Areas for further study 
The final section of this concluding chapter will briefly discuss possible avenues 
along which the research may be extended. I wish to highlight three dimensions. 
Firstly, as was stressed above, migration of Taiwanese engineering experts and 
senior managerial staff is fundamental to technology spillover and knowledge 
reproduction. Consequently, one area of further study would involve exploring the 
dynamics of labour market(s) to understand the time-space mechanisms responsible 
for communications in the technical community composed of Taiwanese, Chinese 
and expatriate staff in workplaces, or trans-space cyber-space offices.  
Secondly, too little attention has been paid in this thesis to the analysis of how 
the Taiwan-based IC firms compete, bargain and/or coordinate with local 
organisations (business enterprises and public institutions) in China. A closer 
investigation into their industrial linkages to local firms is required. One purpose in 
doing this will be to understand the way in which they adjust to local business 
systems from a supply perspective. Furthermore, it also highlights the need to 
involve the supplier-customer connections and production governance with the shift 
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of the Chinese IC market in geography and organisation, in particular considering the 
increasing internationalisation of some Chinese brand-names, such as Lenovo.  
Thirdly, there have been limits in understanding dynamic interactions between a 
liberalising tendency of Taiwan’s developmental capitalism and China’s 
post-socialist transition, although the analysis of the territoriality of the cross-strait 
industrial organisation was associated with the changing roles of Taiwan and China 
in the world economy. Such research would look into the natures of the economic 
systems embedded in the two countries respectively and internal and/or external 
dynamics that evolve their regulatory institutions. With such understanding in this 
thesis, it became clear that the sectorally- and geographically-specific transnational 
production system  allows to evolve a certain Chinese-ethnic institution of 
accumulation, and that there has been a coupling process of the distinct capitalisms 
together with power wrestling between the firms and the states.  
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APPENDIX A  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
No Code of 
informant 
Type of firm Location of firm Title of informant Date and place 
1 Adm.CHJ Park admin. 
Com. 
Shanghai –Caohejing (CHJ) Research Dept. Director  Oct-28-2005 in Shanghai 
2 Adm.SIP " Suzhou –Suzhou Ind. Park (SIP) Deputy Director of Investor Service Div. Nov-02-2005 in Suzhou 
3 Ass.S Assembly 
house 
Suzhou -SIP Deputy Manager of Management Info. Sys. Apr-03-2005 in Suzhou 
4 Assoc.S Indus. assoc. Shanghai –Zangjiang (ZJ) Deputy-Secretary General Oct-26-2005 in Shanghai 
5 Con.Y Consultancy Shanghai –ZJ General Manager (G.M.) Apr-07-2005 in Shanghai 
6 Des.1 [F] Design house Shanghai –ZJ Tech. Mktg. Specialist Oct-26-2005 in Shanghai 
7 Des.2-1 " Taipei –Neihu Tech. Park (NTP) Vice President (V.P.) of Human Resources (H.R.) & Admin. Dept. Jan-21-2005 in Taipei 
8 Des.2-2 " Shanghai –CHJ Director of H.R. & Admin. Dept. Apr-05-2005 in Shanghai 
9 Des.3 " Shanghai –ZJ Director of G.M. & Admin. Oct-25-2005 in Shanghai 
10 Des.4 " Shanghai –ZJ President & Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) Oct-25-2005 in Shanghai 
11 Des.5 " Suzhou –Suzhou New Park (SNP) Site Manager of Suzhou Design Cebter Oct-18-2005 in Suzhou 
12 Des.6-1 " Nanjing V.P. of Sys. Group Apr-04-2005 in Nanjing 
13 Des.6-2 " Shanghai –ZJ C.E.O. Oct-27-2005 in Shanghai 
continued over page  
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Appendix A continued  
No Code of 
informant 
Type of firm Location of firm Title of informant Date and place 
14 Des.7 " Suzhou –SIP C.E.O. Apr-08-2005 in Suzhou 
15 Des.8 " Suzhou –SIP G.M. Oct-19-2005 in Suzhou 
16 Des.9-1 " Hsinchu –HSIP Sr. Hardware Engineer (Eng.) Mar-10-2005 in Hsinchu 
Dec-22-2005 by telephone 
17 Des.9-2 " Hsinchu –HSIP Technical Manager of Digital Consumer Bu. Mar-14-2005 in Hsinchu 
18 Des.10 " Suzhou –SIP G.M. Oct-20-2005 in Suzhou 
19 Des.11 " Suzhou –SIP G.M. Oct-19-2005 in Suzhou 
20 Des.12 " Hsinchu –HSIP Product (Prod.) Manager Oct-14-2005 in Hsinchu 
21 Des.13 " Taipei –NTP Chief Finance Officer Jan-18-2005 in Taipei 
22 Des.14 " Shanghai –ZJ Vice Chief Eng. Oct-26-2005 in Shanghai 
23 Des.15-1 " Shanghai –ZJ President  Oct-27-2005 in Shanghai 
24 Des.15-2 " Hsinchu –HSIP Special Assist. & Spokesperson of President Office Nov-23-2005 in Hsinchu 
25 Des.16-1 " Taipei –Xindian V.P. of Worldwide Sales & FAE Div. May-05-2005 in Taipei 
26 Des.16-2 " Hsinchu Acting Section Manager of H.R. Dept. Dec-09-2005 in Hsinchu 
27 Des.17 " Shanghai –CHJ Director of C.E.O. Office Oct-26-2005 in Shanghai 
28 Des.18 " Shanghai Director of VCT Div. Oct-21-2005 in Shanghai 
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Appendix A continued  
No Code of 
informant 
Type of firm Location of firm Title of informant Date and place 
29 Des.19 " Shanghai –CHJ Director of R&D Nov-03-2005 in Shanghai 
30 Des.20-1 " Taipei –Xindian Sspecial Assist. to President. May-03-2005 in Taipei 
31 Des.20-2 [F] " Taipei- Xindian Sr. Specialist of H.R. Div. Nov-15-2005 in Taipei 
32 Des.21 " Shanghai Director of China Admin. Div. Apr-08-2005 in Shanghai 
33 Des.22 " Taipei –NTP Sr. Detp. Manager of Prod. Marketing (Mktg.) Jan-06-2005 in Taipei 
34 Dis.1 Distributor Taipei Sales Supervisor Jan-24-2005 in Taipei 
35 Dis.2-1 " Taipei V.P. of MarCom Jan-27-2005 in Taipei 
36 Dis.2-2 [F] " Taipei MarCom Specialist Feb-23-2005 in Taipei 
37 Drm.1 DRAM maker Hsinchu –HSIP Director of Manuf. Operation Div. Jan-24-2005 in Hsinchu 
38 Drm.2 " Shanghai –ZJ G.M. Oct-27-2005 in Shanghai 
39 Fdy.1-1 Foundry Suzhou –SIP Sales Manager of Domestic Sales Dept. Mar-31-2005 in Suzhou 
Apr-03-2005 in Suzhou 
40 Fdy.1-2 " Suzhou –SIP Manager of Mktg. Dept. Oct-18-2005 in Suzhou 
41 Fdy.2-1 " Shanghai –ZJ Deputy Director of Mktg. & Joint Development (Dev.) 
Coordination 
Oct-21-2005 in Shanghai 
42 Fdy.2-2 " Shanghai –ZJ Director of Mktg. Oct-21-2005 in Shanghai 
continued over page  
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Appendix A continued  
No Code of 
informant 
Type of firm Location of firm Title of informant Date and place 
43 Fdy.3-1 " Hsinchu – HSIP Sr. Planning Eng. of Supply Chain Integration Dept. Jan-18-2005 in Hsinchu 
Mar-22-2006 by webphone 
44 Fdy.3-2 " Shanghai Director of Business Dev. Oct-24-2005 in Shanghai 
45 IDM.1 IDM Shanghai –CHJ Sales Manager Oct-24-2005 in Shanghai 
46 IDM.2 " Suzhou –SIP Project Manager of Mktg. Dept. Oct-20-2005 in Suzhou 
47 IDM.3 [F] " Shanghai –ZJ Commercial Assist. Oct-24-2005 in Shanghai 
48 IDM.4  Shanghai –ZJ Vice Chief Eng.  Oct-26-2005 in Shanghai 
49 IDM.5 " Shanghai –CHJ V.P. of Foundry & Discrete Oct-25-2005 in Shanghai 
50 Med.D-1 Indus. press Taipei –NTP Deputy G.M. of Sales Dept. Dec-23-2004 in Taipei 
51 Med.D-2 " Taipei –NTP Lead Reporter of News Center Nov-17-2005 in Taipei 
52 Vnd.1 Equip. vendor Hsinchu –HSIP Sr. Eng. of TSMC Account Div. Feb-23-2005 in Hsinchu 
Mar-03-2005 by telephone 
53 Vnd.2 " Hsinchu Manager of Agent Sales Dept.  Jan-10-2005 in Hsinchu 
Sources: Adapted from fieldwork results.  
Notes: (2) Informants is kept anonymous and their companies or institutions are given pseudonyms as well. However, organizational locations are not disguised for 
indicating geographical distribution. (2) Those informants marked [F] are female. 
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APPENDIX B  PROPOSED QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW 
i. General questions for all informants 
 Name 
 Present employer and current job title 
 Brief career history 
ii. Questions for corporate managers 
 What are the reasons for your company’s decision to invest in China?  
 When/how did you start your investment projects? 
 Where/how do you source supply chains when doing business in China?  
 Where are your main customers located? And, how do you exercise your 
business/services with those customers?  
 What are potential/existing difficulties to do business/production locally? 
If any, how do you deal with those issues? 
iii. Questions for engineering staff 
 What is your speciality? 
 How is a process of product development in general terms?  
 How do engineers from different firms and from various divisions within 
your firms work together during the R&D course?  
 Have you posted to branches? If any, what was your task there? 
 How does division of labour operate between a head office and branches? 
 How do you handle the technology transfer in the locales (considering 
China is notorious for its poor intellectual property right protection)?  
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APPENDIX C  INFORMANT RECRUITMENT  
 
Key   
 
Des.2-1 
Des.13-1 
Des.9-1 
Des.9-2 
Des.13-1 
Des.22 
Drm.1 
Fdy.3-1 
Med.D 
Vnd.2 
Vnd.1 
Dis.2-2 
Fdy.1-1* 
Ass.S* 
Des.6-1* 
Con.Y* 
Des.21* 
Des.2.2 
Des.12 Des.16-2 
Des.20-2 
Med.D-2 
Fdy.1-2* 
Fdy.3-2 
IDM.1 
IDM.3 
IDM.5 
IDM.4 
Drm.2* 
Des.6-2 
Adm.CHJ 
Adm.SIP 
Assoc.S 
Des.7* 
Dis.2-1 
Des.20-1 
Des.16-2 
Des.15-2 
The 1st phrase of interviews 
The 2nd phrase of interviews 
Des.1 
Des.3 
Des.4 
Des.5 
Des.8* 
Des.10* 
Des.11* 
Des.18 
Des.15-1* 
Des.19* 
Des.17* 
Fdy.2-1* 
Fdy.2-2 
IDM.2* 
 
 
Interviews in China 
Interviews in Taiwan By personal networks or snowballing 
Via a 3rd party 
By cold calling 
Informants directed the researcher to a third party who was then interviewed. 
Ways to recruiting individual respondents 
Taiwanese staff posted to or recruited in China * 
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APPENDIX D  THE RISE OF IC INDUSTRY IN CHINA 
Governmental promotion in the 1990s 
As early as the mid-1950s, China put a high priority on the development of IC 
technology (OTA 1987); in particular, when China recognised the fundamental 
potential of chips both for business and military capability.67 However, the effort 
made to foster indigenous IC technology was not as effective as anticipated owing to 
China’s centrally planned economy. This was because an overemphasis of the 
military sector and a bureaucratic obstacle68 attributed to a long-term ignorance of 
the commercial benefits of IC technologies before the Economic Reform (Simon and 
Rehn 1986; OTA 1987; di Capua 1998). This situation began to shift thanks to the 
domestic electronics boom. Both central and local administration strove to draw on 
foreign technology and capital for the purpose of industrialising IC technology. 
However, the result achieved little due to a lack of comprehensive programmes, as 
                                                 
67
 The microelectronics thrust in China was further reinforced by the success of American ‘smart 
weapons’ in the first Gulf War (Simon 1992). 
68
 The innovation climate in China was hindered by inefficient resource allocation and dual 
jurisdiction due to overlapping multilevel governance, including numerous ministerial-level 
organisations and provincial or municipal authorities, on industrial support. 
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well as the restriction of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (CoCom)69 (Simon and Rehn 1986; Chen 1998).  
With an expanding chip demand for downstream industries, China has been 
suffering seriously from a lasting lag of chip output. The extending unbalance 
between IC consumption and production in China has called the authority’s attention 
to implement incentive policies for industrial advancement. Considering the 
drawback resulted from repeated investments and overlapping governance, China 
undertook the industrial promotion programmes by central planning. The first 
programme was Project 908, implemented during 1991 and 1995 (Table D.1). 
                                                 
69
 This was an international arrangement that was established to block the Communist bloc during the 
Cold War. The CoCom aimed to deal with the risks of regional and international security and stability 
related to the spread of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. The CoCom was 
terminated in 1993 due to the removal of the political rampart between the East and the West. Later, it 
was reshuffled as Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) in 199
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Table D.1  Comparison of Project 908 and Project 909 
Project 908  Project 909  
Setting up: 
 One 0.9µm/6-inch wafer line:* Huajing 
(technology licensed from US-based Lucent) 
 One mask firm: Toppan (JV with US-based 
Dupont) 
 One assembly plant (JV with Thai-based 
Millennicum Microtech and US-based Micro 
Chip) 
 18 IC design houses (spun off from research 
institutes)  
Setting up: 
 One 0.35-0.5µm/8-inch wafer line:* 
Huahong-NEC (JV with Japanese-based NEC) 
 One silicon crystal line: GRINM 
Semiconductor Material Co. Ltd. (spun off 
from research institute) 
 IC design houses (spun off from system firms 
and IDMs’ design divisions) 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (July 1998) 
Note: * Huajing and Huahong were the focal points in the two Projects, respectively.   
The 6-inch line set up in a domestic company, Huajing, was viewed as the key 
objective to promoting IC production in the Project. However, limited by managerial 
techniques, the operation of this upgraded line suffered from a great loss aggregated 
up to RMB 360 million by the end of 1997. This 6-inch line was then contracted to 
CSMC70 in 1997 and became the first 6-inch pure-play foundry in China. In addition 
to Huajing, another four companies, containing three JV and one local firm, were 
                                                 
70
 CSMC, one affiliate of a Hong Kong-based group, Chinese Resource Co. Ltd., was run by a 
Taiwanese excusive team. In 2002, CSMC merged with the 6-inch line of Huajing.  
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chosen as the ‘backbones’ to upgrade71 the production lines to 5- and 6-inch process 
technologies by concentrating resources upon the selected companies (Table D.2). It 
is obvious that China had to source the advanced technologies (including industrial 
and managerial know-how) and facilitates from abroad because of its suffering from 
outmoded infrastructure and poor industrial organisation. Regarding the IC design 
sector, 18 IC design houses were separated from public research institutes under a 
governmental sponsor. Yet the effect was less valid because those IC spin-offs had 
little market sensitivity (ITRI/IEK Project Jul 1998). 
                                                 
71
 Over 20 IC companies were founded before Project 908 held 3- and 4-inch wafer lines. 
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Table D.2  Five backbones of Chinese IC companies 
Firms  
(Est. year) 
Ownership types Technology capability Notes 
Shanghai 
Belling 
(1988) 
A JV of Shanghai Instrument 
& Telecomm. Bu. (60%) 
with Shanghai Bell (another 
JV) (40%) in Shanghai. 
1.2µm CMOS/4 inch 
0.5µm CMOS/6 inch 
 China’s first IC JV. 
SAMC 
(1989) 
A JV of Shanghai 7th Radio 
Factory with Philips 
(36.86%) in Shanghai. 
2µm bipolar/6 inch  
2µm CMOS/6 inch 
0.8µm CMOS/6 inch 
 Nortel (Canadian-based) 
joined as partner in 1995 
with a 34% share (but sold 
to Shanghai Belling in 
2000).  
 Pure-play foundry model. 
SGNEC 
(1991) 
A JV of Shougang (60%) 
with NEC (Japanese-based, 
40%) in Beijing 
0.5-1.2µm CMOS/6 inch  
CHMC 
(1980) 
A domestic firm in Zhenjiang 
Prov. 
2.5µm bipolar/3-4 inch  Acquiring technologies 
from Japan (Fujitsu). 
Huajing 
(1982) 
A domestic firm in Zhenjiang 
Prov. 
2-3µm bipolar/4-5 inch 
2-3µm CMOS/5 inch 
0.9µm CMOS/6 inch 
 Acquiring technologies 
from Japan (Toshiba), 
German (Siemens) and 
US (Lucent). 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (July 1998). 
With an anxiety to promote industrial capability, a new programme was 
announced in the Fourth Eighth National People’s Congress in 1996 with the main 
goals being as follows (Semiconductor International 2000):  
 Reach volume production levels for 0.8µm and 6-inch process technology.  
 Enter industrial production for 0.5µm and 8-inch wafer technology.  
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 Increase IC design capability to meet market demands.  
 Pursue R&D in 0.3 to 0.4µm and advanced packaging technology.  
 Develop 8-inch single-crystal wafer technology. 
Project 909 was mapped out to be implemented between 1996 and 2000 (Table 
D.1). In pursuit of an import substitution, China, by following the Taiwanese foundry 
model, inclined to gearing up the foundry service in support of the domestic IC 
design sector. China’s first fab with VLSI technology was launched. In terms of 
capital- and technology-intensive wafer fabs, JV remained the way to carry out the 
establishment of higher-level fabs. By 1999, one 0.35-µm/8-inch wafer line founded 
by the Shanghai Huahong Group (71.4%) in JV72 with NEC of Japan (18.6%) began 
batch production with full capacity at 20 thousand units. China, by definition, intends 
to import up-to-date technologies and equipment from foreign enterprises through a 
promise of market access73 in return.  
                                                 
72
 Huahong expected to obtain the technologies and facilities from NEC, while NEC benefited from 
technology licensing and facility vending and stood to earn a huge price difference through selling 
low-cost DRAM made in China to the international market (Nanfang Daily December 20th 2003; 
ChinaByte June 14th 2004).  
73
 There are dual political implications for opening a market. On the one hand, China’s market 
opened to specific partners is not bound to products per se, but expensive equipment instead, in order 
to protect the domestic market from foreign dominance. On the other hand, the U.S. imposes serious 
restrictions on the export of advanced semiconductor technologies and equipment to China under a 
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With an attempt to complete the vertical disintegration of the IC supply chain, 
China poured RBM 286 million into fostering domestic design houses. In Project 909, 
China turned to spinning off design divisions from system firms or IDMs,74 instead 
of research institutes, under the consideration that the new start-ups may design 
commercial chips to meet market demand. Yet, the effort that was made to open the 
up-to-date fab and IC design houses failed to work out in the industrial evolution. On 
the one hand, the technological competence of the seven IC design partners was too 
weak to reach the line-width level at 0.35- 0.5-µm, at which the fab was in operation; 
on the other hand, this 8-inch was run as the exclusive line of NEC for DRAM output 
and struck by a sudden DRAM slump75 in 2001 that caused a serious sacrifice of up 
to RMB 700 million (Micro-Electronics Magazine December 16th 2003).  
In summary, the insufficient commercialisation of domestic IC technology in 
China was attributed by three limits: (1) its inability to transfer S&T results market 
demand; (2) poor infrastructure/equipment and bureaucratic systems; and (3) 
                                                                                                                                          
military consideration, so that China has to obtain the facilities from other sources, such as Europe or 
Japan. 
74
 For example, SHHIC spun off from Huahong. 
75
 After that, Huahong-NEC has turned to focus upon foundry business since 2002. 
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restriction of technologies and facilitates import because of developed countries’ 
export control (e.g. the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls). 
China, thus, was keen on utilising the inducement of ‘market access’ to attract 
foreign companies to transfer technologies and import facilitates in need. Despite this, 
the results achieved little. Two crucial cruces were related. First, the IC production 
system was uncompleted. Particularly, the technology level of the domestic IC 
design sector was far behind the development of process technology. Both the quality 
and quantity of designed chips were unable to match the production capacity that 
new fabs provided so that the industrial activities failed to achieve the synthesis of a 
complete IC supply chain. Second, combined with a lack of sufficient orders, fabs, 
the JVs’ ad hoc, served as foreign companies’ ‘branch plants’. Huahong-NEC was 
not singular of its kind. ASMC had provided 100% capacity for Philips before 
Canadian Nortel joined as the shareholder. Obviously, the operation of new fabs set 
up on the basis of national programmes in the 1990s owned insufficient 
independence of both technology and management.  
A fever of inward investment 
Even though the path on which China upgrades its domestic industry is thorny, 
global companies, in light of the electronics boom in China, come in groups to fill up 
the production vacancies in the locality. By 1997, the global top 20 IC companies, 
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except for TI, have deployed their investment in China. Table D.3 displays that the 
assembly sector dominated over foreign investment items in the late 1990s. 
Compared to wafer fabrication, chip assembly requires less fixed cost and 
technology but more intensive labour involvement, so that international companies 
took the assembly operation as the starting point to invest.  
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Table D.3  The global top 20 IC companies in China prior to 1997 
Rank Company Ownership type 
Chinese partner 
(plant location) 
Des. Fab. Ass. 
1 Intel (US) Wholly owned    √ 
2 NEC (Japan) JV* Shougan (Beijing) √ √ √ 
2 NEC (Japan) JV* Huahong (Shanghai) √ √  
4 Motorola (US) Wholly owned   √ √ 
4 
Motorola (US) JV 
Leshan Radio 
(Sichuan Prov.) 
  √ 
5 Samsung (S. Korea) Wholly owned    √ 
6 Toshiba (Japan) Tech. transfer* Huajing (Zhejiang Prov.)  √  
6 Toshiba (Japan) JV* Huajing (Zhejiang Prov.)   √ 
7 Hitachi (Japan) JV (Singaporean Government)   √ 
8 Fujitsu (Japan) Tech. transfer* Huayue (Zhejiang Prov.)  √  
8 Fujitsu (Japan) JV Huada (Jiangsu Prov.)   √ 
9 SGS-Thomson 
(France)  
JV 
Seg 
(Shenzhen) 
√  √ 
10 Philips 
(Netherlands) 
JV* 
Shanghai 7th Radio 
(Shanghai) 
 √  
10 Philips 
(Netherlands) 
JV 
Changjiang  
(Jiangsu Prov.) 
√  √ 
11 IBM (US) Wholly owned    √ 
12 Mitsubishi (Japan) JV Stone (Beijing)   √ 
13 National 
Semiconductor (US) 
JV 
Sunrise 
(Suzhou) 
  √ 
14 Siemens (German) Tech. transfer* Huajing (Zhejiang Prov.)  √  
15 Lucent (US) Tech. transfer* Huajing (Zhejiang Prov.)  √  
16 AMD (US) Wholly owned    √ 
17 Hyundai (S. Korea) Wholly owned    √ 
18 Matsushita (Japan) JV Huaxe (Shanghai)   √ 
19 Sanyo (Japan) Wholly owned    √ 
20 LG Semicon 
(Korea) 
Wholly owned ʳ  ʳ  ʳ  √ 
Source: Adapted from ITRI/IEK Project (July 1998). 
Note: * The projects of JV or technology transfer were supported by governmental programmes. 
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The foreign companies, mainly IDMs producing own-branded ICs, attempted to 
utilise the lower level of labour wage and land rent in China to reduce production 
costs. However, cost cutting was not the only inducement to foreign investment. In 
particular, many IDMs were keen on participating in the growing electronic system 
market in China. For example, the Belgian-based Alcatel set up China’s first JV IC 
fab, Shanghai Belling, in 1988, to manufacture IC components in support of its JV 
affiliate, Shanghai Bell, for the output of telecomm devices. By means of arranging 
IC manufacturing, back-end and/or front-end, in China, the foreign companies could 
save tax expense in importing ICs and, meanwhile, make use of cheap land to 
manage stock. Besides, the enlarging size of the domestic end-market has contributed 
to attracting foreign investment inward. The case of Motorola is exemplary; it 
opened a wholly-owned assembly plant in Tianjin to package IC and MPU for its 
telecommunication commodities production in China in 1992 to make cost savings in 
its production facilities. With the expansion of the handset market76 in China, 
Motorola promised77 to build up one 8-inch line operated as an IDM in Tianjin in 
                                                 
76
 China has become the largest market for handsets in the world over the last decade due to its huge 
population and increasing purchase power. 
77
 Actually, Motorola had begun to reduce its IC production since 1997 and it shut down five fabs 
worldwide in four years (21st Century Economic Report September 18th 2003). Motorola’s 8-inch fab, 
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2000 in light of market pre-emption. It then became the only foreign company 
among 49 licensed companies78 allowed to produce and sell handset-related products 
locally in 2003. Certainly, China’s potential market has contributed itself as a magnet 
for the IC industry since the late 1990s. 
A remarkable turn in foreign investment in the IC industry in China has 
occurred since 2000 owing to the encouragement of a series of preferential polices, 
among which the ‘State Circular 18’ launched in 2000 was most striking. First, 
chipmakers were required to pay a standard 17% VAT, while a rebate on any net tax 
rate paid that exceeds 6% was granted. An incidental remark was that the amount of 
refund should be used in R&D or reinvestment. Second, IC corporations, investing 
over RMB 8 billions or engaged in 0.25µm line-width or more advanced process 
technologies, were eligible to enjoy an enterprise income tax holiday with the first 
two years having 100% exception and another three years having 50% exception. 
                                                                                                                                          
i.e. MOS-17, was merged with SMIC in 2004 when the line only output less than 4,000 units per week 
according to fieldwork results.  
78
 In 1999, China announced the State ‘5 Circular’ to restrict the production of handsets in China and 
to control the import of handset-related devices, such as mobile switchers or terminal equipment. 
China’s Ministry of Information Industry (MII) has ceased to approve licence to foreign companies 
and ordered foreign companies to export at least 60% of locally produced handsets since 1999 
(ITRI/IEK Project  December 2004). 
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Third, the corporations were also immune from tariffs for imported raw materials, 
expendables, processing technologies and equipment. Moreover, there was a series of 
sequential supplementary regulations, covering governmental grants for enterprise 
R&Ds and protection of intellectual property, and various incentives initiated by 
local authorities.  
The investment of the IC design industry was fuelled by not only indigenous 
enterprises but also, and more significantly, attracted international design houses to 
come in great numbers. As shown in Figure D.1, the IC industrial sectors, including 
design, fabrication and assembly, have seen a dramatic growth since 2001. The total 
revenue increased from US$1.5 billion in 2001 to US$6.7 billion in 2004. In addition 
to the rise of output value, there have been three fundamental features emerging 
since 2000 with regard to the industrial promotion and geographical distribution of 
China’s IC industry.  
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Figure D.1  Value of China’s IC production value: 2001- 2004 (100 million US$) 
Source: Adapted from DigiTimes (September 12th 2005). 
The growth of fab establishment 
There has been new growth of fab establishments in China, emerging with three 
distinctions from the earlier plants. First, the technological level has been upgraded. 
Four 8-inch fabs were launched and 0.25µm or above processes were imported to 
apply to the new wafer lines. Second, except for Motorola’s wholly-owned IDM in 
Tianjin, other new fabs – SMIC (in Shanghai), GSMC (in Shanghai), Huaxia 
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Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (HSMC, in Beijing)79 and HJTC (in Suzhou) – 
are operated in the form of a made-to-order foundry rather than IDM model. Third, 
Taiwanese IC professionals 80  have expressed increasing enthusiasm about 
participating in China’s IC production. In addition to SMIC, GSMC and HJTC which 
I have mentioned in the narrative, one of the co-founder of HSMC is also a 
Taiwanese expatiate – Dr Mike Chang (no relation to TSMC’s Morris Chang and 
SMIC’s Richard Chang) ran an IC design house, Alpha & Omega, in Silicon Valley.   
China’s gravity of IC output, as Taiwan-based chipmakers flock into China, has 
been increasing in the global market by degree, even though its quantity and quality 
still fails to meet the market demand. It is noticeable that the prospect of the foundry 
business also encourages other Chinese companies to shift strategy from IDM to 
foundries. ASMC, the former leader in China’s semiconductor industry, has garnered 
1% of the global foundry market. The rise of foundry operation in China has 
promoted the participation of international assembly plants, equipment vendors and 
IP suppliers and, particularly, the inspiration for the design sector boom. In this sense, 
                                                 
79
 The investing project of HSMC failed due to the withdrawal of the main investor.  
80
 The first Taiwanese-based IC firm in China is Nanker, located in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, 
and set up in 1989, followed by CSMC which took on Huajing’s 6-inch fab as the first foundry in 
China. 
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the foundry sector serves as the engine to drive on the completeness of the IC 
production chain in China. 
The rise of IC design houses 
In the design sector, a surge in design start-ups represents the second feature of 
China’s IC industrial development. The number of IC design houses in China has 
leapt from 57 in 1999 to 421 in 2004 since the first specialising fabless was set up in 
1986; further, there was 106% annual average revenue growth during 2000 and 2004 
(CSIA June 8th 2005). Comparatively, local design houses are inferior to 
foreign/Taiwanese companies in China in respect of technology level. An industrial 
survey conducted by an electronic industry newspaper, EE Times (May 1st 2004), in 
2004 reveals the technology lag of local companies: the proportion of Taiwan-based 
firms engaging with 0.13m was double that of local design houses and nearly 30% 
of local firms focused upon the dated technologies (≥ 0.35m line-width) (Figure 
D.2). Despite China’s boast of numerous IC design start-ups, only a few hold distinct 
market niches and most of them struggle for survival by engaging with lower-end 
products, such as toys and consumer goods (Silicon Strategies May 20th 2004).   
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Figure D.2  Difference of design level between Taiwanese and local firms: 2004 
Source: Adapted from EE Times (May 1st 2004: Figure 2, Figure 6). 
Focusing upon the foreign capital, its participation in China’s design sector is 
particularly significant. Many international IDMs or design companies opened R&D 
centres in the form of design divisions or branch offices, such as Intel’s division in 
Shanghai and Freescale’s branch in Suzhou, to engage design activities by exploiting 
local human resources. The locational factors that foreign companies take into 
account have been local talent pool rather than the material conditions (such as land 
rent or labour wage). Correspondingly, local employees are able to improve their 
technological competencies and their managerial know-how to a certain degree by 
engaging in higher level projects or attending in-house training programmes. For 
example, Trident, a US-based design house specialising in digital TV-related ICs, 
announced a novel chip (USB2.0 TV Tuner Box) in 2004 developed by its local 
R&D team in Shanghai. This team, composed of local engineers and led by a local 
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director, was engaged with this project from specification definition through tape-out 
to marketing.  
 
